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Notes on Dates and Currency: 
 
At the time of the events studied here, Spain had adopted the use of the Gregorian 
calendar.  Scotland and England continued to utilize the Julian calendar, which resulted in 
dates 10 days prior to those of the Spaniards.  Dates contained in the following chapters are 
those cited by the individual document or author relevant to the event being discussed and 
have not been altered. 
 
By the mid-seventeenth century the maravedi, the unit of account serving as the base for 
Spanish currency, had the following values: 
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                                           SUMMARY  
 
 
Although previous examinations of the failed 1698-1700 Company of Scotland 
initiative to establish a colony on the Isthmus of Panama have emphasized its 
impact on the political future of Great Britain, the endeavor also intruded into a 
broader spectrum of geography, commercial enterprise and sociopolitics. 
Coinciding with Europe´s preoccupation with the Spanish succession and the 
reality of a thriving and unchecked contraband trade in goods and slaves in the 
Caribbean, Scotland´s entry into an unsettled and lucrative commercial arena 
provoked strong reaction throughout the Atlantic World.  While the Courts of 
Europe challenged their diplomatic corps with the outfall of Scotland´s blatant 
incursion into the established dominions of the Spanish King, colonial officials 
from Lima to Mexico City struggled to successfully check the establishment of 
the colony as they anticipated the armada deployed from the motherland.  
British Governors from New York to Jamaica were lured into the fray, finding 
themselves concerned over losing members of their marginally populated 
territories, a growing Scottish sense of authority, and the arrival of desperate 
survivors.  Merchants plying the coasts of the Caribbean, regardless of national 
or religious affiliation, warily observed the arrival of the Scottish fleet, 
assessed the opportunities and risks it presented, and replenished the stream of 
intelligence ricocheting across the Atlantic.  
 
Most intimately involved were the indigenous Cuna, in whose territories the 
Scots had opted to construct their fortifications.  Far from a desolate, 
unpopulated region, New Caledonia rose and fell within a matrix of native 
groups who had experienced over 200 years of European contact.  The 
divisions that they would experience as a result of the Scottish presence, along 
with the resulting campaigns of Spanish colonial officials to assure their 
subjugation and prevent further foreign incursion, would attest to the lasting 
impacts of the attempted colony and its dire affront to the sovereignty of 
Spanish America. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
CHAPTER 1       
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Although the story of the Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies has 
traditionally been examined by historians for its justifiably profound role in the evolution 
of the 1707 political union between Scotland and England, the impacts of the Darien 
expeditions, despite their ephemeral existence, also acutely manifested themselves across a 
much broader geographical, diplomatic and economic scope.  Utilizing original documents 
principally from archives in Spain, but also from collections in the United Kingdom, 
Jamaica and the United States, the following chapters present major but previously 
unacknowledged consequences of the Scottish endeavor, expanding the story beyond one 
restricted to Britain and exposing a much larger context of impacted lands and peoples and 
greater influence on the close of the seventeenth century than previously considered.  Not 
only does the trial of five Darien survivors in Sevilla come to light through the discovery 
of their expansive court record, but the legal culpability assigned by the Spanish judges to 
the Company of Scotland and its promoters such as the Duke of Hamilton raises major new 
questions about political influence and financial vulnerability.  The cross-referencing of 
naval logs from Admiral Benbow´s 1698-1700 cruise to the Caribbean with 
correspondence from the Spanish Governors he came in contact with exposes a more 
extensive undermining of the Company´s efforts by King William III than previously 
understood, documenting offers of English assistance to assure the elimination of New 
Caledonia and the presence of Royal Navy personnel in the vicinity during Spain´s 
successful military action to eliminate the Scottish presence.  Motivations driving the 
English response are broadened through new details of reactions across the Caribbean that 
impeded the Portuguese slave trade and its English and Dutch subcontractors, as well as 
conflicts between Jewish and English merchants on Jamaica vying for the lucrative 
potential trade with the Scottish colony.   
 
Frequent and thorough reports from Madrid´s Ambassador to London, now held in Spain´s 
Archivo General de Simancas, make new contributions to the understanding of 
international cooperation and collusion, verifying intelligence provided directly to the 
Spanish by Darien participant and pamphleteer Walter Herries.  The surgeon´s mutually 
beneficial agreement with English Secretary of State Vernon clarifies the motivation for 
the effective espionage that closely monitored and sought to sabotage Scottish activities.   
 
The expanded story of New Caledonia provided in the following chapters is, however, not 
restricted to a European cast.  The native Cuna of Darien not only had to strategize how to 
advantageously maneuver through the presence of the latest group of intruders and the 
inevitable Spanish offensive, but they also were left to absorb the wrath of colonial 
authority following the unfulfilled alliance for protection promised by the Scots.  Long 
after the final abandonment of Fort St. Andrew, the ruins of which stood as a stark 
reminder of foreign incursion, the indigenous population was left to cope with recurring 
initiatives to obtain their subjugation and reassert Spanish control over the region.   
 
Across the vastness of Spanish America there was a formidable reaction to the Scottish 
presence and great celebration at their eventual expulsion. Correspondence from the 
Viceroys of Peru and Mexico held in Spain´s Archivo General de Indias and a publicly 
distributed Gazeta found in the personal collection of Francis Russell Hart at the 
Massachusetts Historical Society are among newly acknowledged sources attesting to the 
importance of New Caledonia throughout the region. Nor was North America exempt from 
impacts across its colonies.  Investigation into the histories of British settlements from 
Jamaica to Jersey to Boston to New York document a diffused settlement of Darien 
survivors, creating an unintended diaspora that established itself in a variety of roles across 
the northern colonies and Caribbean. 
 
The accumulated evidence presented in the following pages supporting New Caledonia´s 
wide wake across the Atlantic World exposes new complexities of a story that coincide 
with a fundamental premise shared by Scots and Spaniards in their respective predictions 
regarding the potential of the Company of Scotland and reflect their mutual intentions for 
inclusion in evolving world economic expansion.
1
  Although the Scots´ aspirations were 
                                                 
1
 For a discussion of the larger context of economic globalization and the contemporary 
strife it created, see in William R. Thompson´s The Emergence of the Global Political 
not achieved and the Spaniards´ ultimate fears not realized, neither party had anticipated 
the project´s impact to be confined to a singular coastline, province, country, or ocean.  
Both the intruder and the established colonial claimant considered the scope of the 
endeavor to be of immense expanse and critical importance.  In printed declarations 
distributed from the barely established site of New Caledonia in December of 1698, its 
governing Council, seeking reinforcements for their fledgling settlement, stated  
 
. . . the chief Captains and Supream Leaders of the People of Darien, 
in compliance with former Agreements, having now in most kind and 
obliging manner received us into their Friendship and Country with 
promise and contract to assist and join in defense . . . against such as 
shall be their or our Enemies in any time to come: Which, besides its 
being one of the most healthful, rich, and fruitful Countries upon 
Earth, hath the advantage of being a narrow ISTHMUS, seated in the 
heighth of the World, between two vast Oceans, which renders it 
more convenient than any other for being the common Store-house of 
the insearchable and immense Treasures of the Spacious South Seas, 
the door of Commerce to China and Japan, and, the Emporium and 
Staple for the Trade of both Indies.
2
 
 
 
Spain´s reciprocal concerns, causing her to mobilize both European and American 
resources to meet the threat, paralleled those of the Scots and acknowledged the additional 
element of religious protectionism.  Responding to verification of the arrival and 
installation of the intruders on the Isthmus, the Council of the Indies, the peak of the 
hierarchy of administrative organization overseeing the Spanish King´s overseas 
                                                                                                                                                    
Economy (London 2000), especially Chapter 6 (“The emergence of a challenge process”, 
pp. 103-118) and Chapter 7 (“Mountains of Gold and Iron”, pp. 119-133). Holton cautions 
that the expanding economic exchanges initiated with European activity in the Americas 
do not necessarily mark the origins of globalization.  Robert J. Holton, Globalization and 
the Nation-State (New York 1998), pp. 24-26.  
2
 The declaration, entitled `Caledonia: The Declaration of the Council constituted by the 
Indian and African Company of Scotland, for the government and direction of their 
Colonies and Settlements in the Indies´, is included in printed form in: Anonymous, An 
Enquiry into the Causes of the Miscarriage of the Scots Colony at Darien or an Answer to 
a Libel Entituled ` A Defence of the Scots Abdicating Darien´. Submitted to the Good 
People of England  (Glasgow 1700), pp. 67-69.  The entire declaration is included in this 
work as Appendix I. 
dominions, expressed the gravity of the situation in an advisory consulta to its monarch, 
Carlos II, in May of 1699 . . . 
 
The Council represents to your majesty that with great regret and pain it 
hears not only confirmation that Scotch have obtained a foothold in 
Darien . . . that which previously was menace only is today fact, and 
shortly these dominions will begin to experience violence, robbery, 
usurpation of provinces, in course of which the Catholic religion will 
perish, which is what will most deeply grieve your majesty´s Catholic 
Heart.  And although the nations will combat each other in those 
quarters, which may serve us as diversion yet, in the long run, all falls 
upon us, since their object is to seize those rich, far-extended kingdoms, 
whose treasure fertilizes, maintains, conserves these dominions, and 
although these nations be divided among themselves, ours must decline, 
for its commerce will fall off, and we will find ourselves lacking the 
substance which supports the body of this monarchy.
3 
 
 
Clearly, neither the Company of Scotland nor the Council of the Indies regarded the 
former´s campaign to establish a trading entrepot in Darien as an inconsequential colonial 
initiative symptomatic of the essentially unrestrained and pervasive illicit trading of the 
last decade of the seventeenth century.
4
  Both of the major protagonists acknowledged 
                                                 
3
 MHS, Hart Collection, Darien Item #13.  The document is an English translation of a 
consulta from the Council of the Indies to his Majesty, dated Madrid, May 9, 1699, and 
originally found in AGI, Panamá 160.  A discussion of the men who comprised the 
prestigious Council of the Indies, and the acquisition of the decades of colonial 
administrative experience they experienced during their careers, prompted J.H. Elliott to 
describe the body as “staffed by elderly, status-conscious officials, tenacious of tradition 
and legalistically inclined, who were above all determined to enjoy in comfort the prestige 
and rich pickings of the high office which they had worked for so long to secure.”  Spain 
and Its World 1500-1700 (New Haven 1989), p. 17.  For a discussion of the role of the 
Council of the Indies during the reign of King Carlos II see Ernesto Schafer, El Consejo 
Real y Supremo de las Indias, Su historia, organización y labor administrative hasta la 
terminación de la Casa de Austria, Tomo 1, Historia y organización del Consejo y de la 
Casa de la Contratación de las Indias (Sevilla 1935), pp. 268-350.  Appendix 1 of the 
same work provides listings of the members and employees of the Council.  Ibid, pp. 351-
376. 
4
For a review of conditions in Spanish America during the relevant time period and 
particularly the phenomenon of contraband trade see Ramón María Serrera´s La Ameríca 
de Los Habsburgo (1517-1700) (Sevilla 2011), especially `El siglo del contrabando´ on 
pages 276-280.  Additional material is provided by Peter Bakewell in A History of Latin 
America-Empire and Sequels 1450-1930 (Oxford 1997) in his chapter entitled `The 
menace and opportunity, dosed with critical native alliances, defense of religious faith and 
major economic stakes.  The perceived field of competition was not limited to a small 
peninsula of land extending into the Caribbean Sea, but instead extended across the 
Isthmus to the South Sea, down that coast to Peru, and across the Pacific to China and 
Japan.  Nor was the Old World exempted from entangling itself in the conflict.  While 
Scotland experienced challenges from competing external interests, Spain received 
disavowals of complicity from King William III, fielded offers of assistance from the 
French, and solicited financial support from the Papacy, all designed to seek advantage 
against a horizon of imminent dynastic change, the threat of heresy and the desire to 
maintain and increase commercial opportunity.  Far from an insular event manifesting 
itself in the troubled relationship between Scotland and her southern neighbor, New 
Caledonia imposed itself on the history of three continents as players across the Atlantic 
World simultaneously sought advantage and stability. 
 
 
                   A DISTRACTED CONTINENT, A CHALLENGED CONTINENT                  
 
The story of the Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies, with its resulting 
disastrous losses,
5
 exemplifies the high stakes of the chaotic interplay between competing 
interests that characterized the Atlantic World of 1698-1700.  The 1690s in Scotland were 
characterized by crop failure and hunger, rising tariffs imposed on vital linen exports to 
                                                                                                                                                    
Seventeenth Century: A Slacker Grip ´, pp. 210-253.  Various manifestations of illegal 
commerce related to the establishment of New Caledonia are further addressed here, 
particularly in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
5
 Of 1200 individuals who sailed from Leith with the first expedition, 44 died on the 
voyage to Darien, 300 at the site of the colony and 400 during the middle voyage between 
Darien and Jamaica and New York.  An estimated 30 eventually returned to Scotland.  F. 
Cundall, The Darien Venture (New York 1926), p. 93.  Douglas Watt succinctly describes 
the economic loss by commenting that “The Company failed and every penny of capital 
was lost.”  D. Watt, The Price of Scotland: Darien, Union and the Wealth of Nations 
(Edinburgh 2007), p. xviii. 
England, resulting social unrest, and, following the 1697 termination of the Nine Year´s 
War, the influx of newly unemployed veterans from King William´s Scottish troops.
6
   
The greater European world had become distracted by the implications of the anticipated 
death of Spain´s childless King Carlos II and the potential for French acquisition of the 
throne in Madrid, prompting diplomatic efforts that formulated the Partition Treaties 
seeking to assign an acceptable heir and reallocate the boundaries of the Spanish Empire.
7
  
In the words of John C. Rule . . .  
 
The drafting of the Partition Treaties was one of the most remarkable 
achievements of diplomacy in the Early Modern period.  Between early 
1698 and the death of Charles II of Spain in November 1700, two of the 
most powerful princes of the period, Louis XIV and William III together 
supervised the delicate surgery, which dissected the Spanish behemoth.
8
 
 
 
The simultaneous occurrence of the Scottish presence in Darien and the eclipsing drama of 
the diplomatic “delicate surgery” being performed in Europe explains not only why the 
establishment of the colony was a dramatically unwelcome distraction, but also why the 
                                                 
6
 For a review of the situation in Scotland, and its role in the implementation of the Darien 
expeditions, see Chapter Four, `The 1690s: a nation in crisis´ in Christopher Whatley and 
Derek Patrick´s The Scots and Union (Edinburgh 2006), pp. 139-183.  Analysis is also 
provided by Michael Fry in The Union: England, Scotland and the Treaty of 1707 
(Edinburgh 2006), pp. 16-22.  The Prologue of George Pratt Insh´s The Company of 
Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies (London 1932) explores the specific 
development of the Company within the same time period. 
7
 For an explanation of the formulation of and preoccupation with the treaties through the 
correspondence of the principal protagonists, see Paul Grimblot (ed.), Letters of William III 
and Louis XIV and of Their Ministers, Illustrative of the Domestic and Foreign Politics of 
England from The Peace of Ryswick to The Accession of Philip V of Spain, 1697-1700 
(London 1848). 
8
 John C. Rule, `The Partition Treaties, 1698-1700´, in E. Mijers and D. Onnekink (eds.), 
Redefining William III, The Impact of the King-Stadholder in International Context 
(Aldershot, Hampshire 2007), pp. 91-105.  For a discussion of the role of the Partition 
Treaties in the later context of the War of the Spanish Succession, see John B. Hattendorf, 
England in the War of the Spanish Succession, A Study of the English View and Conduct of 
Grand Strategy, 1702-1712 (New York and London 1987).  Hattendorf´s contention that 
“studies for each and every participant in the war need to be completed before one can 
accurately write a true and international history of it” (Ibid, p. xvi) can equally be applied 
to the study of Darien expeditions. 
wider ramifications of the Scottish enterprise have not been fully explored by historians.  
At the October 1698 ratification of the First Partition Treaty, with its reasonable assurances 
of secure maritime commerce, the initial Company of Scotland fleet was in the Caribbean, 
sailing to the mainland of Darien after having secured a pilot on the Danish island of St. 
Thomas.
9
  In February 1699, at the unexpected death of the Bavarian Electoral Prince, 
Spain´s designated heir under the initial Partition Treaty, New Caledonia was not only 
experiencing the loss of the Dolphin below the walls of Cartagena and the capture of her 
crew and cargo, but both high-ranking French and English naval emissaries were 
attempting to ingratiate themselves to local Governors with offers of assistance against the 
Scots.  As news reached Madrid in March 1700 of the completion of the 2
nd
 Partition 
Treaty, Spanish forces were receiving the capitulation of the final expedition survivors.  In 
October of the same year, as the failing Carlos II seized the initiative and designated 
Philip, Duke of Anjou as heir “to the succession of all my Kingdoms and dominions, 
without exception of any”
10
, the quiet departure of the four Darien survivors convicted of 
piracy in Sevilla was recorded in the prison log of the Casa de la Contratación11.  As Julio 
Luis Arroyo Vozmediano recognizes in his recent study of England´s role in the Spanish 
succession, the Scottish initiative had a pronounced impact, jeopardizing William III´s ties 
with Spain and providing a convenient opportunity for Louis XIV to solicit Spanish favor 
                                                 
9 Insh, The Company, pp. 123-125. 
10 Henry Kamen, Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century 1665-1700 (New York 1980),  
p. 392.  Kamen devotes his final chapter, `Succession´ (pp. 379-394) to the preoccupation 
over an heir to the Spanish monarchy and to conditions in Spain at the long-anticipated 
death of Carlos II on 1 November 1700, describing the dismal fiscal situation facing Spain 
(“throughout the 1690s . . . the government existed in a state of what can suitably be called 
permanent bankruptcy”, Ibid, p. 387), government instability and rioting provoked by food 
shortages.  Further explanation of the country´s woeful condition as it related to declining 
income from the Americas is provided by A. García-Baquero González´s `Andalusia and 
the crisis of the Indies trade, 1610-1720´, in I.A.A. Thompson and B. Yun Casalilla (eds.), 
The Castilian crisis of the seventeenth century (Cambridge 1994), pp. 115-135. 
11
 AGI, Contratación 4887, Entrada de Presos. The trial of the men is the subject of 
Chapter 5. 
and obligation through magnanimous offers of assistance in eliminating the Scottish 
threat.
12
 
 
Conditions in the Spanish America to which the Scots sailed were no less urgent than in 
the Europe they left behind and dramatically expanded the cast to be impacted by their 
reckless attempt to establish a permanent presence on the opposite side of the Atlantic and 
potentially beyond.  The extent and complexity of Spain´s overseas dominions and their 
governance, coupled with the recent history of internal unrest and hostile foreign 
incursions addressed in the following chapters, dictated that New Caledonia would 
provoke a broad and powerful reaction.  The offense of constructing a fortified settlement 
on the Isthmus received the rapid attention of both of the King´s principal representatives 
in the New World, the Viceroy of Peru and the Viceroy of New Spain, whose territories 
covered the vast Spanish acquisitions across North and South America.   
 
The site chosen for New Caledonia lay between the principal Pacific administrative and 
ecclesiastical center of Panama, with its Atlantic access at Portobello, and the major 
Caribbean port and slave-trading center of Cartagena.  The two cities, each under the 
authority of the distant Viceroy of Peru in Lima, fell within different audiencias (see 
Figure 1), both of which had established histories of over 140 years and had suffered 
devastating raids by foreign intruders well within the memories of the victimized 
communities.
13
  Of vital consequence to the Scots, and reflecting the prominence of both 
urban centers in the maintenance of the Spanish colonial empire, both Panama and 
Cartagena were ruled by individuals simultaneously holding the title of Governor and 
Captain-General and thus exercising notable authority in matters of defense and military 
campaigns as well as civic affairs.
14
   
                                                 
12
 Julio Luis Arroyo Vozmediano,  El Gran Juego. Inglaterra y la Sucesión Española, 
unpublished PhD thesis, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (Madrid, 2012).  
The role of the Darien campaign is discussed on pages 70-90. 
13
 The impact of the foreign incursions is discussed in Chapter 6. 
14
 Lillian Fisher, Viceregal administration in the Spanish-American colonies (University of 
California 1926), p. 82.  Fisher also notes the importance of the junta de guerras, or war 
councils, which provided advice to both Viceroys and Governors in military matters.  The 
prevalent role of the juntas is documented numerous times in the pages that follow.  
  
Figure 1  Spanish-American Viceroyalties and Audiencias  16
th
 and 17
th
 Centuries   
 
Source:  J.H. Elliot, Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-
1830 (London 2006), p. 124. 
 
 
 
 Predominant across Spanish America, and particularly so for its function in providing 
intelligence and mobilizing resources in reaction to the activities of the Company of 
Scotland, was the interconnectedness of the colonial bureaucracy, a characteristic that 
ought to have given the Scots pause for thought while formulating their plans should they 
have fully comprehended what they might provoke from the shores of Darien.  In the 
words of J. H. Elliott . . . 
 
For all the flaws and defects in the system-the built-in conflicts between 
competing authorities, the numerous opportunities for procrastination, 
obstruction and graft- this creation of a `State of the Indies´ was by any 
measure a remarkable achievement, not least because it seems to have 
defied successfully the normal laws of time and space.
15
 
 
 
Nor would American attention elicited by the Scottish enterprise be limited to Spanish held 
territories.  An international conglomerate of cast members from colonies along the 
northern Atlantic seaboard and across the Caribbean, some sanctioned by monarchs and 
others operating outside any treaty or legal agreement, keenly watched, assessed and often 
participated in the Darien initiative, simultaneously wary and enticed by the entry of a new 
actor into a world of high-stakes commercial risk and opportunity.
16
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 J.H. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in the Atlantic World 
1492-1830 (New Haven 2006), p. 129.   
16 For studies of the development of colonial trade within and among the Americas see 
Christian Koot, Empire at the Periphery-British Colonists, Anglo-Dutch Trade, and the 
Development of the British Atlantic, 1621-1713 (New York 2011), Bernard Bailyn, The 
New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge 1955), Cathy Matson, 
Merchants & Empire, Trading in Colonial New York (Baltimore 1998), and Nuala 
Zahedieh, `Economy´, in D.Armitage and Michael Braddick (eds.), The British Atlantic 
World, 1500-1800 (New York 2002), pp. 51-68.  Zahedieh emphasizes the necessity of 
developing “trust networks able to provide reasonably fast and accurate information about 
business conditions, coordinate multiple far-flung transactions, and secure good behaviour 
from distant, difficult-to-monitor agents”, qualities that will repeatedly reveal their 
importance and influence in the following pages.  Ibid, p.66. 
                                        EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE 
 
 
In striving to investigate and expose broader implications of the Darien expeditions, the 
words of two particular groups of participants, compiled primarily but not exclusively from 
Spanish interrogations, provide access to new material only facilitated by desperate events.  
The distinctly unintended itineraries of deserters and prisoners are examined in Chapters 2 
and 3, respectively, revealing a multi-national cast of participants among both the Scottish 
enterprise and the Spanish-American communities and outposts where the parties came 
into contact with each other.  The fortunate circumstance of the availability of these 
thorough and well-distributed records reveals that the Scottish ships carried crew from 
Greece, Italy, Holland and even England.  There was also a uniformly recognized military 
character to the composition of the colonists, despite the Company´s declared motivation 
of peaceful trade.   
 
The records of deserters´ interrogations not only supplied intelligence and detail to Spanish 
adversaries, but also provide historians with the documentation necessary to recognize the 
degree and geographic dispersal of desertion, defining the heavy toll it took on the meager 
resources of the colony, the extent to which the Company of Scotland ignored it and the 
scattering of individuals it created.  Among these men voluntarily leaving the colony were 
two notable individuals whose influence was extended by their own later publications and 
who successfully marketed their experiences and acquired knowledge, but whose roles 
have not previously been fully defined.  Walter Herries, the surgeon who at the earliest 
opportunity left the colony and took up his pen against it, is identified by Spanish records 
to have been a spy reporting directly to the Spanish Ambassador while under the protection 
of the English Secretary of State.  Robert Allen, after spending years working among the 
Spanish-American administration, would expediently return to England and provide 
important understanding of the complex internal workings of Spain´s colonial governance.   
 
The instances of prisoners falling into Spanish hands include dramatic cases which would 
contribute not only extended and multiple declarations, but would also involve torture, 
transportation to Old Spain and formal charges of piracy.  Through the record of their own 
words and those of their Spanish captors, the accounts of the arrest of translator Benjamin 
Spencer on Cuba and the Cartagena beaching and seizure of the Dolphin, under the 
command of one of the colony´s Councilors, serve both to substantiate the extent and 
degree of alarm that the Company of Scotland created and provide specific examples of 
how that alarm penetrated Spanish America.  The captures and resulting acquisition and 
distribution of timely intelligence not only bear witness to the effectiveness of the 
comprehensive communication network that characterized both the offended Spanish 
colonial empire and the world of Caribbean and Atlantic commerce, but also illustrate the 
ways in which that intelligence would be integrated into military strategy and judicial 
process.   
 
Threats created by events surrounding the establishment of New Caledonia not only 
impacted English interests, but also those of Portugal, Holland and France.  These 
previously unacknowledged ramifications are illustrated in Chapter 4 through the 
investigation of the 1698-1700 voyage to the Caribbean of Admiral John Benbow.
17
 
Although he stringently respected the confidentiality of his oral commands from King 
William III, the compilation of the Admiral´s reports and their comparison with the logs of 
individuals under his command and Spaniards with whom he communicated clarify the 
attention he paid the Scottish endeavor and extend the depth and breadth of English 
complicity in assuring the failure of New Caledonia. Examination of the role of the 
Portuguese slave-trading asiento and its personnel, reliant upon English and Dutch 
subcontractors, expands the web of mercantile entities with vested interests in the success 
or failure of the novel colony on the Isthmus.  The seizure by the Spanish, in response to 
the activity at New Caledonia, of ships engaged in both sanctioned and illicit trade 
increased the challenges of delivering slaves and other trade goods to the Spanish colonial 
mainland, igniting a new set of tensions and deliberations both in Europe and across the 
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 Sam Willis´s The Admiral Benbow: The Life and Times of a Naval Legend (London 
2010) makes a solid contribution to the story of New Caledonia by describing his subject´s 
first sail to the Caribbean.  The inclusion by Willis of his sources from the National 
Archives at Kew and Greenwich´s National Maritime Museum was instrumental to the 
cross-referencing of English and Spanish reports of specific conversations and events vital 
to the new information presented here in Chapter 4.   
Caribbean.  These circumstances, however, also provided opportunity, strategically 
exploited by both French and English naval commands, to engage in direct dialogue with 
Spanish-American Governors and Generals in their home ports.  Discussions of offers of 
assistance regarding the Scottish insult served as convenient justification for the 
acquisition of unprecedented intelligence, the chance to indulge in illegal trade, and the 
occasion to become familiar with many of the same individuals, defenses and geography 
that would soon witness conflict during the War of the Spanish Succession. 
 
Chapter 5 returns to the group of prisoners first taken into custody in Cartagena who, 
following transportation to Havana and a reunion with the Company´s translator, found 
themselves forwarded to Old Spain and tried for piracy before the formidable judges of the 
Casa de la Contratación.  The discovery of their lengthy court record in Sevilla´s Archive 
of the Indies not only furnishes numerous details about the men themselves and activities 
at New Caledonia, but also defines what Spain considered to be the most critical elements 
of the Scottish intrusion.  Having compiled and studied documents acquired from the wide 
array of intelligence sources available to them, the judges were aghast at the pleas of their 
defendants that mariners with such experience would possess no knowledge of their 
destination prior to departure.  They expressed equal skepticism that King Carlos II´s 
sovereignty over Darien, a territory claimed by Spain since 1513
18
, had not been 
comprehended.   
 
The high stakes trade played in motivating the establishment of New Caledonia, and 
particularly who were the intended recipients of that trade, was also a significant emphasis 
of the court´s examination.  Contrary to historians´ criticism of the appropriateness of the 
Scottish cargo for Caribbean commerce, the three Casa judges declared the suitability of 
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the goods aboard the Dolphin as consummate proof of intent to illegally conduct trade with 
Spanish communities along the porous coast. 
 
In its eventual conviction of the defendants the court also illustrated its knowledge of the 
organization of the Company of Scotland who had employed the four men and one boy 
standing before them.  Not only did they sentence the elder quartet of defendants to be 
executed as pirates, but they held the Directors and financial supporters of the expeditions 
liable.  In the ensuing international diplomatic effort between London and Madrid to stay 
the death sentence, fueled by King William´s tardy recognition of volatile discontent in 
Scotland, the condemnation of Company principals by the Spanish court would linger, 
causing concern for those prominent Scots who had supported the venture but never 
glimpsed a Caribbean coastline. 
 
The previously unexamined multi-faceted impact of the Company of Scotland initiative 
across the Americas constitutes the subject of the final two chapters.  A broader 
geographical context encompassing both continents is the initial focus, illustrating the 
spectrum of Spanish colonial endeavor that found itself involved in the response to the 
founding of New Caledonia.  Both the established history of foreign intrusion and recent 
memories of devastating raids ensured that the Viceroys of both Peru and New Spain, far 
from the Darien coast in their capitols of Lima and Mexico City, would nevertheless 
become involved in the military response.  Intelligence and military support came from 
their Governors in Caracas, Havana, Panama, Cartagena and Santo Domingo.  Conversely, 
the eventual capitulation would be celebrated collectively, with fireworks and special 
masses celebrated not just in those cities intimately involved, but as far away as Lima.  
Churches across the two-continent expanse of Spanish-America would also find 
themselves impacted, becoming responsible for a donativo funding new defenses designed 
to prevent future foreign intrusions and their accompanying threat to the Catholic faith. 
 
British North America from Jamaica to New Jersey, New York and Boston would also 
become actively involved in events on the Isthmus.  It was with acute interest, fueled by a 
combination of mercantile, familial and religious concerns, that the Darien initiative was 
simultaneously observed, thwarted and supported.  The lure of the proposed new trading 
entrepot and talk of gold mines caused friction on near-by Jamaica, where an insufficient 
labor force was a chronic concern and initiatives by Jewish merchants to serve New 
Caledonia created conflict with English interests seeking their own advantage.  King 
William´s 1699 prohibition of trade, communication with and provision of sustenance to 
the Scots, followed a year later by the formal capitulation to Spanish forces, prompted a 
highly diffused and unorganized exodus of survivors throughout British America.  While 
the Governor of Jamaica witnessed a welcome influx of Darien veterans, South Carolina, 
the Jerseys, New York and Boston would all experience new and existing Scottish 
communities fortified by individuals often possessing years of military experience and now 
well-versed in conditions of the wider world of the Caribbean. 
 
The long-term impact of New Caledonia upon Darien was no less profound.  Ignorant of  
the long-established history of entangled and virulent socio-politics in the region to which 
they sailed, the Company of Scotland exacerbated a myriad of existing conflicts.  Having 
implemented the fortifications of Fort Andrew and forged alliances with factions of 
resident indigenous Cuna, the Scots literally constructed the strongest possible reminder to 
the Spanish of the vulnerability and attraction of the Darien region to outside invaders.  
Not only did the area have to endure the responding presence of Spanish armed forces and 
actual combat, but Scottish promises to defend their local allies against Spanish authority 
were abruptly negated by the March 1700 capitulation, causing both immediate reprisals 
upon the native population and the formulation of longer-term strategies to prevent future 
such occurrences.  Considering the lengthy and complex history of discord and foreign 
influence on the Isthmus, including the murders of clergy and military personnel shortly 
before the Scots´ arrival, new attempts were initiated and additional resources deployed by 
Spain to permanently resolve the problems painfully highlighted by the presence of the 
Company of Scotland.  
 
 
                        A FOUNDATION OF DARIEN HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 
Despite the quantity of new historiography introduced in the following chapters, there 
exists a formerly established collection of information that merits discussion.  Indicative of 
its critical impact on Scotland´s history, this “classic” historiography of the Company of 
Scotland has been heavily skewed in the direction of the Scottish perspective.  Considering 
the inherent limitations, however, the accumulated manuscripts, pamphlets and books 
provide an important narrative of the Scots´ initiative and a vital frame from which further 
study, including these pages, can be constructed. 
 
The following review of the established body of Darien historiography, however, 
deliberately omits one popular and consistently cited source.  John Prebble´s Darien-The 
Scottish Dream of Empire (Edinburgh 2000), regardless of its lack of footnotes, has been 
almost uniformly utilized by historians.  Although Prebble´s list of resources indicates an 
impressive extent of research, and the book´s distribution has undoubtedly fulfilled an 
important role since its original 1968 publication by exposing the story to an appreciable 
audience, its validity as a historical source is questionable.  Prebble´s inclusion of some 
material, although contributing to the literary color of his book, fails to be substantiated 
from original documents.  A notable example concerns the arrival of Cartagena´s Governor 
at the wreck of the Dolphin in a “gold and varnished coach”19.  Not only is there no 
reference to the Governor´s mode of transportation in either his own correspondence or the 
accounts of any of his prisoners, but the devastation of recent French raids on his city (see 
Chapter 6) make it doubtful he would have at the time in question possessed such a 
carriage. 
 
 
 
The Atlantic World 
 
The five ships and 1200 adventurers sailing from Scotland in July 1698 towards a 
theoretically as yet undisclosed destination carried the hopes and travails of that nation as 
cargo.  In a larger sense, what would become known as the Darien Scheme mirrored the 
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 John Prebble, Darien-The Scottish Dream of Empire (Edinburgh 2000), p. 178.  
possibilities implemented by so many other ventures since Columbus´s landfall of 1492; 
hopes of expanding lucrative commerce between the Old and New Worlds, the provision 
of a relief valve for dissident or unwanted populations, and the opportunity to obtain new 
and easily gotten riches and social status.  Each ship, whether departing Europe, Africa, 
South America or North America had its own prism of experience through which it defined 
its experience and aspirations.  Understandably, histories attempting to provide a panorama 
of this burgeoning world place the Scots´ Darien venture, if they mention it at all, in the 
larger context of whatever comparative study they seek to address.  In his highly detailed 
comparison Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830 (New 
Haven 2006), J. H. Elliott discusses the diminishing control of Habsburg Spain over her 
colonies and the concurrent growing and strategic presence of Great Britain, estimating a 
minimum 1000 London merchants plying their trade with the Americas by 1700.  The 
author identifies the pivotal role of England´s 1655 conquest of Jamaica, sanctioned by 
Spain through the Treaty of Madrid of 1670, and the resulting increased penetration of the 
Caribbean by an array of European interests.
20
  His description of the Scottish disaster at 
Darien, acknowledging only the impacts imposed on the initiating country, is succinctly 
depicted as the “high price to be paid for any attempt to establish independent Scottish 
overseas settlements in an America to which the larger European powers had already laid 
effective claim”.
21
 
 
A second perspective is offered by Germán Arciniegas in his Caribbean: Sea of the New 
World, which devotes twelve pages to New Caledonia and provides a limited Scotland vs. 
England rendition of events that transpired on the Isthmus.  The author emphasizes the 
continuing interference and suppression of the venture by the English, but fails to address 
completely the internal weaknesses of the Company of Scotland that were crucial to its 
failure.  The Scottish stereotypes (“being Scotch, the promoters of this venture kept an 
exact account in their journals” and, speaking of William Paterson, “like the good Scot he 
was-he made himself at home in the taverns”22) distract from the historical significance of 
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the events.  Arciniegas also promotes the pivotal role of Paterson in the scheme, a 
characteristic that is perpetuated through much of the Darien historiography, particularly 
the portion originally written in the Spanish language.23  Amid continuing referrals to 
Scottish drunkenness, the account does address the Spanish effort to eliminate the Scots´ 
presence, crediting the decency and charity of the Spanish command
24
, a fact more 
nuanced when considering the retribution imposed on the native Cuna for their alliances 
with the intruders studied in Chapter 7.  
 
Two studies of the distinctly British role in the Atlantic World also acknowledge the 
Darien expeditions.  Eliga Gould, in the chapter `Revolution and Counter-Revolution´ 
included in The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800, emphasizes the unintended 
consequences and synergy of the failed Scottish colony in Darien.  Its crucial role in the 
elimination of the Edinburgh parliament and the eventual passage of the 1707 Anglo-
Scottish Treaty of Union is recognized for facilitating Scotland to fully and successfully 
                                                 
23 The author goes so far as to declare in his summary timeline for 1698 that “Paterson 
occupies Darien”.  Ibid, p. 462.  George Pratt Insh points out that Edinburgh merchants 
were the founders of the enterprise and that Paterson himself never claimed to be among its 
originators.  Insh, The Company, pp. 28-29, 35.  Other Spanish-language works that 
address Panamanian history and contain accounts of the Scottish initiative that perpetuate 
Paterson´s role as founder and central authority include Book 1 of Enrique J. Arce and 
Juan B. Sosa´s unfootnoted Compendio de Historia de Panama (Panama 1934, pp. 256-
271),  pages 57 to 59 of Ernesto J. Castillero Reyes´s Historia de la Comunicación 
Interoceánica (Panama 1948), and a single page in Alfred O. Castillero Calvo´s Historia 
General de Panamá, Volumen 1, Tomo 1, Las Sociedades Originarios, El Orden Colonial 
(Panama 2004), p. 501.  An additional account, Pedro Martínez Cutillas´s Colonial 
Panama-History and Images (Barcelona 2008), p. 450, not only continues the assignment 
of the major force behind the Company to William Paterson, but presents another 
challenge for anyone studying the Darien expeditions: the use of the labels “British” (used 
by Martínez Cutillas on p. 452) or “”English” to describe the Scots, often requiring further 
investigation and/or corroboration to clarify the actual subject of the correspondence or 
narrative involved. Tellingly, the judges of the Casa de la Contratación, whose well-
prepared examinations studied in Chapter 5 concerned themselves with Company 
principals, did not even bring up Paterson´s name.  For additional debate over his specific 
influence in the enterprise, see Saxe Bannister (ed.), Writings of William Paterson, Volume 
I (London 1859), James Barbour´s A History of William Paterson and the Darien 
Company: With Illustrations and Appendices (Edinburgh 1907) and, illustrating that the 
debate has not ceased, Andrew Forrester´s The Man Who Saw the Future (New York 
2004). 
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participate in the full British empire encompassing England´s overseas colonies.
25
   In  
Making the Empire British: Scotland in the Atlantic World 1542-1707, David Armitage 
addresses the motivations behind the formation of the Company of Scotland, the prior 
experience of Scots serving in other European colonies, the contemporary hardships 
Scotland had endured, and the domestic novelty of the subscription system.  The case is 
made that, although the venture was presented as uniquely Scottish, it was essentially 
based on Dutch and Portuguese precedents.
26
  Armitage labels the eventual access to the 
British empire acquired by Scotland through the Treaty of Union as “relief from the 
frustrations of provincial marginality” . . . and the  “consolation prize” for the loss of 
sovereignty.
27
 
 
An important contribution to the bilingual historiography is the 1962 effort of G.E. 
Vaughan, the British ambassador to Panama.  Originally delivered as a lecture at the 
University of Panama and followed by written monographs in both Spanish and English, 
his Historia de la colonia Escosesa en el Darién (1698-1700) y su Importancia en los 
Anales Britanicos addresses the place of the Company of Scotland in the context of 
European affairs at the end of the seventeenth century.  Vaughan discusses the difficulties 
the initiative posed for King William III as well as the attention given to events by the 
French, writing that New Caledonia “threatened the very peace of Europe . .  (and) 
simultaneously created more more ground for conflict between William´s two kingdoms”
28
 
Although the work has had limited exposure through its publication in the  the Panamanian 
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journal Loteria it provides a significant contribution through its recognition of the context 
of contemporary politics in Europe.    
 
The Scottish World 
 
The organization and transcription of Company of Scotland documents currently housed in 
the National Library of Scotland has, understandably, created an invaluable base of Darien 
historiography. Following the discovery of much of the material in the basement of the 
Advocates Library in Edinburgh, the 1849 publication of The Darien Papers  provides a 
vital record from which the Scottish, and more specifically, the Company perspective can 
be studied.  In his introduction, editor John H. Burton unapologetically describes the 
documents he has chosen to include as “showing the unparalleled incapacity, producing 
endless blunders, of those who undertook the mighty task of establishing a new Colony for 
a people totally unacquainted with Colonial empire”.
29
 
 
Three quarters of a century later George Pratt Insh commenced the challenging task of 
preparing a comprehensive narrative history, describing events not only in Scotland and on 
the Isthmus, but also across Europe and as far as Company destinations in Africa and Asia. 
Describing his reluctance to prepare his work without consulting Spanish sources, he gives 
due credit to both Frank Cundall and Francis Russell Hart for their contributions
30
, 
contending that the material they supplied from Spain´s Archive of the Indies, while 
adding detail, did not change the substance of the historical events provided by Scottish 
and English records.31 Unfortunately, that supposition eliminates recognition of the scale 
of preparations in both Spain and Spanish America to assure the expulsion of the Scots, as 
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well as lasting impacts in the Americas.  Despite its restrictions, however, Insh does 
provide an introduction to the participation of the native Cuna, clarifying the divisions 
among them as well as the international experience they possessed.  The author also 
acknowledges the effective communication networks that existed across the region, the 
Scots having been informed by both the pilot hired to take them to the coast and their first 
Indian contacts that they had been expected for a considerable time.
32
  The collective 
history provided through Insh´s efforts, The Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and 
the Indies (London 1932) narrative and its companion source collection Papers Relating to 
the Ships and Voyages of the Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies, 1696-
1707 (Edinburgh 1924) are deservedly cited by virtually every later study. 
 
Any comprehensive review of the interpretations and impact of the Darien expeditions 
appropriately includes analysis of events and conditions within Scotland during the 
surrounding years.  The emphasis of Darien as a contributing rather than the predominant 
cause of the Treaty of Union of 1707 is presented by Christopher Whatley and Derek 
Patrick in The Scots and Union (Edinburgh 2007).  Previous inclinations toward union are 
explored, as well as the synergistic series of calamities that impacted Scotland during the 
1690s.  The combination of crop failures of that decade, diminishing trade due to the 
demise of the French market during the Nine Years´ War, tariffs blocking specific Scottish 
exports to England, and the unprecedented failure of the Company of Scotland established 
the context for the political upheavals that lay ahead.
33
  The authors compare the relative 
stability of England not only with Scotland´s inability to cope effectively with the 
succession of adversities, but also with her internal and protracted debates concerning 
religion, succession, government and her relationship with her southern neighbor.
34
 
 
Although the tragic loss of life and property that resulted from the Darien venture would 
create a potent rallying point and extensive propaganda fodder, The Scots and Union 
effectively provides an exhaustive survey of the complexities of the circumstances leading 
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to union and the convoluted path taken to its establishment.  As there was no single cause 
of the Darien disaster, there was no single cause nor connivance that precipitated the 
Treaty of Union.  The complexities that Whatley and Patrick present are echoed in the 
following chapters with a parallel exposure of the wider array of consequences created by 
Company of Scotland efforts to establish New Caledonia and the diverse array of factors 
that ensured its failure. 
 
The economic causes and consequences specific to Darien are more deeply explored in 
Douglas Watt´s The Price of Scotland: Darien, Union and the Wealth of Nations 
(Edinburgh 2007).  Like Whatley and Patrick, Watt provides a comprehensive story, 
addressing the specifics of the endeavor by interweaving the story of events on the Isthmus 
with concurrent developments in Scotland and England.  The author accurately assesses 
the lack of novelty in identifying the Isthmus as a strategic area for trade and settlement.  
Centuries of development and use of land and sea networks linking Panama and Portobello 
to the Iberian penninsula bore testimony to Spanish commitment to maintaining a presence 
in the region.
35
  Spain would not ignore an intrusion in such a strategic location, yet the 
Company of Scotland Directors, after intense and lengthy debate, made the reckless 
determination that the “position, climate, fertile soil, and the absence of European 
settlement” of Darien merited its choice as a destination and that a declining Habsburg 
empire would not be able to muster sufficient military force to threaten its development.
36
   
 
                                                 
35 Howarth dates the establishment of the 18-mile Royal Road across the Isthmus to about 
1535, describing the mule trail as “the most important thoroughfare in the Spanish 
empire”.  Howarth, The Golden Isthmus, p. 60.  The same author goes on to quantify the 
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Watt guides the reader through the innovative subscription process, the administration by 
the inexperienced, often incompetent, and sometimes corrupt Directors, the tragic events 
during settlement and abandonment of New Caledonia, and the subsequent politicization of 
the failed venture.  Characteristics of a financial mania, such as the large percentage of the 
population who became shareholders, the amount of funds raised in proportion to the 
country´s wealth, and the celebration of the enterprise from the pulpit, in poetry and song, 
and in universities all characterized the enterprise.
37
  At the actual site of the colony inept 
management exposed itself in more immediate ways.  Insufficient stores of food, and the 
shortages of fishing nets to supplement the supply, rapidly contributed to the mortality 
instigated by an array of unfamiliar tropical diseases.
38
  Watt underscores the eventual and 
profound impact on Scotland of the Darien disaster and the major role of its economic 
consequences upon that country´s future . . .  
 
. . . the company failed and every penny of capital was lost.  The Scots 
experienced the destructive force of the new financial world more 
acutely than any nation before them.  A dose of realism followed which 
encouraged the political elite to trade sovereignty and independence for 
the more prosaic prospects of security, economic growth and cash in 
hand.
39
 
 
The awkward position of King William as sovereign of both Scotland and England, and the 
extreme discomfort the Company of Scotland brought to bear on his reign and 
representatives, was an integral part of the Scottish world in the years encompassing 
Darien.  P.W.J. Riley discusses the complexities between the King´s role as English 
monarch, his responsibilities to Spain and the political complications created by his 
Scottish subjects, particularly due to the unfortunate choice of New Caledonia´s location 
within the territories of the Spanish crown.  Riley understates in King William and the 
Scottish Politicians  (Edinburgh 1979) that “William´s relations with Spain were going 
through a delicate phase owing to his involvement in arranging the succession to the 
Spanish throne, so that the activities of his Scottish subjects were a great embarrassment to 
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him.”
40
  Riley contends that English responses to undermine Scottish success “did not so 
much attempt sabotage as withhold cooperation and persuade others to do the same”
41
, a 
proposition refuted here in Chapter 4 through the introduction of new information 
verifying deliberate interference through the deployment of Admiral Benbow´s fleet to the 
Caribbean.  
 
The Spanish World 
 
Spain at the end of the seventeenth century was in no position to allow an enterprise such 
as the Company of Scotland to establish itself in such a valuable, albeit environmentally 
inhospitable, territory as the Isthmus.  No matter how distracted Habsburg Spain might be 
by questions of succession or the protection of other overseas assets, it could not afford the 
threat and affront to the strategic heart of its empire and the revenues that passed through 
it. 
 
Through both his narrative and accompanying translations of correspondence between 
various Spanish officials throughout the Caribbean and in Europe, F.R. Hart
42
 offers 
insight into the intricacies of not only the response to the Scottish presence, but also the 
Spanish imperial world at the end of the Habsburg era.  The Disaster of Darien: The Story 
of the Scots Settlement and the Causes of Its Failure 1699-1701 (Cambridge 1929) 
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42 Hart, trained as an engineer, had served as General Manager of a railroad in Colombia, 
President of the United Fruit Company and eventually as Consul of Colombia in Boston 
from 1908 to 1919.  MHS Francis Russell Hart Collection, 1573-1936: Guide to the 
Collection (Massachusetts Historical Society), p. 1, accessed 23 May 2011 at 10:40 a.m. 
via http://www.masshist.org/findingaids/doc.cfm?fa=fa0161.  In addition to Hart´s 
published material, the personal papers that comprise his collection held by the 
Massachusetts Historical Society contain many transcriptions and translations invaluable to 
a study of the Darien expeditions.  Notable among the documents are both an English 
translation and a copy of the printed version of Gazeta extraordinaria del feliz successo: 
que las Armas Españolas invieron en el desalejamiento del Escoces que se avia fortificado 
en el Playon, Costa de Portovelo, Provincia del Darien en el Reyno de Tierra firme,á II de 
Abril de este presente año 1700, an anonymously authored official account of the 
campaign against the Scots published in Lima shortly after the capitulation. 
provides as much or more information about the Spanish as it does about the Scots.  The 
actual landfall of the expedition in November 1698 did not catch Madrid unaware as 
sophisticated Spanish intelligence networks had long monitored the Scottish plans, and 
both diplomatic and military responses had been initiated.
43
  Concerns were formalized by 
the Council of the Indies in February 1699 via their dire warning that 
 
. . . if the Scots procure a footing and fortify themselves in the island, 
situated so close to the Main, inasmuch as it may be justifiably feared 
from the unreliable character and natural perversity of the Darien Indians 
that they will assist the Scots in their purpose, they can readily spread 
thence and occupy that territory . . . From this would ensure irreparable 
damage-even graver than that experienced in regions which other nations 
have occupied.
44
 
 
Some of the most dramatic record that Hart has made accessible is the translation of the 
diary of Don Juan Pimienta, newly arrived Governor of Cartagena and recipient of the 
above orders.  Pimienta wrote his entries from the flagship San Juan Bautista during 
February and March 1700, responsibly recounting the daily efforts of the campaign against 
the Scots and the sequence of events leading to their capitulation.  Interspersed with notes 
of weather and administrative duties are advisements of intelligence acquired from natives 
and Frenchmen, records of communication with other ships of the fleet, decisions of 
military strategy and the vital information received from Scottish deserters (see Chapter 2).  
The Governor´s entries become especially revealing as he includes his written exchanges 
with the Scots, who pleaded their need for a translator.   The reader can only attempt to 
imagine Pimienta´s expression and frustration as he responds “I have understood very well 
your honours´ three communications (the first in English, the second translated into Latin, 
the third in French), but I recognize the replies which your honours make to me that you 
have not understood mine”.
45
 
 
Representative of aspects of contemporary Spanish military protocol and his own method 
of command, Pimienta does not hesitate to criticize members of his own forces, addressing 
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one officer´s failure to notify him of the entry of an unidentified frigate into the bay at New 
Caledonia.  The governor records his terse reply to the delinquent subordinate, who has 
pled complete ignorance of the suspicious vessel . . . 
 
In view of this reply I went to the place and told him that if he did not 
know how to command, to withdraw to camp, that I would put in his 
stead somebody who did; that this and various complaints against him, 
from the infantry, which had reached my ears, had annoyed me 
considerably.
46
 
 
 
These events so efficiently documented by Pimienta and provided in translation by Hart 
are placed in the larger world of the reign of Carlos II of Spain by Christopher Storrs in  
`Disaster at Darien (1698-1700)?  The Persistence of Spanish Imperial Power on the Eve 
of the Demise of the Spanish Habsburgs.´  Storrs utilizes records from both Spain´s 
Archivo General de Indias in Sevilla and its Museo Naval in Madrid to illustrate the 
substantial and deliberate response to the Scottish intrusion in Darien.  Both naval and 
military preparations were implemented on both sides of the Atlantic despite the pressure 
of other demands involving ending the Nine Years´ War and defending the strategic 
Spanish North African outposts of Oran, Ceuta and Melilla.47  Storrs also credits the 
instrumental role of the refined Spanish intelligence system, repeatedly referred to in the 
following chapters, as well as the diplomatic efforts across Europe to obtain financial 
support from the Vatican to thwart any incursion by non-Catholic “pirates” on Spanish 
colonial soil.
48
  Although the Navarette expedition that was eventually launched from 
Cadiz in June 1700 was not ultimately required to eliminate the Scottish presence in 
Darien, its ten ship, 4800 man contingent speaks both to the value Spain placed on the 
Isthmus and the crown´s ability to deploy forces across the Atlantic when a substantial 
threat was perceived.
49
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 As introduced above, the extensive documents held in Spain´s Archive of the Indies are 
fundamental to Darien historiography. The sheer quantity of the correspondence, 
interrogations, reports and administrative documents held in the legajos or bundles are 
cited by Joaquin Garcia Casares as signifying the acute importance of the Scottish 
incursion to both Spain and her American dominions.
50
 Without negating the value of the 
quantity or quality of documents concerned, however, the tendency has been to confine 
research to what has become its own “classic” collection of Darien-related legajos within 
the vast holdings.  Many of the significant new sources which are introduced in the 
following chapters were discovered by searching material outside of that currently indexed 
as pertaining to Scots, Darien, New Caledonia or any of the principal individuals involved.  
Primary examples are the voluminous court record of the trial studied in Chapter 5 and the 
related register of prisoners held by the Casa de la Contratación.  It is also vital to 
acknowledge that, although the site of the colony fell within the jurisdiction of Panama, 
officials from Cartagena, within Santa Fé´s authority, actually conducted the majority of 
the direct contact with the Company of Scotland and its representatives due to their city´s 
position on the Caribbean coast.  Undoubtedly, there is extensive material still to be 
uncovered within the immense collection. 
 
The Darien World 
 
Despite the ramifications of the events that transpired, the story of New Caledonia has not 
prompted a significant body of historiography specific to the site and the surrounding 
Darien territory.  Certainly the web that was the Atlantic World makes it difficult to talk 
about any single geographic area in isolation, particularly as numerous factions continually 
jockeyed for advantage in territory and trade.  Nevertheless, some authors do specifically 
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turn their attention to events unfolding in Darien and allow us to hear the indigenous 
voices of the Cuna people, as well as those of the Spanish and a cast of both established 
and itinerant foreign inhabitants. 
 
Two contemporary narratives of New Caledonia have consistently provided source 
material for historians studying the Company of Scotland and, although colored by their 
authors´ cultural and personal biases, provide vital information of life and events in the 
colony.  The first, by Reverend Francis Borland who participated in the final expedition, 
was written decades following the actual events but was based on the author´s diaries.
51
  
The second, highly controversial, is the collection of pamphlets written by first expedition 
surgeon-turned-deserter Walter Herries.  His important role in the Company´s story, forged 
not only through his actual experience in the colony but also through his writings and 
espionage, is addressed in the following chapter.  Pertaining to his credibility as a source of 
information, ample evidence is presented that the surgeon´s testimony should be given 
more regard than the skepticism and even ridicule his writings have provoked, particularly 
due to the substantiation found in Spanish correspondence of important details and 
accusations he recorded that have often been dismissed as bias and fiction.  The highly 
controversial reception of Herries´ works at the time of their publication, fueled by his 
biting sarcasm directed at Company management and supporters, should not negate their 
value as historical sources.
52
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 Atlthough the majority of her work involves the Scottish effort to prove their legal right to 
Darien, Bridget McPhail utilizes the proliferation of resulting pamphlets to which Herries 
contributed to distill descriptions of the Cuna and their society in Through a Glass, Darkly: 
Scots and Indians Converge at Darien.  The vast majority of the accounts, which McPhail 
describes as biased, documented a people not unlike, and certainly not less prosperous, 
than many Scots.  Religious differences, if they were a concern at all, were ameliorated by 
the fact that the Scottish ministers accompanying the expedition had a distinct lack of 
success in influencing their own brethren “who seemed curiously reluctant to observe the 
Sabbath or attend sermons, and whose behavior when they did attend was considerably 
less genteel than that of their Indian counterparts”.
53
  Citing several published sources, the 
author also proposes that the Scots´ historical familiarity with their own tribal societies 
eased their interactions with their neighbors, explaining that “the Scottish nation was to a 
large extent historically based on a society of independent clans owing allegiance to none 
but their chief, and the pattern still persisted in the highlands”.
54
   
 
While McPhail does reference broader implications of New Caledonia by writing that 
“long after the would-be colony collapsed, the drama of Darien played itself out in the 
theatre of Europe”
55
 and does turn her attention to the indigenous population, she also 
perpetuates the critical false supposition that is fundamental to the opposing argument 
presented in the following chapters  
 
Caledonia left no lasting impression on the great map of the colonial 
world.  It was a temporary irritation to the Spanish empire; and it had no 
discernable effect on the local inhabitants, who were once again left  
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            in peace after the Spaniards had expelled the Scots.
56
 
 
 
Perpetuating this same misconception of the enterprise´s incidental role in the history of 
the Isthmus and the Americas, Dennis Hidalgo refers to Storrs´s work, Insh´s publications 
and original sources in Scotland and England in `To Get Rich for Our Homeland: The 
Company of Scotland and the Colonization of the Isthmus of Darien´.  Accentuating the 
novelty of how profoundly a European home country was impacted by events undertaken 
in the Americas, the article´s publication in the Colonial Latin American Historical Review 
does serve to expose the attempt at Isthmian colonization to a wider group of scholars, but, 
paradoxically, its concluding remarks that “the effects of the venture in Panama, where the 
event is remembered sketchily because of its modest consequences”
57
 run counter to the 
evidence presented here of the array of consequences both in Panama and across the 
Americas.  
 
A significant initial effort that does seek to chronicle the impact of New Caledonia on the 
Isthmus is the first chapter of a full-length study of the Scots and the Cuna intended to be 
completed by Panamanian anthropologist Reina Torres de Arauz.  Tragically, Torres de 
Arauz died before she could complete her work, which, based on observations expressed in 
its first installment, promised to analyze the Scots´ presence within the lengthy and 
complex history of Darien, uniquely emphasizing the variety of previous initiatives by the 
Spanish to subdue the Cuna and suppress the extensive experience of interaction with 
foreigners, particularly English, which they possessed.  Although the work was never 
completed, the introductory portion of the work is invaluable in providing an 
understanding of the dynamic state of affairs into which the Scots naively inserted 
themselves.
58
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 Torrez de Arauz, Reina, `Nuevo Edimburgo del Darién, Los Cunas: Anfitriones de Los 
Escoceses´, Loteria, Volumes 314-316 (May-July 1982), pp. 134-155.  Torres de Arauz 
utilized correspondence produced by the Scots in her wider work on the Cuna.  She 
 Carrying Torres de Arauz´s theme forward and further exploring the Darien vantage point, 
including a focus on the savvy adaptation of the Cuna to centuries of Spanish, French, 
English, and, suddenly, Scottish interaction, is Ignacio Gallup-Diaz´s The Door of the Seas 
and the Keys to the Universe (New York 2004). The author reconstructs the multi-faceted, 
inconsistent and volatile world into which the Scots were only the latest European arrival, 
providing the resident population with yet another opportunity to exercise their skills in 
language, trade and political acumen.  In effect, the Scots had sailed into a region recently 
rocked by political discord both within the structures of the Spanish colonial government 
and between the government and its presumed Indian subjects.  Not only did the Conde de 
Canillas, under whose jurisdiction Darien fell, have to cope with recent murders of 
Franciscan missionaries, a bloody attack on a Spanish garrison, and a troubling French 
presence, but a flotilla of Scots had now brazenly intruded, exhibiting every intent of 
constructing fortifications and establishing a permanent presence.  Governing the chaos 
from Panama City was not easy, despite the impressive intelligence networks and almost 
two centuries of Spanish administration.  Luis Carrrisoli, the mestizo whose family had 
long been the crown´s primary representatives in Darien, received a written reprimand 
from Canillas, expressing the latter´s distinct lack of appreciation for the administrative 
tactics being implemented to subdue Darien and its inhabitants, both indigenous and 
foreign.  Particularly upsetting to the royal administrator was the tendency of the Cuna to 
create unsettling alliances with whatever group of interlopers arrived on shore.
59
   
 
The continued opportunities presented by these European arrivals, and their consistent 
quests to identify assumed “chiefs” with whom to treat, created, according to Gallup-Diaz, 
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unique and innovative leadership opportunities for the native men of Darien.  If the visitors 
wished political leaders, the indigenous population would be willing to create them, to the 
advantage of both parties.  Spanish efforts to identify a hierarchical structure mimicking 
their own had initiated the phenomenon and the later arrival of French, English and 
Scottish visitors further provided “Indian men who wished to accrue social power that they 
did not formerly possess . . . an additional stage upon which to do so.”
60
   These self-
appointed Cuna leaders were the same practiced ambassadors who were neither surprised 
by the arrival of the Scots nor hesitant in establishing relations and pressing martial 
opportunities.  One unintended consequence of the Scottish arrival was the exposure of a 
wider array of artificially created Cuna leadership than the Spanish had previously 
assumed, a scenario that would continue to perplex and demand the resources of the 
Panamanian government long after the evacuation of New Caledonia.
61
 
 
Gallup-Diaz´s identification of European, and particularly Scottish, failures to recognize 
the nuances of Darien society resonate and are elaborated upon throughout the following 
pages as new and varying aspects of the story of New Caledonia are presented, revealing 
the wide wake of consequences the Company of Scotland left in its path.  Not only were 
politics on the Isthmus disturbed, but reaction was forthcoming from the courts of Europe, 
both Spanish and English America, an array of commercial interests, and a body of 
religious institutions.  The watchful eyes of the Atlantic World were focused on an 
unprecedented enterprise, simultaneously daring and tragically naïve.  
 
Paralleling this broader consideration of the Darien expeditions is an overriding lesson 
resulting from the composite of both the historiography presented above and the extensive 
resources listed in the bibliography.  Regardless of the acquisition of a substantial quantity 
of new material, research has been limited by language and geography.  Revealed is a story 
far more expansive than English and Spanish words relate.  Potential future scholarship 
investigating French, German, Dutch and Danish sources, among others, will serve only to 
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further the story of New Caledonia and define its even broader wake across the evolution 
of the seventeenth century into the eighteenth. 
 
                                    
                                     THE COMPANY OF SCOTLAND 
 
Events which the above historiography seek to explain and the following chapters seek to 
expand had their formal beginning in 1695 with the sanction by the Scottish Parliament of 
the newly created Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies.  Notably, the 
required approval of King William, absent in the Low Countries, was instead provided by 
his High Commissioner in Scotland, an action which later would be utilized by the 
monarch to claim ignorance of Scottish intent to establish their colony within Spanish 
territory.  
 
Originally intended to be guided by a combined contingent of Scottish and English 
Directors, the enterprise quickly succumbed to rival goals between London and Scotland 
based factions.  As George Insh writes 
 
While the English directors, with their gaze fixed on the trade of the East 
and with their energies directed towards breaking into the mare clausum, 
stand for a limited sectional interest, the Scottish directors, among whom 
are represented both merchants and aristocracy, stand for a wide national 
interest.  In Scotland there lay behind the movement for the founding of 
the Company the insistent though long-thwarted desire to establish a 
Scottish colony . . . and the eager, stirring, passionate longing of a 
country recently set free from the tyranny of theological controversy and 
impatient to direct its energies to that career of industry and commerce 
from which it had been so long excluded.
62
 
 
 
The chasm that developed between the competing factions provoked the Company´s 
evolution into a distinctly Scottish joint-stock effort, based in Edinburgh and funded solely 
by Scottish subscribers.  Along with the patriotic fueling of economic support came the 
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opportunity for the Scottish projecter and former director of the Bank of England William 
Paterson to finally successfully promote his long-held personal dream of Darien as a 
trading entrepot.63 
 
Preparations for the implementation of the enterprise, facing a myriad of economic and 
political obstacles, continued in earnest during 1696 and 1697, Company representatives 
being dispatched to Amsterdam and Hamburg to oversee acquisition of appropriate vessels 
while trade goods and provisions to establish a colony were consolidated in Scotland.  
Markedly absent was a serious study and debate regarding Spain´s history on the Isthmus 
and the reaction that could legitimately be expected from an initiative by any foreign entity 
to establish a permanent presence in the strategic heart of her American colonial holdings.  
As discussed in Chapter 5, Company of Scotland personnel would stand by their claims 
that they had sailed from Leith in July 1698 under sealed orders, ignorant of their final 
destination and unaware of the affront to the Spanish Empire they were about to create. 
 
The subsequent tale of New Caledonia encompasses the successive abandonments of the 
site, arrivals of relief expeditions, issuance of proclamations ordered by King William 
prohibiting support or communication with the colony, the deliberate and forceful reaction 
of Spain, and the involvement of a multitude of non-Company concerns, all of which are 
explored in the following pages.  The relative brevity of the enterprise on the Isthmus, 
lasting less than a year and a half from the anchorage off Golden Island in November 1698 
until the final capitulation to Spanish forces in March of 1700, did not, however, result in 
the immediate demise of its sponsoring Company.   
 
Despite the economic and human losses incurred in the Darien initiative, the Company of 
Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies, concurrent with efforts to obtain justification for 
their right to colonize New Caledonia investigated in Chapter 5, had continued to dispatch 
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ships to Africa and the East Indies.
64
 Meeting with their own series of questionable 
circumstances, these voyages added to the growing discord with English trading concerns 
and culminated with the seizure in the Downs of the Company´s Annandale in January 
1704 and the retribution-fueled seizure and eventual hanging of crew from the Worcester 
by Scots in the following months.
65
   
 
A semblance of resolution of the entire Darien affair would finally emerge among 
negotiations leading to 1707´s Treaty of Union.  As with so many aspects of the intended 
establishment of New Caledonia, soothing political discord would provide the basis for 
assuring the initiative´s passage.  The Scots would acquire not only their long-sought free 
trade with England and colonial markets, but the unprecedented creation of the Equivalent 
would pay back, with interest, a broad spectrum of Company of Scotland participants.  In 
return, Scotland would not only relinquish vital aspects of her sovereignty, but the 
Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies, along with dreams of a rich and 
thriving Scottish trading empire, would be dissolved.
66
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64
 The efforts of the Company of Scotland in Africa and the East Indies are addressed in 
`Book III-Africa and the Indies´of Insh, The Company, pp. 245-312. 
65
 Ibid.  Insh records the story of the Worcester on pp. 284-312 and notes the inclusion in 
the related trial of affidavits provided by two seamen who were veterans of Darien and 
later participated as crew on Company voyages to India.  Ibid, pp. 300-301. 
66
 For discussion of the Equivalent in the negotiations see Chapter 17 (`Bailout´) in Watt, 
The Price, pp. 219-242 and Whatley, The Scots, especially pp. 254-256. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
UNINTENDED ITINERARIES I 
DESERTERS, OPPORTUNISTS AND A SPY: DISSENT AND DISAPPOINTMENT 
FEED INTELLIGENCE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC 
 
 
 
These poor men who were design´d for Souldiers or Planters, finding 
themselves mistaken in their golden Hopes, and no appearance of any 
thing but felling huge Trees, and very shrimp allowance of Victuals (and 
those very bad) soon wearied of the Enterprize; and before they were a 
full month upon the place, several deserted, some by Land towards the 
Spaniard and others lurk´d in the Woods till they had an opportunity to 
transport themselves by water to Jamaica.67 
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These words, written by the surgeon Walter Herries describing the early weeks of his 
experience in New Caledonia, introduce both the causes of desertion and the impact it was 
to have on the Company of Scotland´s colonial endeavor.  Not only would the loss of 
human resources have a deleterious effect
68
, but the intelligence, acquired experience and 
material goods that the deserters took with them would all combine to assist those interests 
seeking to assure the colony´s demise.   
 
This chapter investigates the record of these participants in the Darien expeditions who 
made the critical decision to voluntarily separate themselves from the main body of 
colonists.
69
  Their stories not only clarify the vital role of desertion, acknowledged by the 
perpetrators themselves to the Spanish
70
, but also add new dimensions to our 
understanding of the Company of Scotland´s administration, participants, enemies and 
impacts. We are introduced to a decidedly more international cast of mariners and 
landsmen than generally presumed and acquire an understanding of the predominance of 
military hierarchy and personnel that comprised the expeditions.  The chronicles of 
desertion explain how the perpetrators, devoid of familial resources and familiar 
environment to provide protection or sustenance, implemented their change of 
circumstances and struggled to capitalize on limited and foreign resources to survive.  We 
often learn how they were treated as they embarked on their desperate and vague itineraries 
and how they coped with hunger, illness, failed expectations and unanticipated 
circumstances. In addition to diminishing the labor force and skills of the colony itself, 
some of the deserters effectively exploited their accumulated experience for self-promotion 
and monetary reward. The unintended and unacknowledged dispersal of these individuals 
constituted not only a significant threat to the Company of Scotland on the Isthmus, but 
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their paths through New Caledonia reached across the Caribbean into the larger 
entanglement of links and conflicts that characterized the Atlantic World at the end of the 
seventeenth century. 
 
In addition to scattered personal accounts and official reports, the extensive and methodical 
catalogue of Spanish interrogations of deserters gives voice to sectors of the population 
who were either illiterate and thus unable to provide their own record or who otherwise felt 
inclined to protect their anonymity following desertion. These interrogations, the majority 
of which are held in the Archive of the Indies in Sevilla, also provide a lens through which 
the effectiveness and intricacies of Spain´s extensive intelligence network, vital to the 
planning and execution of efforts to eradicate the Scottish presence, may be examined. 
Both administrative and military officials efficiently mobilized the needed support of 
translators, scribes and legal professionals to fully capitalize on the knowledge and 
experience of their unanticipated guests.  The resulting cast, from illiterate Irish soldiers 
serving in the Spanish military to the President of Panama, the critical and often first-hand 
information they acquired, and its distribution throughout the vast network that was the 
structure of the empire, addresses how Spain sought to protect her interests amid the 
chaotic and threatening conditions as the era of Habsburg rule reached its conclusion.  This 
synergistic relationship between those who voluntarily departed from the Company of 
Scotland and those who received them comprises a new perspective on the enterprise´s 
dramatic failure.  The collective story of the men involved establishes the significance of 
desertion in the collapse of New Caledonia and provides an extended explanation of its 
related loss of human and economic resources. 
 
 
 
                           EARLY, OFTEN, AND UNACKNOWLEDGED  
 
 
Desertion had evolved into a problem even prior to the ships sailing from Scotland71 and 
would continue essentially unabated until the eventual capitulation to the Spaniards in 
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                  Figure 2:  Route of Darien Fleet, September-November 1699 
Source:  J.S. Barbour, A History of William Paterson and the Darien Company 
(Edinburgh 1907), between pages 58-59. 
 
 
The initial case of desertion in the Americas, weeks before the ships reached their final 
destination, was that of Michael Pearson.  In his 7 October 1698 journal entry Commodore 
Robert Pennycook succinctly records that, upon the fleet´s departure from Crab Island “we 
left one Michael Pearson behind, who ran away from the Tent to the Woods”.
72
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RH4/135/1, Vol. 2. 
72
 Insh, Papers, pp. 79-80. 
his motivation or intent, Pearson´s action provides an indication of how desertion was 
initially addressed.  As noted by Scottish historian George Insh in an appendix to Papers 
Relating to the Ships and Voyages of the Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the 
Indies, 1696-1707, the acknowledgment of this and a series of impending desertions was 
deleted from the version of events submitted back to Edinburgh in the first packet of 
correspondence sent from the fledgling colony. A comparison with the official journal, 
prepared by Dr. Hugh Rose, reveals that the latter merely edited and revised the log of the 
Commodore, at the same time eliminating any reference to either Pearson´s desertion or 
any of the others that had occurred.
73
 The omissions assured initial reports of unmitigated 
success, prompting celebrations in Edinburgh and enabling decisions by the Court of 
Directors to continue preparation of successive expeditions unmarred by the realities of 
conditions challenging the settlers on the Isthmus. 
 
Desertions had, in fact, impacted New Caledonia within weeks of the November 1698 
arrival of the fleet.  On the 30
th
 of that month ten planters
74
 fled, along with arms taken 
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campechianum along the Caribbean coast was well established and could reap profits of up 
to 110 pounds per ton in England.  Peter Galvin, Patterns of Pillage, A Geography of 
Caribbean-based Piracy in Spanish America, 1536-1718 (New York 1958), pp. 89-90. 
74
 The designation of planters was the lower part of a hierarchy of men created by the 
Company of Scotland for its military participants.  The positions technically eliminated the 
need for the approval of the Privy Council for troops raised in Scotland. Herries, A 
Defence, p. 31. At the higher end of the hierarchy, Captains were assigned as Overseers, 
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One such individual was Colonel Dowdall, a veteran of the Battle of the Boyne, who was 
convinced to forego his military status after “the Darien Company offered him 
extraordinary Encouragement to command their forces: on this he dropped his 
Commission, embarked with the rest, and was at last involved in the same general 
Misfortune.”  Charles Leslie, A New History of Jamaica, From the Earliest Accounts to the 
Taking of Porto Bello by Vice-Admiral Vernon (London 1740), pp. 264-265.  The planters 
were to have been maintained by the Company for three years, after which they would 
receive 50 acres of countryside and a house in the main settlement. Herries, A Defence, p. 
19.   
from aboard the Unicorn.75  Following a Council meeting that same afternoon a search 
party was sent out in a boat.  It was successful in locating the men, who were brought back, 
put in irons and provided only bread and water.76   
 
On the morning of 16 December another group of seven planters fled and, despite both 
land and sea parties being dispatched after them and requests of assistance made to local 
indigenous captains,
77
 there is no indication of the men´s return to the colony.  The 
transportation for at least part of this group may have been provided by a unique bounty 
program initiated by Governor Beeston of Jamaica to alleviate the labor shortage on his 
island.  In a report prepared by Secretary of State Vernon, King William was informed that 
his Governor had commissioned a sloop to sail to New Caledonia during those early 
months, instructing her captain to “bring away such of the Scotch as are willing to come 
with him, and he is to have five pounds per head (from Beeston) for each man he shall 
bring”. 
78
 
 
Whether or not the enticement of the bounty was involved, at least two of the men were 
confirmed to have been transported to Jamaica by George Chine, a Scot captaining a small 
sloop under the command of Englishman Richard Long.79  Long, whose presence in the 
region slightly predated the Scots, had sailed into New Caledonia in mid-November and 
spent several days hosting and being hosted by the Company of Scotland.  Although there 
was suspicion regarding Long´s avowed mission to hunt Spanish wrecks, the general 
assessment of his capabilities by the newer arrivals was that “he appear´d a most ridiculous 
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 NAS, GD406/1/5437, Letter from Captain Richard Long to the Duke of Hamilton, 7 
March 1707. 
shallow-pated fellow, laught at and despis´d to his very face by his owne officers and 
continually drunk.”
80
 
 
The English Captain was shortly to create considerable animosity between himself and the 
Scots.  According to a 1707 letter he wrote to the Duke of Hamilton, he had sailed his own 
ship to Jamaica and ordered Chine to Old Providence.  The latter defied orders and instead 
sailed back to New Caledonia where he allowed two vitally needed carpenters to board and 
sail with him to Jamaica “for the sake of the gold which they gave him for their passage.”81 
 
                                       SURVIVAL AND OPPORTUNITY 
             
Another participant who evidence supports as among these early successful groups of 
deserters was Robert Allen who, like others, would experience the dual roles of deserter 
and prisoner, but whose uniquely acquired knowledge of Spanish America would benefit 
him in future years, particularly during the War of the Spanish Succession.
82
 In 1708 Allen 
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 NAS, GD406/1/5437, Richard Long to the Duke of Hamilton, 7 March 1707.  Long´s 
letter is particularly intriguing as it solicits financial participation from the Duke of 
Hamilton in a scheme to seek recuperation of money lost on the Darien venture by trading 
linen and woolens along the Spanish-American coast.   Long recounts the incident of the 
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connivance I should justly deserve your Grace´s and their displeasure to my utter ruine.” 
Ibid. There is no indication that Long´s petition to the Duke was successful. 
82 A Robert Allen is listed as a Captain´s Boy on the Rising Sun (NLS Adv. MS 83.7.4., f. 
105v), which did not depart from Scotland until September 1699.  A Robert Allan  appears 
as a “sailor” on the Unicorn, which did participate in the initial expedition that arrived in 
Darien in 1698 .  The latter listing is from the Index to the receipts for payment of arrears 
due to seamen on Company of Scotland ships, 1698-1711, a document compiled by the 
Group Archives of the Royal Bank of Scotland in 2010.  The latter listing is intriguing as 
the Robert Allen discussed here had permanently departed Spanish America by 1711 and 
could have taken advantage of the opportunity to recoup wages regardless of his actual 
status as a deserter.  Likewise, the individual considered here may have been among the 
planters with the first expedition or, more likely due to multiple references to his youth, 
erroneously reported the year of his departure from Darien.  Discussions of the war, which 
provide the context for the information Allen would offer, are found in John Hattendorf´s 
England in the War of the Spanish Succession, A Study of the English View and Conduct of 
authored and submitted a memorial to British Secretary of State Charles Spencer 
documenting an impressive resumé of his experience in Spanish America.  Although Allen 
does not identify himself as a deserter, he does incriminate himself when he concedes that 
he left the Scottish colony of Darien in December of 1698 for Jamaica.  From there he 
traveled widely throughout Spanish America, working for merchants on trading voyages.  
In 1701 he found himself back in Darien exploring for logwood, where he became the sole 
survivor of an Indian attack.  After living approximately eighteen months with members of 
a decidedly friendlier indigenous community he was informed of the presence of nine 
English sloops, with which he made contact.  Joining the combined force of 600 “of her 
Maty´s Subjects that had commissiones from the Governour of Jamaica”, and confirming 
his value to the project by negotiating the recruitment of sixty additional native allies, 
Allen and the combined force completed a successful raid on the town and mines of Cana.  
A second smaller attempt on Antioquia proved far more hazardous.  Finding their numbers 
reduced from 210 to 150, short on supplies, and surrounded by hostile forces, the survivors 
requested quarter and safe conduct to Cartagena.  Within days, Allen and two comrades 
narrowly escaped being executed by the Spaniards.  Over the following twelve months he 
was moved from location to location, witnessing the “Countreys of Peru for above 800 
leagues”.  Finally he found himself imprisoned in Quito, where he came to the attention of 
Don Antonio de Ron Bernardo de Quiros, fiscal of the Audiencia and Surveyor General of 
the Province of Quito.  Continuing to exhibit an uncanny ability to exploit his 
circumstances, Allen eventually spent seven years as the official´s Secretary, gaining a 
unique understanding of the internal workings of Spanish colonial administration.  As both 
men were departing from Portobello in 1707 to sail for Old Spain, where Don Antonio was 
to take a prestigious position on the Council of the Indies, their ship was taken by Admiral 
Wager.  His superior having been killed, Allen was convinced by the Admiral to return to 
Great Britain and seek employment in the expanding trade to the West Indies.  Although 
Allen, having lost all his personal effects, wrote that he was compelled to accept offers to 
go to Holland to discuss offers with their West India Company, he added that he 
                                                                                                                                                    
Grand Strategy, 1702-1712 (New York and London 1987) and Henry Kamen´s The War of 
Succession in Spain 1700-15 (Bloomington 1969). 
considered it his duty to report to the Secretary of State, and “could be found at the house 
of Mr. James Campbell Merchant”.
83
 
 
Although the accompanying analysis of Allen´s manuscript contends that the 
contemporary political climate in London was not conducive to exploiting the knowledge 
and credentials of men like the bilingual deserter, it also emphasizes that such experience 
was consistent with London´s increased military concern with Spain and her dominions.
84
    
 
Apparently not having had access to reports of early deserters from Darien or later works 
authored by Allen himself, Alsop also states the sole corroboration of Allen´s story to be 
the account of the first, successful raid on the mines.
85
  In fact, the young deserter´s saga 
and accompanying documentation did continue, taking advantage of the heightened 
interest in Spanish America during the War of the Spanish Succession through his 
preparation of a thirty-seven page pamphlet entitled An Essay on the Nature and Methods 
Of carrying on a Trade to the South-Sea.  The publication, printed in London in 1712 and 
coinciding with negotiations to end the war, schemes to acquire trade along the Pacific 
coast and the establishment of the South Sea Company, identified its author as someone 
“who resided some Years in the Kingdom of Peru” and was dedicated to “the most 
Honourable Robert Earl of Oxford, and Earl Mortimer, Lord High Treasurer of Great 
Britain”.
86
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84 Ibid, p. 198. 
85 Ibid, pp. 197-198, ft. 3.  Additional corroboration is provided by Henry Barnham, in his 
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Later in the same manuscript the author relates Allen´s successful pleas to his Spanish 
captors, telling them that he “was born in Ireland (certainly preferable to self-identifying 
himself as a Scot who had been at Darien) and was a servant to an Englishman and forced 
to come . . .” Ibid, p. 251. 
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 Allen´s pamphlet was originally printed and sold by John Baker in London.  Reflecting 
the strategies and concerns of later decades, it would be reprinted in 1762 under the title 
The Great Importance of the Havannah, set forth in An Essay on the Nature and Methods 
of carrying on a trade to the South Sea, and the Spanish West Indies and in 1763 as Essay 
on the nature and methods of carrying on a trade to the South Sea, A new trade laid open 
 Markedly absent in Allen´s pamphlet, likely seeking to avoid any doubts regarding his 
allegiance to British initiatives, is any reference to Darien, the Company of Scotland, or 
prior employment within Spain´s colonial administration.  What the author does provide is, 
in effect, a substantive primer of the workings of Spanish America, utilizing, not 
surprisingly, the Audiencia of Quito as a specific example.  He broadens his geographical 
focus with lists of products from the various regions of the Spanish empire, as well as 
identifying the major ports of each geographical unit and providing a history of Spain´s 
management of trade.  The assumed interests of his readers are specifically addressed by a 
discussion of “By what other means other European Nations, and in particular England, 
have always receiv´d some considerable Share of the Profits therof”.
87
  After describing 
various trade routes, including the transport of money remitted to Old Spain and the 
location and access to various mines of silver, gold and emeralds, the specific and lucrative 
illegal trade between the Spanish colonies and Jamaica encompassing the period of the 
Scottish establishment on the Isthmus is addressed . . . . 
 
But that which most of all favour´d this Jamaica-Trade, was the galleons 
not coming from Old Spain, as had been usual for Nine or Ten Years 
together, viz. from the taking of Carthegena by Monsieur Ponti, Anno 
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Domino 1697, until the Year 1706, for the Spaniards, during that interval 
of time, receiving few or no Supplies from Old-Spain, and at the same 
time many of them coming down with their Money and other 
commodities, under pretence of waiting for the arrival of the Galleons, 
they took their opportunities, supply´d themselves privately from our 
Vessels, and by such Means the Merchants and Factors at Jamaica, drove 
a very considerable Clandestine Trade al along the Coast from Rio de la 
Hacha to Chagre, besides some small Trade which they also carri´d on to 
Mexico, Cuba and Hispaniola, but the largest and most beneficial part of 
that Trade was carri´d on within the aforesaid Limits, on the Coast of 
Porto-Belo and Carthagena, those Places being the Ports from whence all 
the Kingdoms of Peru, Chili and New-Granada were supply´d, and 
whereof our Merchants had then a very considerable Share, to the very 
great advantage of their Mother Kingdom.
88
 
 
 
Allen continues, emphasizing the lucrative value of English merchants´ prior contracts 
with the Portuguese to supply the Asiento with slaves (see Chapter 4) and the subsequent 
loss of that business since “the intrusion of the Duke of Anjou into the Monarchy of Spain, 
and the commencement of the present War”.
89
  The potential presented by a South Sea 
trade along the coast of Chile and Peru, the author contends, has been exploited by the 
French, effectively supplanting British commerce through points of entry in Panama and 
Portobello.  Validating his advice with what he declared were actual translations of 
correspondence from Spanish officials, French sea captains and Peruvian merchants, Allen 
traces the introduction of French trade along the Pacific and explains how the provision of 
goods at lower prices on the opposite coast could still confound French gains.
90
  In closing, 
the resurrected deserter, relying on his years of acquired experience, writes of the benefits 
of assuring trade through both old Spain and Jamaica and expresses his hopes that  
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the Authority and Incouragement of Parliament, and all the Assistance 
which can be reasonably be expected from Her Majesty, and those in 
Authority under Her, to whom this Trade has appear´d of so great 
Benefit and Importance, that no Incouragements or Assurances will be 
wanting for the Accomplishment of so great and good a Design.91 
 
Hinting at more clandestine transfers of knowledge, Allen also notes that other of his 
proposals will not be made public, for they “may require Secrecy in Execution”.
92
 
 
Of vital concern regarding the impact of Darien and its deserters is that individuals such as 
the intellectually adept Allen had an opportunity to survive and thrive, marketing their 
acquired experience and skills and contributing to an unintended dispersal of Scots across 
the Atlantic World.  Not only were these individuals of value to Spain, but their extensive 
first-hand knowledge of conditions within Spanish America, and often their fluency in the 
Spanish language, provided an important product that could be bartered to competing 
governments and commercial interests. 
 
 
                               SURGEON, DESERTER, AUTHOR AND SPY 
 
December 1698 also witnessed the departure from New Caledonia of the man who would 
become the most vocal and infamous of deserters, ultimately offering himself directly to 
the Spanish Ambassador to London as a spy operating on behalf of King William III and 
the English Secretary of State. Unaware of the man´s total portfolio, Company of Scotland 
Directors would describe him to their Councilors in the colony as being of “mutinous and 
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pernicious Temper” and alert them to the fact that “He had two Paquets from Caledonia 
with your Last to us, but from whom we know not”.
93
  
 
The man referred to was Walter Herries, a Scot from Dumbarton. His service in the Royal 
Navy from 1688 to 1695 was impressive, but he had also had a physical altercation with 
his commanding officer, resulting in not only the fact that he had been run through but that 
he faced a court martial.
94
 No doubt he had been relieved to receive the offer of a position 
as surgeon when he was hired in London by the Company of Scotland in November 1696.  
He was contracted to proceed to Amsterdam or Hamburg, then on to Scotland to depart on 
a trading mission to either of the Indies “at the same time made tacitly to believe that I was 
to go to the East Indies and that the ships would sail next March at the farthest”.
95
 
Although he would eventually be labeled a deserter by the Company, Herries would 
defend himself in his own printed exposés by explaining that he “had an honourable 
Discharge and Certificate sign´d by the Caledonian Council, with the Colony´s Great Seal 
affixed to it”.
96
 Supporting his words with action, he would also take the Company of 
Scotland before the Admiralty Court at Doctors´ Commons and, like many other merchant 
mariners of his era, successfully recoup his wages.
97
 Likely provoked to some degree by 
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the deserter moniker ascribed to him, Herries would evolve into a highly vocal critic of the 
Company of Scotland. His considerable writing skills were mobilized to ridicule his former 
employer and document what he considered to be the abysmal management of the Darien 
endeavor. 
 
Leaving the site of the colony in late December 1698 in the company of two emissaries 
sent back with correspondence to Edinburgh, the surgeon had sailed first to Jamaica and 
then on to Bristol, arriving there 18 March 1699.  After promising his comrades that he 
would not write anything concerning the Company of Scotland for two months, a trust he 
says he kept, he proceeded to London.
98
  Once he turned to his writing, however, the 
virulent combination of his literary skill, biting satire, first-hand experience with the 
Company and familiarity with the principle cast of personalities became apparent.  In the 
ensuing production of competing pamphlets he claimed the lack of any man in the fleet 
who had been on the Spanish main,
99
 the understanding by seamen that they would 
proceed on a trading mission and return to Scotland following the delivery of the landsmen 
to New Caledonia,
100
 and the inadequate quantity of provisions, which he illustrated with 
the information that  
 
Men sold their shirts to the Indians for 20 or 24 plantains a piece, which 
would not serve a Man above three or four days, and our council were 
oblig´d to give strict Orders that no Man should sell his Cloaths, else I 
verily believe our Men had been naked in two months after our 
Landing.
101
  
 
 
Herries also addressed the larger controversies involving the Company of Scotland´s 
designs.  He wrote of efforts to lure men from English and French Caribbean settlements to 
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Darien
102
 and initiate lucrative contraband trade with communities along the Spanish 
Main.
103
 
 
The surgeon´s accusations did not go uncontested.  A campaign against him by the 
Company and its proponents eventually culminated in a 1 January 1701 warrant for his 
arrest, complete with a reward of 6000 pounds Scots and indemnification of “all persons 
from any hazard of slaughter, Mutilation, or other violence which they may commit . . . in 
apprehending of him”.104  The “blasphemous, scandalous and calumnious libels” that his 
writings were accused of containing resulted in a further order that the pamphlets 
themselves be burned by the hangman of the City of Edinburgh.
105
 
 
Herries´s campaign against the Company was not, however, limited to the production of 
pamphlets or legal action to recoup wages. Evidence in English documents lends credence 
to his employment as an important informant in London promoting English interests, to 
whom he was known as Walter Harris.  In the Calender of State Papers, Domestic Series, 
of the Reign of William III, covering the months from January 1699 through March 1700, 
are several references to the benefits of collaboration. As early as 2 June 1699 there is an 
entry addressing the request for a pardon, initiated by “one of the Secty´s of Scotland” so 
that he might return to the Royal Navy.
106
  The following day the Admiralty Board 
considered the request, identified as originating with Secretary of State Vernon, but 
expressed concern over its potential to “be Prejuditiall to the Discipline of the Navy”.  It 
was decided to directly request the King “to Signafy his Command”.
107
 A response was 
forthcoming the following month through the Secretary, resulting in the passage of an 
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exceptional resolution pardoning the Surgeon and halting all punitive action regarding “ye 
late Quarrell betweene him and Capt. Graydon his Commander”.
108
  
 
In return for these rewards the surgeon provided intelligence and attempted to influence 
opinion through a variety of means ranging from letters to pamphlets to active intervention 
with Company of Scotland personnel.  Results of his efforts were submitted to the English 
Secretary of State, who would in turn inform King William of relevant details. As early as 
a 13 June 1699 report to the monarch, Secretary Vernon described initiatives on Jamaica to 
promote Scottish interests, information he had received “out of the letters sent to Harris the 
surgeon”.
109
   On 7 January 1700 Herries informed Vernon of his direct intervention to 
avoid the censorship of reports by individuals returning from Darien. “Lest these 
gentlemen should have been biased by . . . agents of the Scotch company”, the surgeon 
wrote, “I took care that the material part of what they had said before several witnesses 
should be inserted in the public prints”. Herries was referring to Captain McLean, who had 
reportedly read his book and verified its truthfulness, while others interviewed regarding 
the “demise of Darien” would, for “the honor of Scotland” maintain a discreet silence. The 
surgeon added that he was departing for the country where, in addition to tending to his 
pregnant wife, “I design to answer the last scurrilous and rebellious pamphlet; I hope to the 
satisfaction of all sensible men, whether Scots or English.”
110
  
 
Indicating the importance assigned to such activity, although not mentioning Herries by 
name, correspondence dated 6 February 1700 from the attorney named Trevor
111
 to 
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 Reflecting involvement with Herries from the highest levels of government, the 
attorney involved was likely Thomas Trevor, who served as Attorney-General under 
William III.  Robert Frankle, `Trevor, Thomas, first Baron Trevor (bap. 1658, d. 1730)´, 
Secretary Vernon declared that, after a review of various documents “I cannot find any 
evidence to charge any person with being the author of the libel in relation to the Scotch 
colony at Darien . . .”112 
 
Full exposure of Herries´s activities, and the substantive threat to Scottish interests that he 
actually presented, is, however, not provided by English sources.  Although the surgeon 
may have refrained from writing about the Company for the agreed two months, Spanish 
records verify that he was far from inactive during his early weeks back in London.  
Spain´s Ambassador to London, the Marquis de Canales, describes an April 1699 visit 
from Herries, disclosing not only his acknowledged role as a spy operating with the full 
knowledge of the English Secretary of State, but also his motive of a full pardon and 
reinstatement in the Royal Navy.  Although historians have justifiably suspected collusion 
between the surgeon and Vernon, two manuscripts held in the Archivo de Simancas in 
Spain give a vivid account of how Herries provided important and timely intelligence 
directly to the Spanish.
113
   
 
In a packet of information submitted to Madrid for the “royal hands of His Majesty” and 
dated 11 May 1699, with material from the month prior, Canales recounts a gentleman 
caller, first identified as English, who had come looking for his secretary.  The visitor 
would not identify himself, saying that he had matters of the highest importance to discuss 
solely with the Ambassador.  Upon being allowed entry, the anonymous man revealed that 
he could provide all concerning the Scots in Darien, including their forces, their ships, and 
their plans for relief being prepared both in Scotland and Hamburg.  The visitor further 
explained that he understood the insult Company of Scotland actions had given Spain and 
offered his services, adding that the two men could converse without anyone else present 
as they both spoke Latin. 
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 The two documents are found in AGS, Estado 4183, and comprise reports from the 
Marquis de Canales to the King dated 27 April 1699 and 11 May 1699.  Unfortunately, the 
packet is not paginated nor in precise chronological order, but it contains solely documents 
relating to the Spanish reaction to the Company of Scotland´s activities. 
 During the initial three hours of the conversation Canales pressed his informant for his 
name and country without success.  Finally, Walter Herries identified himself and 
explained that he was a Scot who had participated in the first expedition to Darien and had 
returned during the month of January with Mister Hamilton, who had gone to Edinburgh to 
report to the Company regarding the positive state of the colony.  Herries elaborated that 
he knew the “calamities” that could occur from the enterprise for the King of Britain.  He 
offered to divulge all the secrets he knew, showing the Ambassador a letter from Secretary 
of State Vernon to verify his role and identity.  He also had come prepared with a small 
map of the Isthmus and demonstrated his authenticity by naming the vessels and Captains 
of the Scottish fleet and the Council of New Caledonia and recounting the stipulations of 
the original patents of the Company of Scotland. 
 
Herries confirmed that he knew the principal operatives in Edinburgh and also that he had 
discussed the situation at different times with Secretary Vernon, who had ordered him to 
interact with the Scots instrumental in Darien affairs, especially the Duke of Hamilton and 
one Johnson, and to deliver the resulting intelligence to him personally.  It was for the 
good of both England and Spain that the Scottish endeavor not succeed, Herries added, 
acknowledging the problems created for English merchants involved in the transportation 
of slaves
114
 and Spanish initiatives to protect the sovereignty of their lands. 
 
Following six hours of conversation the men concluded the session, Herries saying that he 
would need the Secretary of State´s permission before providing more information.  He 
would return under cover of darkness, the need for secrecy being vital to protect himself 
from the Scots. 
 
The subsequent visit did occur in the middle of the night, the Ambassador being informed 
that permission had been granted by Vernon.  The spy reported on the disgust felt by his 
own King at the action undertaken in Darien, the “deceitful” way in which it had been 
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perpetrated by the Parliament of Scotland and its potential to rupture the relationship 
between the two crowns.  The reports Herries would make, he assured the Ambassador, 
would not be frivolous and would help secure the peace between the reigns and in the 
Indies. 
 
Verification that communication did continue is provided by a subsequent report sent to 
the Spanish King from the Ambassador´s residence in July 1699 documenting “I had with 
me the Scottish spy who has been previously named.”115  The value and frequency of 
intelligence, although not indicated as received from Herries, is exemplified in a dispatch 
sent to Spain the following month.  In his 31 August correspondence, Canales refers to his 
previous report of 11 August regarding Darien, and provides the recent news that  
 
the latest letters from Edinboro in Scotland assert that on the 19th of that 
month there cleared for Darien a convoy consisting of five vessels  . . . 
which sent 300 gentlemen, young volunteers, and 1200 men and some 
women, to settle the country, 400 seamen, in addition to the ordinary 
crews of these vessels, with all sorts of subsistence, munitions, war 
material, and other things necessary to offensive warfare and expansion 
into the region which they say they have taken under their protection.  
Further, that another convoy is making ready to clear before Christmas 
for, although they say they do not need further immediate relief, the wish 
to make themselves entirely safe against all enemies
116
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continuing stream of information may indicate that Herries remained involved even 
following the expulsion of the Marquis of Canales in August of 1699.  In retaliation for the 
Ambassador´s preparation of a letter criticizing King William´s role in negotiating the 
partition of Spanish territory and the succession of the Spanish crown, Canales had been 
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interim.  Simultaneous concerns over activities on the Isthmus and the Partition Treaties 
are expressed in a consulta from Spain´s Council of State to the King in AGS, Estado 
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 Although lacking the verification of the surgeon´s active espionage, suspicion regarding 
Herries´s role in events, coupled with the virulent sarcasm of his writings, has impacted the 
credibility historians have assigned to his record.  Insh describes the “reckless assertion 
and corrosive satire of his Defence of the Scots abdicating Darien”117 and labels the work 
“a source so demonstrably untrustworthy”.
118
  Watt, while acknowledging the reliance 
historians have placed on Herries´s writings, also issues the warning that they “must be 
treated with some care given its viciously partisan nature”.119  Gallup-Diaz, however, while 
noting the controversy surrounding the surgeon´s publications, also concedes the 
indisputable fact that Herries had first-hand knowledge of the colony.
120
 
 
A review of the facts presented by Herries regarding the loss of the Dolphin, and its 
corroboration with the Spanish record discussed in the following chapter, strongly suggests 
that more credit be given the accuracy of the surgeon´s accounts.   His honest and direct 
presentation to the Spanish Ambassador, clearly admitting his motive of Royal Navy 
reinstatement, provides further evidence of his truthfulness, no matter how unpalatable.  
Herries was an unapologetic and effective literary talent who made no attempt to conceal 
his disillusionment and outright disgust.   While his qualitative assessment of individual 
personalities is certainly open to criticism, a differentiation between those opinions and the 
record he presents of events, independently confirmed by Spanish officials, constitutes a 
more historically accurate path to pursue.  The surgeon´s multiple roles as expedition 
participant, author and spy identify him as a key source who successfully maneuvered the 
entangled tentacles of international concerns alarmed at the establishment of New 
Caledonia, providing him with unique opportunities to record events from a variety of 
perspectives. 
 
 
                                    DESERTION ON VARYING FRONTS 
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 While debate and intelligence echoed across Europe, events continued to unfold at 
disparate points in the Americas.  In April 1699 the problem of desertion finally forced 
itself into official correspondence.  From New Caledonia the Councilors were compelled to 
send home a representative with dispatches  “to inform you fully of the state of affairs with 
us, and to negotiate what else might concern us at home”.  A “most villainous and 
treacherous design, that was lately carrying on, for running away with the St Andrew” had 
been the provocation.  Contributing to the Councilors´ shock was the fact that declarations 
taken from some of the conspirators revealed that the plot had been known not only to one 
of the sea captains and others weeks prior, but had not been reported to the governing body 
of the colony.  The identified perpetrators were reported to be in irons and the Council 
expressed dismay 
 
How such unnatural, and dangerous enterprises should be hatched among 
ourselves, and in such a place; and at a time, when we could reasonably 
dread of no manner of hurt, but from our professed Enemys.
121
  
 
One of the responses to the discovery of the intended plot was the passage later the same 
month of Rules and Ordinances for the Good Government of this Colony.  Although the 
punishment for attempted desertion was designated as both whipping and a week of service 
for each day of absence, the failure to report discussion of desertion was far more dire . . . 
 
No man shall, upon pain of death, hold correspondence, give advice, or 
keep intelligence with any Rebell, or enemy, as also, he who shall know 
of any such intelligence, and shall not, with all Convenient Speed 
discover the same, and, the party, or parties, therin Concerned, to the 
Council, or some one of the Councilors . . .
122 
 
In August the reaction to the affair by Company of Scotland Directors in Edinburgh was 
documented in a response sent from Greenock on the 18th.  Ignorant of the irony that the 
entire colony had been deserted, they posed the question  
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 . . . why Deserters of any kind should be allowed to pass unpunish´d 
severly is what we cannot understand, considering the charge we are at 
in transporting them and their effects, and that their transportation 
hinders so many more good men that would willingly have gone in their 
room.123 
 
On the 20
th
 of June 1699, following a decision by the Councilors, the surviving members 
of the original expedition, succumbing to dissent, sickness, hunger and the news of 
proclamations ordered by King William forbidding any assistance to them, “all dislodged, 
and left Darien”. Two of the Company´s ships, the Caledonia and the Unicorn, eventually 
sailed into New York in early August, having suffered the loss of an estimated 300 men at 
sea.
124
  The fact that the salvation presented by the resources of New York prompted a new 
wave of desertion could not have been surprising.  While the absent Royal Governor, the 
Earl of Bellomont, and his on-site Lieutenant Governor debated over the means to deal 
with the Scots given the King´s order,
125
 survivors began to drift away into the population 
of the English colony.  As the men began to realize that their Captain intended to resupply 
and return to Darien to rendezvous with relief ships from Scotland they took 
“opportunityes to be gone; so yt he sayes, it seems impossible for Capt. Drummond to 
return with his ship”.126 The problem became so acute that on September 22nd a memorial 
was presented to Lieutenant Governor Nanfan and the Council of New York requesting 
assistance.  It pled that 
 
since our arrival in this Port Severall as well Saylors as Planters have run 
away and deserted the Company´s service, and ships to which they 
belonged, by which and the great mortality which was among us, the 
ships are so disabled that scarce remains of what was in both so many as 
will be able to carry home one . . .
127
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Despite the desertions and proclamations, Drummond stealthily managed to man and 
provision a vessel and, leaving behind a frustrated and legitimately suspicious Governor of 
New York, proceeded on a return voyage to the Isthmus
128
, reaching the site of the colony 
in time to witness the arrival of the Rising Sun and her consort of three ships and 1200 
would-be colonists on 30 November 1699.  Having been denied water and provisions on 
Montserrat due to the proclamations and suffering the loss of an estimated 160 during their 
passage, the newcomers found their colony  “Deserted and gone, their huts all burned, their 
Fort most part ruined, the ground which they had cleared adjoining to the Fort all 
overgrown with shrubs and weeds”.  It was “no wonder,” wrote Francis Borland, “that our 
people were sadly discouraged upon their coming hither . . . because they were ill suited 
and furnished to begin a new plantation, and had not materials suitable to such a design . . . 
Our party were not sent forth to settle a colony, but only to be a recruit and supply to a 
colony.”
129
  A council held shortly afterwards determined to send 500 of the men to 
Jamaica in order to conserve provisions while they waited for direction from Scotland.
130
 
 
That decision, coupled with dashed expectations and the harsh realities of clearing jungle 
and rebuilding fortifications, prompted a major desertion within two weeks of the fleet´s 
arrival.  The incident is also the first for which we have both a Scottish and a Spanish 
version of events.  Borland recounts that nine men of the Rising Sun stole one of her boats 
and fled during the night.  They were not sought as their escape route could not be 
determined.131   
 
                                                                                                                                                    
optimize local resources to resupply, claiming only an intent to return to Scotland, but 
instead returning with provisions to New Caledonia.  
128
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Spain had firmly established and refined the value of gathering intelligence from deserters 
and prisoners of war
132
 and, fortunately for the historian, made extensive use of 
documented and widely distributed interrogations during efforts to eliminate the Scots 
from Darien.  The acknowledgement of the critical role of this network of intelligence is 
exemplified by the Viceroy of Peru, the Count of Monclova, in a letter to his King 
reporting receipt of news of the Scots´ return from the President of Panama, along with the 
depositions of the nine deserters and two others who opted to flee by land.
133
  The detailed 
content of the declarations, along with their resulting distribution to increasingly broader 
and more elevated ranges of Spanish officials, provided a vital channel of uniform first-
hand information with which to assess, plan and potentially alter operations.  
 
The nine men that both Borland and Monclova wrote of had headed to Portobello, where 
they arrived safely and were brought forward for interrogation by the Spanish on the 29th 
of December 1699.
134
  Juan Bauptista, Nicholas Grillo, Simon Modesto and Juan Coda 
were the four individuals interrogated and they provided evidence of the multinational 
composition of the expedition.  Two of them were English, one Italian and one Greek.  All 
of them are included on the pay list of the Rising Sun: “John Baptista” is listed as a 
yeoman, and “Nicholo Greilo”, “Simon Amodesto” and “John Codd” as sailors.135   They 
related to their inquisitors that they had departed from Scotland three months earlier in the 
fleet of four ships and described the firepower of each vessel and the state of the land 
defenses currently being rehabilitated.  Total manpower of soldiers and sailors had 
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originally been 1,150 men, reduced by approximately 150 deaths to 1,000.  They had 
understood they were coming to an established and functioning colony but had found only 
two small vessels, one English and one Scottish,136 upon their arrival.  They related to the 
Spaniards what they knew of the ships of the original expedition, that they had heard one 
had returned to Scotland and another was in Jamaica.  Their intelligence regarding 
enthusiasm in New Caledonia for a possible raid against Santa Marta no doubt raised an 
alarm but may have been somewhat countered by the revelation of a tentative plan to send 
the sick and one or two ships of men to Jamaica in order to conserve dwindling food 
supplies.  Queried as to why they had chosen to escape the men reported that they had been 
deceived and had no desire to take up arms against Spain as they were also Catholic.  As 
with other intelligence gathered from deserters and prisoners, the declarations were copied 
and sent to a network of officials across the Spanish colonies in America, eventually being 
forwarded from the President of Panama to King Carlos II in Madrid on the 11th of January 
1700.
137
 
 
Similar information was acquired from a pair of Scots who also chose to desert, utilizing a 
very different method to make their escape.  Their interrogations were conducted by the 
President of Panama on the 15th day of January 1700 and are illustrative of the 
standardization, formality, organization and thoroughness of the interrogation process.  A 
team was mobilized to witness and document the procedure, accompanied by an Irish 
soldier serving in the Barlovento fleet138 who was summoned to act as translator.  The first 
deponent was named as Juan Jadin (John Jardine?), who gave his age as twenty-five and 
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his birthplace as Monte, Scotland.  He related that he had come with the first expedition of 
five vessels and served on board Caledonia under the command of Captain Thomas 
Drummond.  Their purpose was to establish themselves in Darien and conduct trade with 
the Spanish.  Jadin gave a detailed review of the design and structure of the fortifications 
constructed by the first arrivals, as well as the placement and size of cannon and supplies 
of shotguns, grenades and ammunition.  For sustenance, he related, they had flour, meat 
and fish coming from Jamaica until the King´s prohibition of any form of support.  
Because of the lack of provisions and high mortality and illness they had left for New 
England, where they received notice of additional ships having left Scotland for New 
Caledonia.  With a crew of seventeen and a hold full of supplies, they then reembarked for 
the colony, where they arrived after a month and a half.  Two days following, the squadron 
of four ships came in carrying 1270 new colonists, including twelve Captains, infantry and 
eight women.  Questioned as to the cause and means of his escape, he simply said hunger 
had been his motive.  Emphasizing the dire lack of provisions, he said that each day he had 
been allocated only two small biscuits and a little fish.  He and his companion had not 
known how to negotiate the jungle terrain so they had given some of the local Indians linen 
to bring them to the Spanish.  They had been delivered by their guides to Campmaster don 
Luis de Carrisoli, who had relayed them forward to Panama.139  
 
The second deponent, named as thirty-four year old Guillermo Estrafan, had also originally 
sailed on Caledonia.  Although he couldn´t provide the total number on the first 
expedition, he could clearly quantify its military composition of twelve companies of 
forty-five men each.  He knew that for certain, he related, because he was a soldier in one.  
As his companion had done, he detailed the original fortifications and arms and reiterated 
their original intent to establish themselves for trade.  Combined with the high rates of 
death and disease, he related the fear that there would eventually be insufficient survivors 
to man the ships.  In response to why they had returned to Darien, he repeated Jadin´s 
information and added that a new vessel had been acquired in New England.  The squadron 
that now lay at New Caledonia included ships of 60 and 30 cannon and two merchant 
vessels.   The artillery had not yet been mounted, there was extensive damage to prior 
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construction and there was much work but little food.  He reiterated they had departed 
voluntarily, hunger being the motive, and that linen had been traded for guide services 
across the Isthmus to Real de Santa Maria, from where they had sailed to Panama.140 
 
 
                 INCREASED DESPERATION, DISCORD AND DESERTION 
 
The pair who had successfully negotiated a crossing of the Isthmus did mention the recent 
prior desertion of nine men in one of the Company´s boats,
141
 but did not refer to, and may 
not have known about, a more dire but unsuccessful plot by some of their brethren.  
Alexander Campbell had been executed on 20 December 1699 following the revelation of 
his part in plans to seize members of the Council and sail away with two of the Company´s 
ships.142  The current Council of New Caledonia showed no hesitation in reporting the 
intended mutiny to their Company administrators in Edinburgh.  In a letter dated three days 
following the hanging of Campbell the harried governing body related the uncovered plot, 
noting that “Wee have lame and partiall proofs against severall others, but not so legall as 
they should be. So we must have patience.”  They also acknowledged that rumors were rife 
among the so-called planters, exacerbated by the shortage of provisions, that there was a 
design “of saving the victuals for private advantage, and selling the men to be sent to 
Jamaica”.  The earlier desertion of the nine men, compounded by the loss of the eight-oar 
boat they took with them, was also included in their report.
143
 
 
The dire circumstances experienced a short-lived respite following the arrival on 11 
February 1700 of Captain Campbell of Fonab with a sloop of provisions.  Despite 
Campbell´s subsequent leadership during a skirmish with a Spanish patrol (described more 
fully in Chapter 7), within two weeks desparate conditions returned as New Caledonia 
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colonists witnessed the presence outside their bay of eleven Spanish vessels.
144
  This 
forecasted arrival of the Spanish, led by Governor Don Juan Pimienta of Cartagena, also 
created new opportunities to desert.  For the Spanish, these welcomed deserters would 
provide the critical and timely intelligence of conditions in New Caledonia that allowed the 
strategic management of resources that would successfully pressure the Scots toward 
capitulation.  
 
From aboard San Juan Bautista Pimienta initiated his diary of the campaign.  Within days 
of his arrival three Scots were brought to him, declaring themselves to have deserted six 
weeks prior, again due to hunger.  They were able to quantify for Pimienta a force of 500 
regulars in the Scottish settlement.  In response, a council was held and two hundred foot 
soldiers were sent ashore, along with the chief engineer, to establish an infantry camp.
145
  
Having established himself on land, obtained additional intelligence from both Indian and 
French sources and dispatched his first message to the Scots, Pimienta lamented that “Not 
a deserter has come in to this camp nor have we succeeded in taking any prisoner, although 
I have endeavoured, and much wished to do so, in order to acquire news of their strength 
and stores.”
146
   
 
The Governor did not have long to wait.  Within a day deserters began to appear with the 
strategic information Pimienta needed to effectively continue orchestrating his campaign. 
 
Now the enemy, either because they were afraid, or bored by the 
country, or wearied of their work, or vexed at the ill-treatment they 
received, were passing over to our side, among them a cadet and a 
sergeant who were at the first encounter.  Others hid from their men until 
they had the opportunity to come to us, and said that they would all come 
if they had not been frightened by their superiors who told them that the 
Spaniards would give them no quarter.  Senor Pimienta received them 
with great kindness, and sent them on board the ships with orders that 
they be treated well.
147
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The individual reports, though not always consistent, did constitute valuable information.  
A “gentleman or subordinate officer” reported only three months of stores of short rations 
in the Scottish camp, dysentery was rife, and there were only 300 veteran troops.  A 
schooner had departed a little over a week earlier for Jamaica to obtain relief.  A forward 
post had been established, implementing brass cannon covered in rawhide, to cover what 
was determined to be the only approach the Spanish could utilize.  Armed fireships were 
being prepared and attempts were underway to reconnoiter the Spanish ships at night and 
set fire to them.  To illustrate the poor quality of nourishment the Scots possessed, the 
deserter produced one of his meager biscuits.
148
 
 
More intelligence regarding the vulnerability of New Caledonia was forthcoming.  
Substantiating the later Spanish report, another deserter, when asked why there were not 
more desertions, did recount that the rumor had been circulated that the Spaniards gave no 
quarter and that rewards for their sufferings would be forthcoming from Scotland.  The 
same individual added that desertions would increase as soon as the Scots´ own guards 
would permit it.  There was also news of the Scottish command´s reaction to Spanish ships 
not actually entering the port . . .  “unless they receive relief it is hunger which will compel 
them to surrender”. 
149
   
 
An interrogation recorded by the notary of the San Juan Bautista on 25 March 1700 
substantiated the acute lack of food and provided critical intelligence on the status of 
defensive strategies.  The deponent was twenty-two year old John Fraser of Aberdeen.  The 
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Scots had enough supplies, he calculated, for six to seven months at only a half-pound of 
flour and a quarter pound of salt meat per day, plus any small quantities of fish they could 
catch and some fruit provided by the Indians.  The artillery had not been landed, but a 
scheme had been formulated where the guns were mounted on one side of a ship, facing 
towards the port.  The intent to use fireships was being successfully thwarted by the armed 
launches of the Spanish that patrolled the harbor mouth each night.
150
 
 
Assisted by such precise and timely intelligence, and further motivated by concerns over 
the status of his own forces´ declining health and provisions, Pimienta was able to bring 
the engagement to a rapid conclusion.  The final Articles of Capitulation were signed on 31 
March 1700.   
 
Having no knowledge of events since the prior December, recognition of the vital and 
continuing role of desertion finally received it due in Edinburgh.   On 3 June 1700 a 
proclamation was issued by the Council-General of the Company of Scotland Trading to 
Africa and the Indies prohibiting 
 
Any Person or Persons of what Degree or quality soever inhabiting the 
said Settlement of Caledonia not only to protest against but also to 
disobey and oppose any Such Resolution and that it shall be Death, 
either publickly or privately to move deliberate or reason upon any 
Desertion or Surrender of the said Settlement of Caledonia . . .
151
  
 
 
The eventual acknowledgement of the severity of desertion came far too late to prevent the 
critical loss of men and resources upon which the fledgling colony was reliant.  The 
extreme circumstances which provoked men to leave the settlement not only reflected fatal 
and unrelenting flaws in the management of New Caledonia, but also created a valuable 
flow of pragmatic information efficiently received, distributed and incorporated across 
Spanish America to expedite expulsion of the Scottish intruders.  The critical role of the 
deserters would be further acknowledged by its incorporation into the Gazeta 
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extraordinaria, publicly printed and distributed in Lima following the capitulation (See 
Chapter 6). 
 
Providing his own on-site assessment of desertion and its causes, one of the Scottish 
ministers, writing from on board the Rising Sun in Caledonia Bay on Christmas Day 1699, 
lay the responsibility for desertion with the Company Directors.  His letter, which 
eventually reached the English Secretary of State, declared that  
 
For it hath been our directors error first and last to send and entrust with 
their ships and concerns too many men who have no principle either of 
conscience or honour . . . too many knaves, too many fools, too many 
Lairds and lairds bairns that think it below them to work and finding 
themselves disappointed of their big Phantastick hopes of getting 
goupens of gold for the uptaking and never thinking of the necessities 
working and sweating for it.  Felling trees, cutting down many groves, 
digging in the bowels of the earth, which now they find they must be put 
to with thrift and hunger.  This makes many rue their voyage and long to 
be at home again . . .
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CHAPTER 3 
UNINTENDED ITINERARIES II: PRISONERS 
 
Although desperate and often just as hungry, ill and exhausted as deserters, the prisoners 
examined in this chapter, by their very definition, found themselves in very different 
circumstances.  They had made no deliberate decision to depart from their comrades and 
often had no or minimal time to plan a strategy or consolidate any form of provisions.  Nor 
could they choose their companions, a factor that could and did create the danger of 
exposing plans and identities jeopardizing both welfare and lives.   
 
The vulnerability of the prisoners did not diminish their role in the conflicts that 
reverberated across the Atlantic.  Some of those captured would find themselves 
transported back to Old Spain and the focus of the highest level of international diplomacy.  
Others would find their acquired intelligence valuable closer to home and still others 
would lose their lives for establishing alliances with New Caledonia.  Although the 
majority of captives were members of the Company of Scotland expeditions, they were by 
no means all Scots, and clearly demonstrate the multinational face of participants, both 
intentional and otherwise.  Fueled by the mutual goals of intelligence gathering and 
reprisal, and often caused by blatantly coincidental circumstances, prisoners were taken by 
not only the Spanish, but also by representatives of the colony.  The exposure of 
conflicting records surrounding instances of capture and imprisonment also furthers the 
argument of how censorship and bias affected the understanding and deliberation of 
management of the Company of Scotland and propelled its initiatives toward wholly 
unintended consequences from the Courts of Europe to the Isthmus of Darien. 
 
 
 
 
 
         CAPTAIN ROBERT PINCARTON AND THE CREW OF THE DOLPHIN 
 
The first prisoners came to the Spanish without warning by literally grounding themselves 
on the beach adjacent to the city of Cartagena on a Sunday afternoon in February 1699.  
The crew of thirty men and one boy provided not only a wealth of intelligence, but also a 
most welcome and strategic category of prisoner in the person of Captain and Councilor of 
New Caledonia Robert Pincarton.  The dramatic beaching of the Dolphin immediately 
outside the walls of Cartagena has largely been ignored by historians,
153
 but it is evident 
that the resulting rewards of material goods and information suddenly available to the 
Spanish were substantial.  The intended trading mission had been vehemently but 
unsuccessfully opposed by Councilor William Paterson on the basis that sending two 
highly valued and experienced sea captains with a crew of over two dozen seamen on a 
single mission in a vessel marginally able to handle current windward conditions would be 
reckless.  In addition, sailing with the vessel would be a substantial portion of commercial 
assets, the loss of which would be a critical economic blow.
154
  His warnings would be 
prophetic. 
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 Governor of Cartagena don Diego de los Rios y Quesada wrote of his good fortune to his 
superiors, relating that, between three and four p.m. on that Sunday he had immediately 
responded to signals from the Santo Domingo guard-posts, where a ship had run up onto 
the beach. Although the vessel flew an English flag and her command presented 
themselves as English, papers thrown overboard from the vessel were recovered and, 
among them, was discovered correspondence from the Councilors of New Caledonia to 
their parent company in Scotland.155  There was also the intelligence acquired from the 
French naval officer who was a passenger and from an Italian serving among the crew. 
Particularly notable was the capture of Captain Robert Pincarton, not only one of the 
Councilors of the colony at Darien, but Captain of the Unicorn, one of its principal vessels.  
With the information acquired from documents and interrogations, the Governor was able 
to write the General of the Barlovento fleet that the Scots had only 700 to 900 men and 
only three war ships of poor construction due to their original design as merchant vessels.  
The colony was suffering from a lack of supplies and was full of fear of an attack.  Copies 
of the report were also sent to Spain, both to the King and to the Council of the Indies, 
being carried by one of the ships of the asiento.156   
 
The beached vessel was the Dolphin, which had sailed from New Caledonia only days 
prior.  Although her real mission was subject to debate, her cargo could be readily 
inventoried and, of extreme interest, her command was of the highest rank.  The ship 
carried such trade goods as shoes and wool to be traded for provisions.  An examination of 
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the three records of the capture of the Dolphin and the subsequent imprisonment and 
interrogation of her crew exposes not only additional non-Scots among the sailors, but also 
unacknowledged goals of the Company to engage in contraband trade, continuing 
censorship of official reports to Edinburgh Directors, and the accuracy of Walter Herries´s 
writings.  The odyssey of the principle protagonists would prompt action from both 
London and Madrid and require a demonstration of highly skilled and complex 
international diplomacy to reach resolution.
157
 
 
Captain Pincarton and pilot James Graham would both eventually prepare depositions for 
their employer upon their return to Scotland in early 1701, following their transportation to 
and trial and conviction of piracy in Old Spain. Editor J. H. Burton, in a footnote to the 
published versions of the men´s accounts, notes that both appear to be in Pincarton´s 
handwriting and the style and substance of the content is remarkably uniform.  There are 
numerous identical phrases in both reports, an opinion verified by review of the original 
documents.
158
  Pincarton writes that a collision with a rock, so severe that baling and 
pumping were ineffective, required the run onto shore.  The subsequent arrival of the 
Governor and his officers resulted in a canoe being dispatched for the men, who were 
ordered ashore.  The initial plea for assistance to retrieve the goods from the Dolphin 
received a positive response, but a brief consultation among the Spanish was followed by a 
rapid change of attitude.  The crew was suddenly put under strong guard and marched to 
town, where they were imprisoned.  Pincarton himself suffered a broken rib and was put 
into solitary confinement and irons.  Following his interrogation a few days later he was 
taken to the “upper prison”, where he was held for three months.  In response to his pleas 
for food and clothing, he was instructed to petition “as a favor” for the liquidation of some 
of the cargo in order to provide for him and his men.  By that time some of the crew had 
died and he himself was “in a starving condition”.  His forthcoming petition was approved, 
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following which allocations were made for daily meals and cloth retrieved from the stores 
for clothing for both himself and Captain John Malloch.  Pincarton witnessed the cargo and 
fittings of the Company´s ship being carried away and would notice some of her guns 
remounted on his later transport to Havana.  While Captains Pincarton and Malloch were 
kept in a “house of office for the guards” where they cleaned a place to sleep every night, 
the remainder of the crew was sent out daily to work on the massive city walls and clean 
streets, during which time they had to beg passers-by for charity.  Upon receiving the 
intelligence that New Caledonia had been deserted, Pincarton petitioned the Governor for 
the group´s release, but was denied with the explanation that he would be sent to Old 
Spain. 
 
Graham´s almost identical account does add that he was searched for papers and had his 
money confiscated.  He also witnessed his personal effects, including books, instruments 
and clothes, carried away, being able to retain only “one cap, one wescoat, one pair of 
drawers, one shift, one pair of shoes.” 
 
Neither man elaborates on their interrogations in Cartagena, which constitute the second 
version of events.  Initiated the morning following the beaching of the Dolphin the 
Spaniards, having mobilized an efficient and experienced team, including an Irishman to 
serve as translator, began by considering the seized documents.  In addition to the retrieved 
Company of Scotland papers, a French lieutenant, seeking to return to his native country 
after being shipwrecked near New Caledonia, had judiciously prepared a written statement 
and expeditiously submitted it to Spanish authorities.159  Both sets of material had been 
translated and studied for the morning´s proceedings. 
 
John Malloch, Captain of the Dolphin, was first to be interrogated and maintained that he 
was Diego Tamayson (Jameson?), English and a thirty-eight year old Protestant from 
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London.  He was cautioned by his captors to tell the truth or he would be manacled and 
held in solitary confinement.  He continued to maintain his English identity despite 
continued warnings and the information that the orders from New Caledonia concerning 
intentions to dispose of the cargo along the coast of Caracas were in his interrogators´ 
hands. Still maintaining he only had sailed from Jamaica, he explained he knew little of the 
situation in New Caledonia as he had been there only a short time to seek shelter from the 
winds.  Asked about the whereabouts of Vice-Admiral Benbow, Malloch responded that he 
had heard in Jamaica that his squadron was in the area, but he had not seen the Vice-
Admiral.
160
  The Captain related that, also in Jamaica, he had heard that the Scots had the 
permission of their King to settle in lands not claimed by any European monarch.  He 
explained that he had been in New Caledonia only to trade salted meat and wine that he 
had brought from Madeira, assuring his questioners he had not brought arms to the 
colonists.  When asked if the Governor of Jamaica had sent assistance to the Scots, and 
what was said in Jamaica concerning the colony, Malloch related differing opinions and 
that most of the correspondence with the Scots had been with merchants.
161
 
 
Having completed what must have been a frustrating interrogation with Jameson/Malloch, 
the next deponent was Captain Robert Pincarton, who initially identified himself as Diego 
Robesson (Robertson?), an Englishman from London.  Presented with the evidence to the 
contrary and the sanctity of his oath, the Councilor of New Caledonia dropped his false 
identity, admitting he was the said Pincarton and a Scot from Prestonpons.  He continued, 
providing a wealth of information regarding the arms and personnel aboard each of the 
Scottish ships.  He added that he was not fully aware of the land force numbers, but that 
there were approximately 2000 individuals, including eight or nine women, who had 
embarked from Scotland.  So far there had been few deaths and general good health.  A 
detailed explanation of fortifications, including the construction of forty-five platforms for 
artillery, was described, as were the navigational challenges and capacity of the port itself.  
Five relief ships from Scotland were anticipated, but none of them belonged to the English 
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King.  Pincarton was also asked about what he knew of Benbow´s activities, to which he 
responded that he knew of him, but was unaware of his whereabouts and that he had not 
been at New Caledonia.  He further explained that a Company messenger had been sent 
back to Scotland via Jamaica with pleas for supplies.  The trade goods on the Dolphin such 
as shoes, slippers, wool, and linen were to be traded for sugar and tobacco in Barbados, 
which were then to be transported to Scotland.  With the exception of one Italian and one 
man from Holland, the thirty-man crew was from Scotland.  Help had not been solicited 
from Jamaica and there had been no communication with that island´s Governor.  
Questioned regarding the Indians, Pincarton related that they had established friendly 
relations, especially with certain of their Captains, but that the colonists maintained they 
did not wish to trade arms or make war with the Spanish, but wished peace with all parties.  
He assured his interrogators that the Company of Scotland had no intention of expanding 
into other parts of the region and explained that the governance of the colony was not 
hierarchical, but rotated weekly among the seven Councilors.  Completing the customary 
signing and swearing to the truthfulness of his declaration, Pincarton gave his age as forty-
three years.
162
 
 
Next to be interrogated was the Italian, Juan Bautista Acame.  He declared himself to be a 
seaman who had originally sailed from Scotland on the Unicorn under Captain Pincarton.  
The mariner reiterated accounts of arms, mortality, food supply and defensive meaures, 
noting that the latter were hampered by the lack of appropriate construction materials.  
There had been searches for gold, but they had none in their possession.  The French 
lieutenant that accompanied the Dolphin had been at the colony about a month and a half 
and was wishing to return to France after his ship had been lost.  Acame gave his age as 
twenty-seven, but did not know how to sign his declaration.
163
 
 
With the assistance of a French translator, the contents of the paper provided by the 
Lieutenant were then introduced into the record.  The author, who gave his name as 
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Durinan, recounted his service under Captain Duvivier Thomas.  At the behest of the King 
of France, they had been hunting pirates to assist the security of Spanish dominions until 
they had lost their ship in Caledonia Bay.  Identifying himself as Catholic, twenty-five 
years old and an official of the marine guard of Rochefort, he provided a detailed 
description of what he had learned of the housing, defense and governance of the Scottish 
colony, as well as the presence there of a Dutch vessel.  He clarified that the Indians of the 
area had assured the Scots that they had never been conquered by the Spanish and that they 
had given permission for the colonists to establish themselves.164 
 
The seaman from Holland, for whom yet another translator was utilized, received 
particular attention from the interrogators.  He identified himself as Esteban de Berga from 
Breda and of the reformed Calvinist faith.  During his first session he denied having been 
at New Caledonia, with the result that he was manacled and placed in solitary 
confinement.
165
  After substitution of a German resident of Cartagena to serve as translator 
he was brought back before the inquisitors and explained that his city was under Swedish 
jurisdiction.  He had sailed with the Company of Scotland´s original fleet in the Unicorn 
and transmitted what he knew of ships, men and arms at New Caledonia.
166
 
 
As the interrogations continued on into the week, twenty-three year old pilot James 
Graham was questioned, declaring that they had been sailing to Barbados to trade for rum, 
sugar and tobacco to carry to Scotland.   In response to the Spanish inquiry into the 
mission of the Dutch ship at New Caledonia, he replied that it needed to be watered and 
careened.  He elaborated that his role as pilot limited his knowledge of land activities to 
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acquiring water and wood.
167
   Thomas “Bachah”, a twenty-seven year old Scottish seaman 
related that he had not known their destination when he left Scotland, but was concerned 
solely with his salary for his service on the Unicorn.  He also admitted that Captain 
Pincarton had given the order as they ran aground at Cartagena that they should all deny 
having come from New Caledonia and maintain they were from Jamaica bound for 
Barbados.
168
  The twenty-nine year old surgeon Andrew Livingston, who would escape his 
imprisonment and eventually return to New Caledonia, was asked for information similar 
to that demanded of his shipmates, but emphasized that he could not be precise about 
current details as they had sailed fifteen days prior.
169
 
 
The re-interrogation of Captain “Diego Tamayson/Jameson” resulted in the admission of 
his actual identity as the Scot John Malloch and that he had sailed from New Caledonia.  
After giving intelligence regarding the defensive capacity of the colony, he reiterated 
Pincarton´s order to present themselves as bound for Barbados and further confirmed the 
latter´s elevated status within New Caledonia.
170
  
 
The consolidated information acquired from the ten documented interrogations was of 
extreme value for its quality, quantity and timeliness. The Governor of Cartagena de 
Indias, with minimal effort and expense, had been able to capitalize on his enemy´s 
misfortune to compile both a complete and current portfolio of the situation at Darien and 
beyond and forward it to his superiors and compatriots.  No doubt he would have been 
surprised to see additional details of events exposed by the pen of a source in England.  In 
turn, the censored Walter Herries would have appreciated the vindication of his own work 
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that Spanish documents provide. In his 1701 pamphlet An Enquiry into The Caledonian 
Project, With A Defence Of England´s Procedure (In point of Equity) in Relation 
thereunto-In a Friendly Letter from London, to a Member of the Scots African and Indian 
Company in Edinburgh, to guard against Passion, the surgeon-spy turned author gives yet 
a third version of events in Cartagena.  Based on claimed conversations with Pincarton, 
Captain John Malloch and Surgeon Livingston held in London shortly after their return and 
only three months prior to publication, Herries writes that the actual mission of the 
Dolphin was to trade with ports along the Spanish Main near Riohacha and Santa Marta.  
The ship was then to seek Barbados or other English or French possessions where, under 
the pretense of needing water and wood, they were not only to conduct Company business 
but also to distribute their own declarations.  Discovering heavy leakage in the ship, 
however, they turned back toward the colony.  As they passed off shore of Cartagena they 
noticed another vessel and collided with a rock as they were attempting to approach close 
enough to communicate.  The sole option for survival being a run ashore, the entire group, 
recognizing the danger they faced should they be revealed as Scots from New Caledonia, 
agreed to pass themselves as Englishmen from Jamaica heading towards Barbados.  
Acknowledging the Spanish well knew the identity of their Councilors and Captains,
171
 
Pincarton and Malloch were to use the pseudonyms of James Jamison and John Robertson, 
respectively.  The incriminating declarations
172
 were thrown overboard, while Pincarton´s 
clerk John Neilson
173
 (“either designedly or negligently”) kept a packet of letters to 
Edinburgh in his pocket. A Frenchman on board, after swearing to not betray the origin of 
the crew, was allowed to accompany the men ashore.  As the English flag was flown from 
the Dolphin the immediate reception as they beached the ship was welcoming, but “upon 
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suspicion (or some discovery of the French Lieutenant),” Captains Pincarton and Malloch 
were each placed in solitary confinement.  Interrogations began the following day, with 
Malloch maintaining his identity as James Jamison, even when faced with contrary 
evidence.  The incriminating documents, besides proclaiming the men´s actual origin, 
included their intention to trade in Spanish-held dominions along the coast.  Refusing to 
concede his contrived name or origin, Malloch was taken away and “loaded with iron”.  
Pincarton was then sent for and initially declared himself as John Robertson.  Warned 
about the condition of his soul and informed about the letter submitted by their French 
passenger, he confessed his true identity and answered thoroughly questions regarding 
circumstances at New Caledonia.  He was then “kindly treated”, as opposed to Malloch, 
who was “used like a dog”.  Upon completion of his interrogation Pincarton sent for 
Livingston, directing him to notify the remainder of the men that the Spanish knew their 
identities and that they need not maintain any pretense of being Englishmen.  Based on full 
recognition of who the men were, their attempted false identities and colors, and the intent 
to blatently violate the Treaty of 1670 by trading directly with subjects of Spain
174
, both 
the ship and her cargo were confiscated.
175
 
 
The striking corroboration between original Spanish documents and Herries´s publication 
provides vital credence to their versions of events, particularly when it is considered that 
the material was produced within a relatively short time frame on two continents in two 
different languages by two men who had never met.  Herries also would have been well 
acquainted with the Scots involved, having served with them on the voyage to Darien and 
having sailed from the colony on a Jamaican sloop only weeks prior to the ill-fated 
departure of the Dolphin.176 
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The entire story of this first group of prisoners
177
 not only substantiates the credibility of 
Herries as a source and the inclusion of non-Scottish participants, but, of greater 
importance, it acknowledges the goal of the Company of Scotland to establish illicit trade 
along the Spanish main.  Such a pretense underscores the complications the entire 
enterprise created for Scotland´s King, the competition it presented to English, Portuguese, 
French and Dutch interests, and its flagrant violation of Spain´s territorial claims and 
international treaties.  The level of concern from London is evidenced in the effective and 
remarkably timely reports submitted to King William by his Secretary of State.  As early 
as June 1699 notification of the capture of the Dolphin, relayed from Admiral Benbow in 
the Caribbean, was submitted by Secretary Vernon to the King.
178
 
 
 
             PRISONERS OF THE INTRUDERS:  ESCORTED AND RELEASED 
 
While the drama unfolded in Cartagena, the Scots in turn took their first prisoners.  
Following a skirmish with the Spanish, Barbour makes the extravagant claim that over 100 
prisoners were taken, including the supposed Chief Commander, Don Domingo de la 
Rada.179  The Spaniard would find himself a negotiating tool, but first he was interrogated 
on board the St. Andrew 10 February 1699.  He repeatedly refers to the Scots as “English” 
and relates his orders to command a patrol of 230 men to Tubacanti.  From that position a 
scouting party of twenty-five men had been sent forward to try to obtain prisoners.  The 
Indian Captain Pedro had promised his men could obtain ten or twenty “English”
180
, but, 
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after being informed the Spanish did not have sufficient gold with them to pay for the 
services, negotiations broke down.  The following morning, expecting to speak again with 
Pedro, the Spaniards were instead surprised by the force from New Caledonia.  De la Rada 
found himself cut off from escape by the Indians and expediently surrendered himself.
181
 
 
An attempt was made to capitalize on de la Rada´s capture by preparing a letter for the 
President of Panama, assuring him of the Scots´ peaceful intentions and offering to initiate 
diplomatic efforts.182  The message was first relayed to the Governor of Santa Maria, 
notifying him that they also had the Spaniard in their possession, whom they would 
“continue to treat with all kindness and civility until we have advice from you how to 
dispose of him”.
183
 Campmaster Luis Carrisoli produced a rapid and polite reply, writing 
that he had forwarded the Scots´correspondence and would wait for a direction from his 
own superior prior to making any judgments.  As for de la Rada´s future, he replied “I 
thank you for the offer, and leave it to your selves to dispose of him as you shall please.”
184
 
 
As witnessed by his eventual deposition taken in Santa Maria by Carrisoli in May, de la 
Rada was well able to fend for himself.  The purported Commander arrived at Carrisoli´s 
home in the company of two Scotsmen and was identified as one of the twenty-five men 
who had participated in the patrol against the Scots.  When he did not return following the 
skirmish it had been said he had gone into the Scottish camp.  He had indeed been in New 
Caledonia and brought back with him a first-hand account of events in the colony, a 
marked contrast to the minimal information he had provided in the deposition taken by his 
Scottish captors.  The thirty-eight year old said he was actually a trader from Barbacoas 
and had accompanied the patrol.  Witnessing his comrade wounded by an arrow, suffering 
from the flux, and finding himself cut off by Indian fighters from whom he knew he would 
receive no quarter, he strategically decided to turn himself over to the Scots.   Near their 
settlement he had met two Frenchmen who were salvaging the wreck of their ship.  These 
men eventually took him to the Scottish Vice-Admiral, who in turn had released him on 4 
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May.  He had been provided with a gun, two pistols and a supply of linen for his return 
journey, as well as the two-man escort.  The pair was expected to accompany him only part 
way, but de la Rada, “through deceit and flattery”, had brought them to Carrisoli.  The 
former prisoner explained that he had been released because he had recognized the Scots´ 
desire to trade with the Spanish, their ample supplies of textiles and their great interest in 
procuring gold.  He had thus proposed to act as their agent and would use his reputation 
and knowledge of the country to obtain the metal and return within a month to barter for 
their goods.  He would also notify others of the possibilities available at New Caledonia 
and thus establish an even larger market.  De la Rada conscientiously emphasized this ruse 
was only to obtain his freedom and not to actually enter illicit trade with the Scots.  He had 
even asked for and received assurances from the seven heads of the government of the 
colony that they would protect him as he proceeded with his trading initiatives. 
 
Characteristic of other interrogations completed by the Spanish, detailed intelligence as to 
the quantity and quality of the enemy was collected.  Although he had not been allowed the 
freedom to walk throughout the colony, the former prisoner had been befriended by one of 
the Scots and had been told there were approximately 1300 residents and that there was a 
defensive moat full of water.  Ever willing to exploit his circumstances, de la Rada updated 
his countrymen on the firepower of the Scottish fleet and the arrival of trading vessels from 
Jamaica with provisions.  He claimed he had heard that the Jamaicans, declaring that 
Panama could easily be taken, had offered 7000 men to help the Scots fight the Spaniards.  
The proposal was denied by the colonists, unless they were to suffer an attack themselves.  
There were six to seven thousand additional Scots expected, including families, and their 
intention was to establish good relations with the Spanish.  De la Rada expressed his own 
opinion that, if adequate forces were not available to exterminate the colony, it would be 
more prudent to leave them as they were.  There was the possibility of attacking the 
intruders from the sea but it would be effective only if activated before reinforcements, 
expected hourly from New England, arrived.  He reemphasized he did not think the Scots 
would initiate an attack, but they had established allies, both overt and covert, with the 
local Indians.  The presence of five English ships off Portobello had been discussed openly 
in the colony.  They were under the command of Admiral Benbow, but, contrary to 
Spanish belief, they were not there to assist the Scots.  He did expect, though, that they 
would aid New Caledonia if it came under attack. 
 
Carrisoli and his men then turned to de la Rada´s escort, utilizing an Irishman serving in 
the Spanish navy as translator.  The first individual identified himself as George 
Drummond, a soldier from Edinburgh who had served in King James´s guard.  The 
Lieutenant explained the Company´s license from King William to settle in unoccupied 
territory and its intent to avoid war.  He was thoroughly questioned about the details of the 
design and size of defenses, adding that recovered cannon from the wrecked French vessel 
were being hauled up to and mounted at the fortifications.   Admiral Benbow´s squadron 
belonged to the King of England and not to the Company, but was prepared to give the 
Scots assistance if needed.  The only communication between New Caledonia and the 
Admiral had taken place when the English fleet had met the ship the Scots had sent to 
Cartagena to demand the Dolphin and her crew.  Since Benbow had been in Portobello, 
two Scottish vessels had sailed there, but he did not know their mission.  The Jamaican 
vessels which had come to New Caledonia brought only food as arms were not necessary, 
the Scots being amply supplied. 
 
Perhaps attempting to deter the Spanish from aggressive action, Drummond gave the 
population of New Caledonia as an astounding 5000 and then went on to describe the 
seven-Councilor government, with Robert Pennycook at its head.  He noted that they had 
brought with them a large supply of trade goods such as clothing and textiles.  One 
brigantine had been sent to Cartagena, which was the one that was lost, and one Councilor 
had returned to Scotland to report to the Directors.  Six relief vessels were expected hourly 
from home, and they were anticipated to transport “the most important personage in 
Scotland”.  Families were also expected, but he did not know how many.  The Indians 
were regular visitors to sell fruit, but no Spaniards or mulattoes had appeared.  When asked 
about negros, Drummond said they had brought none to sell nor to use in building their 
fortifications, nor did they anticipate any. 
 
Turning to the events concerning de la Rada, Drummond said they had accompanied him 
because he had asked their command to provide an escort across the mountains for 
protection from the Indians.  When they had intended to turn back at Tubacanti, they had 
been prevented from doing so by an edict from the President of Panama.  He did not know 
the reason for de la Rada´s release from New Caledonia, but he did understand a general 
order to not arrest any Spaniard, instead to allow them freedom of movement.  Verifying 
the military composition of the population, he recounted that their squadron had twelve 
captains, all of whom had served in Flanders.185 
 
An account of the skirmish that had brought de la Rada into New Caledonia was also 
provided by Borland, giving Scottish strength in the encounter as an estimated 150.  He 
mentions de la Rada only as the sole prisoner acquired and that his escort was never heard 
from again.186  The second escort-turned-prisoner does, however, reappear.  George 
Cowan´s case was presented before the Directors in Edinburgh 19 March 1700.  Having 
accompanied de la Rada as ordered, he had been sent as a prisoner to Panama and 
eventually to Cartagena, where he had escaped on a trading vessel bound for Jamaica.  
From there he had found his passage home and was rewarded with six pounds sterling.  
The Company acknowledged the strategic value of his experience “traversing the most 
important places possessed by the Spaniards upon the Continent of America” and praised 
his offer of continued service.  Cowan would find himself on board the relief ship 
Providence headed back to New Caledonia.187 
 
The variety of circumstances and prisoners following the evacuation of the first expedition 
provided a new wave of dramatic intelligence across the Caribbean and the Atlantic, 
illustrating both intricate and effective networks of communication that existed and the 
high priority given the Scots´ activities.  On the 10
th
 of July 1699 Governor William 
                                                 
185
 The original of de la Rada´s interrogation is in AGI, Panamá 160 (unfoliated).  Material 
described here is from its translation in MHS, Hart Collection, Darien Item 32.  AGI, 
Panamá 109 (unfoliated) also contains the declarations, forwarded by the President of 
Panama to Madrid 9 May 1699. 
186
 Borland, The History, pp. 21-22. 
187
 NLS, MS Adv. 83.7.5., f. 148r., NAS, RH4/135/1, entry for 19 March 1700. 
Beeston of Jamaica wrote to Secretary of State Vernon in London.  Although the Governor 
had a packet of correspondence already on board a vessel prepared to depart for England, 
that ship had been delayed and he had urgent news to supplement his original dispatches.  
Beeston related that the desertion had taken place seventeen days earlier and, based on the 
Scots´ lack of provisions, “whither we cannot hear nor guess unless they are gon to 
disperse themselves amongst the Northern Plantations.”  After offering the circumstances 
that he felt may have led to the desertion, he provided details of how he had obtained the 
information . . .  
 
The Master of the Vesell tells me that he met three Canoes at the Barnes 
that came from Callidonia and had three Spaniards on them who had 
been Prisonors with the Scotch and Freed by them when they saild and 
also that those Canoes were laden with Iron Crows Shot and other Iron 
Tools the Scotch left behinde them which seems to Indicate that they 
went away in haste.
188
 
 
 
Upon arrival of the news in London, the Spanish Ambassador immediately wrote Madrid, 
reporting the resulting clamor running through the English capital, the validity of which he 
had confirmed by “instantly taking his coach” and seeking out Secretary of State 
Vernon.
189
 
 
Released Spanish prisoners also carried the news to their own dominions.  Shortly after 
arriving in Cartagena in July 1699, Admiral of the Barlovento fleet Andrés de Pez, while 
proceeding with his own preparations to sail against the Scots, received surprising 
intelligence from seven arriving Spaniards.  They had been held prisoner at New Caledonia 
and deposed that the site had been deserted, its former inhabitants heading to New 
England.  Writing to his monarch, de Pez provided his own self-aggrandizing 
interpretation of the reason for the departure of the Scots. . . 
 
The great anxiety occasioned them during the seven full months that this 
fleet remained in their vicinity, making war upon them both by sea and 
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also by land, and by its having come to this port to assemble greater 
force, of which they were informed.  This fear, added to certain lack of 
subsistence they suffered and sicknesses which came upon them, moved 
them to the aforesaid resolution.190 
 
 
 
            BENJAMIN SPENCER: STRANDED, IMPRISONED AND TORTURED 
 
That the evacuees experienced no exclusion from potential imprisonment or fear of the 
Spanish is illustrated by the dramatic case of Benjamin Spencer, the expedition´s 
translator.  William Paterson, who had also departed the colony 20 June on board the 
Unicorn, recounted events in his eventual report to the Directors of the Company upon his 
return to Scotland.  By the 25th of July their solitary ship had struggled into the Cuban Bay 
of Matanzas.  Intending to obtain water, a pinnance was sent into shore the following day.  
Rather than water, however, they found themselves in the immediate vicinity of a Spanish 
fort.  “By some inadvertency,” Spencer stepped ashore and was captured.  The Spanish 
troops then endeavored to obtain the pinnance, but the Scots were able to escape, dodging 
both shots and a small boat of pursuers.  That evening they set sail without their linguist.191 
 
As for Spencer, his version of what occurred was well documented by his captors and their 
superiors.  Gallup-Diaz acknowledges the value of the depth and breadth of Spencer´s 
depositions,
192
 enhanced by the translator´s fluency in Spanish and resulting ability to 
converse directly with his inquisitors.  The declarations provide a first-hand account of the 
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initial expedition, full of detail not recorded elsewhere and further substantiating both the 
military character of the expedition and the international composition of its participants.  
They also relate the harrowing story of the survivor abandoned on the beach, his torture 
and interrogations, and his transfer to Havana.
193
  Notably, the documents also testify to 
the impact of the Scottish activity across the Caribbean and the magnitude of the 
geographic area that concerned itself with events at New Caledonia.   
 
The Spanish account of the encounter with the Unicorn is included in a packet sent to the 
King by Governor Don Diego de Cordoba Lasso de la Vega of Havana on 25 September 
1699 covering events initiated the previous August 5
th
.  On that day a large vessel had been 
spotted off Matanzas.  A launch sent ashore bore a Spanish-speaking individual who spoke 
with the local fort´s Captain Serrano, identifying his ship as English, from Jamaica and 
headed for New England.  Because they had lost their mast and required wood and water, 
they requested permission to land.  As the Captain extended his questioning the men 
remaining in the launch appeared to become alarmed and departed, abandoning their 
Spanish-speaking comrade.  Alerted by that action and the subsequent departure of the 
mother ship from view, the Captain threatened torture (according to the Governor, a threat 
not carried out) unless the prisoner fully explained his circumstances.  Spencer then 
revealed his ship had been one of those at Darien, and that New Caledonia had now been 
abandoned.  Recognizing the critical nature of the news, a message was sent immediately 
to Havana, from which a command was returned to forward the prisoner to the Governor. 
 
After hearing that the colony had been deserted due to high mortality, lack of expected 
relief from Scotland and the declarations of the English King, Lasso de la Vega prepared 
and forwarded packets of Spencer´s depositions to the Viceroy of New Spain and General 
don Martin de Zavala, General of the Guarda Costa194, sending them via a dispatch boat 
that departed the 14
th
 of August.  Zavala himself sailed into Havana on the 26
th
, followed 
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on the 3
rd
, 4
th
 and 6
th
 of September by vessels from Cartagena bringing verification of the 
departure of the Scots from both the General of the Barlovento fleet and the city´s 
Governor.   
 
In the hands of his Havana captors, Spencer´s interrogations had become more intense.  
They had been initiated only a week after his capture at Matanzas and started with the 
prisoner declaring himself a native of Holland.  He recounted his original departure from 
Scotland, the census of ships and personnel, and the military organization of the 
expedition.  He stated clearly that there were Italians and Frenchmen among the men, as 
well as other foreigners.  Five women had come with the expedition from Scotland, but 
only one had survived Darien to depart the colony.  Within a day after sailing they could 
see smoke and flames at the settlement, recognizing that the houses and buildings were 
being burned as the fort was not constructed of combustible materials. 
 
A chronological description was given of their arrival and settlement at New Caledonia.  
During their clearing of the land and initial construction the Indians began to bring notice 
of imminent Spanish offensive action to drive them out.  In response 160 men were sent 
under command of James Montgomery to the camp of one of their Indian allies.  The 
combined force moved on and had a skirmish with an estimated 25 Spaniards and twelve 
Indians, resulting in two Scottish fatalities and up to fifteen wounded.  The Spaniards 
withdrew hastily due to the far greater number of Scottish forces, but left behind bread and 
cheese.  In return for acquisition of the provisions, the Scots left behind a musket and 
withdrew.  They also had found a Spanish merchant named Don Domingo de (la) Rada, 
who had “lost his way”.   The man said he was from Santa Maria, which was near the gold 
mines of Cana and reported that there was a Spanish force of 250 near Tubacanti, which 
included the men they had just encountered.  After holding de (la) Rada two months at the 
settlement, the Council of New Caledonia decided to release him, accompanied by two 
escorts to go as far as Tubacanti.  The two escorts had been detained and had never 
returned to the settlement.  
 
Addressing further questions regarding circumstances and intentions beyond the immediate 
area of New Caledonia, Spencer said he did not know whether or not their departure was 
known in Cartagena, but he did know they knew of it in Santa Maria.  There had been no 
trade with that town, but it was only a day and a half from their settlement and the Scots 
knew it was adjacent to the gold mine called Cana.  Trade with the Indians was minor, 
basically food materials.  There had not been talk of crossing to Panama as they had been 
occupied establishing their settlement, at which no one had been left behind.  A French 
ship, which apparently was spying on their activities, had been sent by Monsieur DuCasse.  
The evidence of its intent had been acquired from a letter found in a bottle on a vessel 
taken along the coast by the Scots.  In that discovered document DuCasse, who was the 
Governor of Pitiguao, offered to assist the Governor of Portobello to dislodge the Scots.  
 
Returning to events at the colony, Spencer explained that the failure of pledged relief from 
Scotland created serious confusion and was only understood when news of King William´s 
proclamations was received.  That edict, according to the colonists, was why their own 
Company´s relief ships had not appeared.  At that point “they resolved to abandon their 
scheme to settle, because they could not maintain it”.  The four ships that had abandoned 
New Caledonia had become separated, and Spencer´s vessel had entered Matanzas Bay not 
knowing where it was.  As Spencer had been speaking to the Spanish guard ashore, his 
shipmates, remaining in the launch, had become frightened by the arms of the Spanish and 
the fire they heard as they rowed away from shore. 
 
Spencer also provided information regarding the Scots´ reaction to the imprisonment of 
Captain Pincarton and the taking of the Dolphin in Cartagena.  After the return of the men 
had been refused, the decision had been made to attempt to capture “persons of esteem” to 
negotiate an exchange. 
 
The interrogation then led into a discussion of authority for their settlement, which Spencer 
said had come from the King of England.  He recalled the stipulations regarding the 
requirement to settle in lands unoccupied by any European power or monarch, and that the 
permission of any native population was obligatory.  The indigenous people were to be 
exempt from taxation for a period of twenty-one years. 
 
Spencer´s role in the enterprise was solely because of his language abilities.  He had signed 
with the Company of Scotland for a salary of ten pounds for himself and a servant. 
 
The questioning then turned to identification of ships that had visited the Scots in New 
Caledonia, providing the Spaniards with a localized census of not only vessels in the 
immediate vicinity, but also who was communicating, and potentially collaborating, 
directly with the colony.  The response was that Spencer had seen five English ships and 
several French vessels.  One of the latter he had heard had come to trade along the coast, 
and this was the one that wrecked as it was leaving the bay.  The Scots had responded to 
her distress signals.  Spencer had heard that some gold and considerable amounts of silver 
had been salvaged.  Commodore Pennycook had some of the treasure in his possession, 
which prompted discord with the French Captain.  Eventually an agreement was reached 
giving the Scots one eighth of the gold and silver saved, but the argument did not end and 
arms were eventually raised over the allocation. 
 
Some gold had also been obtained from the native cacique Diego, as compensation for the 
hospitality of the Scots and “in recognition of a perpetual league and alliance”.  Having an 
estimated value of 300 pounds sterling, it had been presented following an incident 
involving a launch belonging to the colony being retained by Diego´s people.  Some 
additional gold had been acquired from the nose and ear jewelry worn by the native men 
and women. 
 
Trade goods originally brought to Darien included English cloth, including many types of 
linen.  They were intended for trade with the English and also with the Spanish.  There 
were also wrought iron implements, arms of all kinds, and various tin, iron and copper 
plates, as well as cups and goblets designed for barter with Kings along the Guinea coast 
for negroes.  Some of these original stores were still on board the Unicorn, which, 
according to what he had heard his Captain say, was headed to New England to secure 
provisions.  The ship was leaking badly and they estimated they had only a month´s worth 
of supplies.  Spencer had heard no word about returning to Darien. 
 
As the questioning wore on, the Governor returned to the subject of fortifications at New 
Caledonia.  He was told that there had been no engineer at the colony.  A Captain who had 
served in Flanders was in charge of the construction and the intent was to expand the fort 
when reinforcements arrived from Scotland.  At the present time it was more of a battery 
than a regular castle.  Work had not begun on the fort until two to three months following 
their initial arrival.  
 
Tension seemed to intensify between captor and prisoner as the Governor indicated doubt 
over some of Spencer´s responses to the hierarchy of command and his explanation for the 
presence of the Scots on Cuba.  Mention was also made of the content of the documents 
seized at Cartagena, which had previously been provided to Havana.  Spencer found 
himself remanded to jail, where he was ordered “pressed” regarding the most critical issues 
of Darien´s abandonment and his arrival on Cuba.  Overtly threatened with torture, the 
translator repeated that the survivors, amounting to approximately 500 individuals, had 
departed in their four remaining ships, leaving behind four or five Frenchmen.  Recounting 
again his abandonment at Matanzas he pled “and this is the truth and God fail him if it is 
not, and may his soul burn endlessly in hell if he is lying”.  He was taken to a torture 
chamber where he was stripped and placed on “the horse”
195
 and again commanded to tell 
the truth.  At that point the Governor, “seeing how heavily this illness bore upon him”, 
suspended the interrogation. 
 
Contributing to Spencer´s difficulties was material in the original messages from Captain 
Serrano of Matanzas, also contained in the same document of the Hart collection, which 
related the initial claim that the Unicorn was English.  It had only been under threat of 
torture that the translator had originally admitted otherwise.  The status of Spencer´s 
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religion also surfaced, identifying him as a Jew, which would also bear on his trial in 
Sevilla the following year.
196
   The statement that he “was sick of `the horse´” before he 
left Matanzas appears to indicate that, contrary to the Governor´s claim, he had also been 
tortured earlier.  Serrano did relate that they had suspected the Unicorn of being pirate and 
that Spencer´s initial requests to wood and water and repair had been regarded as ruses.  
 
As word drifted into Havana verifying the abandonment of New Caledonia, Spencer´s 
testimony gained credibility.  His surprise and relief at discovering himself reunited with 
Captain Pincarton and his three companions from Cartagena must have been profound, and 
the exchange of information regarding what had happened to each of them, as well as the 
grand design of the Company of Scotland, must have been related numerous times.   
 
For the captors,197 the news of the Scots´ departure must have seemed no less dramatic.  
The systems of communication, even faced with the considerable impediments of the time, 
had functioned well.  Word had criss-crossed the Caribbean and been forwarded home to 
Spain, compiling a vast amount of information.  Advantages presented by unexpected 
events had been fully exploited by a well established, consistent and refined system of 
intelligence gathering, achieving nothing less than an on-going journal of events not only 
at New Caledonia, but also across the larger Caribbean and Atlantic Worlds.   Data 
received from both deserters and prisoners provided immeasurable assistance to Spanish 
concerns mounting the effective land and sea operation against the Scots, but it also 
comprised a highly valuable supplement to the portfolio of knowledge concerning 
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geographically dispersed activities of both allies and enemies.  The continuing and 
consistent evidence of the military character of the Company of Scotland´s expeditions, 
and repetitive evidence of intentions to participate in the thriving world of contraband 
trade, could only have alerted the diverse web of legal and illicit interests to the validity of 
a Scottish threat and underscore the need for prompt and definitive action.  Whatever the 
impacts of the actions of the Company of Scotland in its home country and England, 
Spanish America and the wider cast of Caribbean players had vital investments to protect 
and would not shirk from doing so. 
 
Although examined more thoroughly in Chapter 7, any review of the cast of prisoners 
involved in the attempted establishment of New Caledonia would be incomplete without 
addressing the decidedly unacknowledged role of the local indigenous population.  The 
Memoirs of Mr. William Veitch and George Brysson relates that  
 
Some of the Indian chiefs who had been most friendly to the colony, 
were taken from the side of the Scottish ships and made prisoners.  The 
ministers, pitying the poor natives, drew up a petition in their favour and 
sent it to the Spanish
198
 
 
The request being denied, we are once again reliant on Walter Herries for a record of the 
punishment imposed on the allies of the Scots.  Unlike the trials and release of other 
prisoners, and indicating policies to be implemented to prevent further alliances with 
foreigners and assure control over the indigenous populations, the native prisoners were, 
the surgeon wrote, “impaled alive.”
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CHAPTER 4 
ADMIRALS, GOVERNORS AND SLAVETRADERS:  ENTANGLED INTERESTS 
COPE WITH SCOTTISH INTRUDERS 
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 With the implementation of their Darien enterprise, the Company of Scotland initiated 
ripples of action and reaction that extended across the Atlantic World, touching Europe, 
Africa and the Americas. Focusing on action within the Caribbean basin and the voyage of 
English Admiral John Benbow and his fleet, given virtually no previous credit for its role 
in the unfolding story of the Darien expeditions, this chapter explores how the Scottish 
threat manifested itself among the entangled interests that plied the Atlantic and Caribbean 
attempting to establish bases of colonial enterprise and commercial advantage. Relying 
heavily on primary sources from England and Spain, Benbow´s activities and interactions 
with Spanish officials and New Caledonia colonists are traced, illustrating a previously 
unrecognized complicity by William III in ensuring the failure of the Scottish enterprise.  
Not only were overt offers of assistance made to colonial officials along the Spanish Main 
to eliminate the Scottish presence, but examination of Benbow´s itinerary also provides a 
record of the range of interactions and initiatives among Portuguese, Dutch, and French 
interests, as well as English and Spanish.  No major party was remotely interested in 
witnessing the success of a new player establishing themselves in the vicinity, dictating the 
conclusion that there was no means by which New Caledonia would survive, much less 
flourish. 
 
The importance of these various interactions and international efforts was not only 
pertinent to the Company of Scotland and its mother country, but also provided a 
deliberate opportunity for intelligence-gathering and practical rehearsals for future 
deployment. Benbow and his entire fleet would return to England with acquired 
documentation and practical experience that would soon prove its worth. As uncertainty, 
speculation and intrigue prevailed at the end of the seventeenth century over the 
anticipated death of the King of Spain and that country´s succession, the Scottish initiative 
inadvertently provided the web of intertwined interests with invaluable knowledge of and 
familiarity with the names, places, vulnerabilities and capacities of both potential enemies 
and potential allies.  
 
Efforts previously undertaken from London to undermine implementation of the Scottish 
venture are summarized by English Secretary of State Vernon in a 7 March 1699 letter to 
Ambassador to Spain Alexander Stanhope.  First, he related, parliament had taken action to 
thwart proposed London subscriptions.  William III had then dismissed his Secretaries in 
Scotland over the affair and further intervened to suppress proposals in Hamburg.  Once 
the Scots had “settled themselves”, effectively revived their plans, and successfully sailed 
their fleet as far as St. Thomas, the King went further, issuing orders to the respective 
Governors of his plantations to provide “no correspondence or succour”.200  “His majesty”, 
Vernon summarized, “has of himself done all the Spaniards could have desired of him”.  
The Secretary ended the letter with orders to the Ambassador to “take care to make this 
matter rightly understood”.
201
  
 
Mounting alarm over the activities of the Company of Scotland was not, however, limited 
to London-based concerns and potential commercial rivals.  Rather, they came from a 
wide-ranging array of sources with varied investments to protect. Governor Beeston of 
Jamaica, writing home on 5 December 1698, had spoken for his fellow royal 
representatives in struggling Caribbean colonies when he notified the Council of Trade and 
Plantations that 
 
The Scotch fleet is arrived at Darien, into which bay one of our sloops 
saw them sail.  If they settle there and are healthy, the noise of gold (of 
which there is great plenty in those parts) will carry away all our debtors, 
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servants and ordinary people in the hope of mending their fortunes, and 
will much weaken what little strength we have.
202
 
 
 
Walter Herries, the surgeon-turned-critic (and spy), provided a contemporary 
substantiation of Beeston´s concerns.  In his 1701 pamphlet the man who had first-hand 
experience in New Caledonia wrote of declarations printed in Boston that were to be 
“secretly and industriously spread . . . over the Leeward islands . . . to invite Men of all 
Nations . . . to come over to Caledonia”.  Newcomers were enticed to join the Scots 
through assurances that they would enjoy equal privileges with the original colonists of the 
“free port and Corporation”.  Jamaica, being the closest colony where the documents were 
dispersed, had been the “first acquainted with the Tidings”.
203
 
 
In History of His Own Time, published in 1734, Bishop Gilbert Burnet reiterated that the 
dual lure of gold and Spanish plunder was regarded as having an irresistible appeal to a 
labor force desperately needed in the colonies, with the result that “Our English plantations 
grew also very jealous . . .”
204
 Nor was the anxiety relegated solely to the realms of King 
William III.  Burnet notes not only that the establishment of New Caledonia in close 
proximity to vital Spanish ports at Portobello, Panama and Cartagena caused intense 
Spanish alarm, but that “The King of France complained also of this, as an invasion of the 
Spanish dominion, and offered the Court of Madrid a fleet to dislodge them.”
205
  Perhaps 
the most inflammatory of his accusations, supporting the Bishop´s view that William´s 
continued devotion to his homeland markedly hindered his popularity
206
, was that 
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 It was further given out, to raise the national disgust even higher, that the 
opposition the King gave to the Scotch colony, flowed neither from a 
regard to the interests of England, nor to the Treaties with Spain, but 
from a Care of the Dutch, who from Curacao drove a coasting trade, 
among the Spanish plantations, with great advantage; which, they said, 
the Scotch colony, of once well settled, would draw wholly from 
them.
207
 
 
Support for the accusation is provided by a standard phrase included in contemporary 
orders of the Royal African Company to their Captains.  They were directed  “to not hinder 
the ships belonging to the Dutch Guinea Company or to follow attack or seize the ships 
and effects of the Interlopers of that Nation.”
208
 
 
There remained an additional concern impacting yet another monarchy.  At the time the 
Scots chose to proceed with their efforts for commercial advancement, the asiento, 
assuring its holder a monopoly over delivery of slaves to Spain´s American dominions, 
was held by the Portuguese Cacheo Company.  Their contract required the delivery of 
slaves to Cartagena and other designated ports
209
 by a variety of means, not limited to their 
own vessels.  The lucrative trade could be and was subcontracted to English ships from 
London and Jamaica and Dutch ships from the Low Countries and Curacao.210  The 
Portuguese had established their presence by providing 4000 slaves annually in 1693, 
when they had contracted with the Spanish company then holding the asiento.211  Three 
years later they had secured the business for themselves for a period of six years and eight 
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months, promising to deliver 30,000 negroes “neither old nor decrepit.”
212
  Among the 
investors realizing considerable profits was Portugal´s King Pedro.
213
 
 
As extensive as the financial rewards of the slave trade were, however, the potential for 
accompanying contraband trade translated into substantially increased revenues.  
Opportunities to transport additional merchandise, both human and otherwise, were 
enhanced by the fact that slaves did not have to be registered or taxed by Spain´s Casa de 
la Contratación.  In exchange for the human cargo, as well as whatever bundles of linen, 
silk, hardware and liquor might be supplemented, silver bullion would be received.
214
  The 
beneficial circumstances of on-board human labor and contraband goods provided a unique 
opportunity that could be efficiently exploited.  As reported to the Board of Trade in 1685, 
English merchants made up packs of English dry goods sized for human transport.  The 
bundles would be carried to a designated isolated location by the slaves prior to the ship´s 
entry into port.  The jettisoned contraband goods would be guarded until they could later 
be moved into secure storage under cover of night.
215
  The advantageous condition of legal 
entry into Spanish ports, coupled with opportunities for additional illicit profits, created a 
dedicated cast of competitors wary of new participants seeking to share the proven 
financial reward.216 
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discussion and comparison of the impact of the foreign contraband trade with that 
 Despite numerous and inevitable frictions with the asiento, its liberal movements across 
the Atlantic and within the Caribbean, enhanced by international crews,217 created a 
valuable alternative pathway for transmission of written and verbal intelligence, as well as 
for the transport of officials and religious personnel.  Don Juan de Castro y Gallego, 
returning to Madrid from royal service in Chile, had sailed from Havana to Lisbon on one 
of the Portuguese Company´s vessels and produced testimony regarding not only what he 
had experienced in his own position, but what notice he had acquired of the Scots and 
English from other passengers.
218
  That the factor of the Asiento de Negros was included in 
the War Council called by the President of Panama in response to initial word of the arrival 
of the Scots in Darien testifies to the importance attributed to the role, influence and 
resources of the slave trade contractors.
219
 
 
 
 
 
                MISSION TO THE CARIBBEAN: ADMIRAL JOHN BENBOW 
 
In March of 1698, months prior to the Scots embarking on their first expedition from Leith, 
English Admiral John Benbow, who had conducted himself admirably both in recent 
campaigns against the French and by providing convoy escort service
220
 had been called 
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 Benbow is best known for his controversial (and final) 1702 battle against the French 
fleet in the Caribbean, In his biography, author Sam Willis devotes a chapter to the 
Admiral´s prior campaign in the Caribbean studied here, noting that “Everyone in the 
before the Admiralty.  He was informed that the King had resolved to put him in command 
of a squadron destined for the West Indies.  Preparations were hindered by lack of funds 
but reports from the Caribbean of threats against the trade to New Spain and, more notably, 
that English commerce with the Spanish Main was actively being stifled by the Spanish, 
pushed the preparation process.
221
  Formal written orders, notably vague and frustratingly 
brief, were finally issued in Novembe 1698, the same month the Scots arrived in Darien.  
The Admiral was directed 
 
. . .to visit his Majesty´s respective islands to windward (of Jamaica) 
taking particular care that the ships under your command be from time to 
time so employed as may most conduce to the safety of his majesty´s 
islands and plantations, and the trade in those parts, until such time you 
shall receive further orders.
222
 
 
Sailing from Portsmouth on 29 November and arriving first in Barbados, Benbow soon 
was informed by infuriated officials of injustices committed by the Spanish.  Ignoring both 
stipulations of the contract strictly forbidding interference with movements of slavetrading 
vessels and the hindrance of commerce that it would create, the Governor of Cartagena had 
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seized two English ships involved in the asiento trade.  The declared purpose of the seizure 
was to use the vessels in the campaign to oust the Scots from Darien.
223
 
   
The contemporary tensions, the impact of the seizures, the relief of merchants involved in 
the slave trade at the arrival of the Admiral´s fleet, and the ensuing complications all the 
activity created is expressed in an advice to London from Josiah Heathcote.  The factor for 
the Royal African Company wrote in his 4 March 1699 report . . . 
 
You will heare what fine Voyages the Ships made with their Negroes at 
Cartagena, and how they were used by the Government and Factor of the 
Asiento, and the two Ships that lately Stopt there and are gone to 
Veracruz will meet with the same Civilitys, to say the truth, the 
Spaniards are in all things where they have the Advantage and Power 
very Rude to us and use the French and Dutch with much more liberty 
and Respect so that its Pitty we have not liberty to make them Sensible 
of their indignitys.  Rear Admiral Benbow is now goeing over and 
Severall Merchants are with him, he intends to  . . . them out of some of 
our Vessells they have taken from us without any Reason, and use the 
men worse than prisoners . . . which is a great indignity to our nation and 
to His Maj.s honour to be so treated by them, and I hope some Wider . . . 
be given that we may not so tamely be obliged to . . . insults.  When you 
hear that they put the Negroes . . . for which they paid the Master out 22 
or 23 and Sold Each Negroe before their faces for 200 . . you will admire 
their impudence, but you must know that this is the Roguery of the 
officials Real, who doe this to cheate the King of so much of his due, and 
share it amongst them . . but should be laid before their Ambassadour 
224
  
 
 
Regardless of potential alleviation of the affronts, however, Heathcote included a 
complaint predicting undesirable impacts, most notably the flight of the meager Jamaican 
labor force to the Scots, caused by the presence of Benbow´s fleet . . . 
 
Notwithstanding the Expresse Commands of the King that none shall 
impresse men here without the Govs. Warrant, and Confirm´d by the 
Lors of the Admiralty, yet the rear Adml. Orders his Captains to 
impresse the inhabitants, which is not onely interfering with all 
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Authority but will frighten away all our seamen and Ordinary People to 
the Scotch or any Place Else where they think they can be Easie, so that 
it seems to me this Island can never be well settled, having so many 
disadvantageous Putbacks225 
 
Heathcote was not alone in his criticism of the Admiral´s actions.  Governor of Jamaica 
Beeston had his own questions about Benbow´s tactics.  Late in January, he wrote to 
Secretary of State Vernon, two of Benbow´s ships had arrived and reported that their 
Commander had parted from them at Nevis.  He had apparently sailed in company of a 
slave-trading vessel to the coast of the Spanish Main without explaining his intentions to 
those of his fleet which he directed to Jamaica.
226
  The logs of the Master and the 
Lieutenant of Benbow´s flagship Gloucester do, however, chart the progress of their 
mission.  At the same time Beeston was writing to London, the Admiral was conducting a 
strained dialogue with the Spanish Governor of Cartagena, Don Diego de los Rios y 
Quesada.  Benbow had arrived outside the city in late January, pleading the need to water.  
The Governor had refused to allow their ships inside the narrow channel leading into the 
port, but did send the requested water to them by two Portuguese boats.  The Admiral then 
initiated his personal campaign of diplomacy and threat to obtain the release of the 
detained English merchant ships, with the successful result that all the vessels were cleared 
to depart on the 3rd of February.227 
 
A distinctly different interpretation of the interaction between the Spanish Governor and 
the English Admiral, complicated by simultaneous French proposals, is covered in the 
former´s report to his own King dated 24 February 1699 and dramatically expands the 
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motivations for the English presence.  Rios first recounted the heavy demands upon his 
position, providing his own self-appraisal that he was handling his responsibilities 
admirably.  In the midst of trying to organize action against the Scots and control 
contraband trade, the Governor had received an offer of assistance against the Scots from 
French Captain Juan Rache.  Within days of vetting the validity of that offer, and sending 
Rache in the company of the Barlovento fleet to gain intelligence, two additional arrivals 
had caught the Governor by surprise.  The pair of vessels had immediately posted English 
colors and sent in a launch with a letter from one Admiral Benbow.  In it the author 
reported he was concerned over the site and intent of the Scottish settlement, declaring that 
his total fleet was “ready for any eventuality should the Scotch commit any evil”. They 
were also hunting for pirates, Benbow elaborated, which were reported to be operating off 
the coast of Hispaniola.  He was so concerned about getting accurate information, he 
declared, that he had come alone so as not to alarm the local jurisdictions. He requested 
water, explaining that it had been fifty days since their departure from England and they 
had had no previous opportunity to replenish their supply.  They would, he offered, be 
departing for Jamaica once the task was completed.  The Captain assigned with relaying 
the letter ashore added that their squadron was under direction from King William to 
“gather up the Scotch”,228 also offering to the Governor the information that additional 
ships of the fleet were standing at Nevis and off the coast of Santo Domingo. 
 
Rios was particularly wary that the English visitors simply wanted intelligence on how 
much the Spanish knew of the Scottish initiatives, and that they might actually comprise 
the relief fleet he had heard was expected from Scotland.  Exercising prudence, the 
Governor decided to dispatch a contingent of officials to meet directly with the Admiral 
and evaluate the situation.  The embassy was received cordially and given surprising news  
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The Spaniards continued the consultation, but regarded what they had heard as somewhat 
contradictory to the original written message they had received.  The English continued to 
press their case, emphasizing peace and amity between their two sovereigns.  The 
representatives from Cartagena were given gifts of cloth and departed on amiable terms 
“talking among themselves of how to return the courtesy shown, but cautiously”.    
 
Governor Rios then wrote back to Benbow, expressing appreciation for both the offer of 
assistance and the cloth sent him for a coat.  He provided information regarding the Scots 
and assured the Admiral that he was confident the English would remove the Scots 
immediately, adding that the dominions of Spanish America were taking their own 
measures to assure elimination of the colony at Darien.  Negotiations over watering the 
Gloucester continued, with the Governor declaring he needed his king´s permission to 
allow the English access and Benbow countering that, in order to save the lives of those 
under his command, he may have to force his way in.
229
 A compromise was finally reached 
with an offer from Rios to send men to obtain the empty barrels and return them to the 
English replenished. An acceptable arrangement was also forged to allow the small asiento 
vessel accompanying the Admiral into port to unload its cargo of slaves and obtain its own 
water supply. 
 
There remained the issue of the detained asiento slave-ships. The Governor had been 
pressured for their release as early as the 15
th
 of January by the local representative of the 
Portuguese concessionaire, who requested that the pair of his company´s ships be allowed 
                                                 
229
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Governor and the Admiral are contained in AGI, Panamá 215, ff. 153v-171r. 
to clear for Lisbon, as well as the same number of English ships for their home port. It was 
claimed that the vessels had been held a month, causing heavy detriment and expense, 
without the intended formulation of any firm plans for operations against the Scots. 
Whatever Benbow´s diplomatic pressures
230
, the issue was settled with the Governor 
acknowledging the stipulation of the Slave Trade Concession prohibiting detention of its 
vessels, graciously adding that he wished to save expenses for all concerned.
231
 
 
In spite of consistently finding himself in receipt of assurances that the “sole object of their 
coming was to remove the Scotch, who, they said, had come hither without order of their 
king” Governor Rios was no doubt relieved to witness the departure of the English the 12
th
 
of February. That same day he would receive word of an additional offer from the French 
to assist in eliminating the Scottish presence.  Monsieur DuCasse, Governor of Pitiguao, 
offered “munitions, firearms, and all the assistance possible” to expel “this evil people 
from these parts”.
232
  
 
No doubt feeling somewhat satisfied with the success of his efforts, Benbow sailed for Port 
Royal, Jamaica, from where he was able to file a report to London dated 3 March 1699.  
The document, which would be provided by Secretary of Vernon to the King, informed his 
superiors that he had found the Spaniards in Cartagena very disposed towards the French 
and very “jealous of us on the Scotch account”.   He was able to provide the latest 
information on New Caledonia, including the current news that the Dolphin and her crew 
were being held in Cartagena and that there had been an initial armed skirmish between the 
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Spanish and the Scots in Darien.  He was sailing the following day for Portobello, he 
wrote, to gain a better account of the situation and demand additional English-owned trade 
goods, men and ships that had been seized by the Barlovento fleet.233  Vernon added his 
own assessment of the situation, noting to his King  “The Spaniards are very little sensible 
of the declarations that you did not approve of the Scotch, since they make no end of the 
seizing of our ships.  Benbow is taking a course that will either make them very civil or 
very angry.”
234
  New Caledonia was clearly inserting itself into international politics, 
adding strain to an environment where an array of allies and enemies had interests to 
protect. 
 
 
                             DEBATING CARIBBEAN EVENTS IN EUROPE 
 
Both Spanish seizures of English resources and the related interruption of the Portuguese 
asiento´s slave-trading contract were attracting attention on both sides the Atlantic.  Not 
only did King William mount a campaign to assure the Spanish King of his lack of 
complicity in the Scottish effort in Darien, but increased expressions of concern from both 
English and Portuguese commercial interests required a response.  After receiving 
Benbow´s report from Jamaica, Secretary of State Vernon wrote Ambassador Stanhope in 
Madrid, informing him of English ships seized and taken to Portobello.  He related that 
merchants involved with the asiento had paid him a visit “to complain that some of their 
ships there and the Negros (were) taken away from them without paying for them”.  He 
included in his letter a deposition taken 2 March 1699 that effectively illustrated the tactics 
and impacts that were causing the complaints.  John Chapman and John Noale had been 
Chief Mate and gunner, respectively, on board the Good Will, sailing with their prescribed 
cargo of slaves from Guinea.  They had arrived in Cartagena on 27 September and 
delivered their human merchandise to the Portuguese as ordered.  Preparing to return to 
England, they were consistently denied permission to clear and their rudder was ordered 
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unhung by the Admiral of the Barlovento fleet, effectively incapacitating their ship. This 
was followed by a visit from the Governor, who “took away all small arms, locked up the 
great cabin, powder room and hatches and ordered the Captain and two doctors on shore . . 
. at their own expense”.  After two days the men had been allowed to return to the ship, but 
powder, provisions, iron bars and two sets of sails had been seized.  The explanation given 
by the Spaniards was that the Spanish and French were to “join against the English, then 
that the reason was because the Scotch had landed on Golden Island”.  They were all to be 
held prisoner, they were informed, until word was received from Spain regarding their 
future.  They were, however, able to escape with their captain´s consent “in an English 
brigantine who rode there under Dutch colors bound for Jamaica”.  The Secretary added a 
footnote to Stanhope, directing him to “endeavor to make people there (Madrid) 
sensible”.
235
 
 
Stanhope had previously initiated a campaign to assure the Spanish Court of his own 
country´s innocence and frustration pertaining to the Company of Scotland.  On April 15
th
 
he had written Vernon assuring him that England´s position “shall be conveyed to every 
one of the Counsellors of State upon my word and your authority . . .”
236
  Assurance as to 
the effectiveness of his efforts was transmitted two weeks later, when the Ambassador 
wrote the Secretary that  
 
I have, either by myself or friends, published so effectually his Majesty´s 
disowning the Scotch design in the West Indies, that I am sure not a man 
in Madrid, that ever heard of the former, but has been informed that his 
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Majesty not only disowns it, but has done all that is possible to 
disappoint it.
237
 
 
In July Vernon forwarded to Stanhope a copy of the proclamation issued by Governor 
Beeston of Jamaica prohibiting assistance to and communication with the Scots,  
instructing the Ambassador to submit it to the Spanish Court.
238
  By early August the 
Ambassador was able to report back that the Spaniards had publicized the substance of the 
document by printing it in their gazette and that other diplomats had reported to him that 
the Spanish did indeed “comprehend William III´s sincerity”.
239
 
 
The situation from Lisbon was no less perplexing. London´s Ambassador to Portugal Paul 
Methuen had initially written his equal in Madrid saying that he didn´t consider the 
Spanish threat to the “American Scots” as substantial, but regarded the greater deterrent to 
be that the “King´s disowning them, must of necessity rout them, and I fancy it may be 
likely to make them turn pirate”.
240
  Within weeks, however, a differing degree of concern 
was aired.  Methuen informed Stanhope of his own efforts at the Portuguese capitol, 
describing 
 
a great deal of concern at the Scotch settlement in America although not 
any ways at the thing itself but the consequences of it at Madrid, which 
they fear might be a means to render ineffectual the late Agreement 
which the Cacheo Company has made with several merchants in London 
concerning the transportation of negroes to the west Indies at a certain 
price, they finding themselves incapable of going through with it without 
help. However they are now very well satisfied upon my acquainting 
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them that his Mgsty has entirely disowned everything the Scotch had 
done as contrary to his intention and command.
241
 
 
Successive correspondence documents the confusion about the Scottish presence at Darien 
and doubts over future collaboration between the English and Portuguese companies.  On 
16 June Methuen wrote expressing disbelief at a report that sickness was decimating the 
Scottish endeavor, adding that asiento representatives were “pressing hard at the Spanish 
Court to assure the freedom of English ships”.242  Within a week he forwarded a new 
report that a ship from the Cacheo Company had arrived back in Lisbon “with reports of 
the great strength of the Scotch”.243 Potential economic consequences remained the major 
consideration, Methuen pragmatically stating in a September letter that “I know not how 
the Portuguese will come off of the security they have given in England to be answerable 
for all damages, or whether their agreement with the English can go on.”244 
 
Concerns pertaining to the relationship between the two companies had also garnered 
attention in London.  In late August the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Royal 
African Company found themselves summoned before the Admiralty Board to discuss 
contracts with their Portuguese partners and specifically whether or not assistance to their 
ships by the Royal Navy “might not be Prejuditiall to their Company and Contrary to the 
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Act of Parliament”.
245
  After being assured otherwise, a Memorial was prepared for and 
approved by the Lord Justices sanctioning “Orders to be given to the Commanders in the 
West Indies, to assist such Shipps and Vessells as shall be Employed . . . in Transporting 
Negroes . . .”
246
 
                                 
 
                                                    PORTOBELLO 
 
Continuing his mission in the Caribbean, Benbow proceeded to Portobello to ascertain the 
situation there.  On the way he also conducted his initial documented conversation with the 
Scots.  On the 17
th
 of March the log of the Gloucester recorded the presence of two small 
vessels from “Caledonia”.   They reported that they had been at Cartagena to demand the 
Dolphin and her crew.  The Spanish Governor, however, had refused.  The Scots, “after 
giving the Admiral an account”, sailed for New Caledonia.
247
  
 
Within a week of the dialogue with the Scots, Benbow´s fleet was anchored outside 
Portobello, where the Governor gave them less than an enthusiastic reception.  Master 
Thompson of the Gloucester documented that a letter had been relayed into port, but the 
response expressed the Spanish administrator´s “dissatisfaction at their laying within shot 
of their castle”, adding the warning that the Barlovento fleet was present in the harbor.248 
The Governor had good reason for caution.  Unknown to the English, Admiral don Andrés 
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de Pez was away in Panama conferring on plans to eradicate the Scots and had left his fleet 
“with only seamen, ship´s boys, and some officers, in small number”.
249
 
 
Subsequent developments at Portobello are documented by both English and Spanish 
reports to their respective superiors and reflect the tension created by the Scottish presence 
in the area.  In his communication to the Lords of the Admiralty, Benbow expressed his 
frustration at the continuing belief that England´s interests were inseparable from those of 
Scotland. . . . 
 
I used all the arguments I could to persuade them to the contrary but to 
little progress being denied the privilege of their ports to water, all the 
country in an alarm, letters passed almost every day wherein I insisted to 
have the goods, men and vessels that belonged to my prince and subjects, 
which at last they did consent that if I would go from befor their port my 
demands should be sent after me, for my lying there was very nervous to 
them.
250
 
 
Circumstances were exacerbated by an incident documented by one of Benbow´s Captains 
on the 28th of March, when a sloop “seen in the offing” was brought in by the English 
fleet.  She had come from Cartagena, transporting “ab.103 negros several passengers and 
goods with three fryars, in the evening cleared the sloop but detained the fryars”.
251
   The 
detention and the suspicions it was perceived to substantiate were included in a letter from 
the Governor of Portobello to his counterpart in Jamaica.  The Spaniard expressed his 
frustration with the Scots, Benbow and claims that New Caledonia had been initiated 
without King William´s knowledge and sanction . . . 
 
It appears plain to the meanest capacity that the Scotch being subjects of 
the King of Great Britaine would not dare without his Licence and 
permission to undertake so bold an enterprise . . . what hath augmented 
our suspicions that there is some malicious design on foot is the arrival 
of the squadron under the Command of Admirall Benbo at the mouth of 
this Port, and there having layne these 44 days impeding the going out 
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and coming in of our boats of traffick for provisions, imprisoning our 
religious men . . . for although Admirall Benboe coloured it by saying he 
came to demand of the Barlovento Fleet . . . some prizes that he said they 
had taken from the English Nation,  I can´t persuade myselfe to believe 
that a Squadron of such strength and cost should come upon a matter of 
so small importance since the expense of the Admirall´s Fleet must in 15 
days amount to more than he asked for.
252
 
 
Not included in any correspondence or formal report from Portobello, but noted in the logs 
of two of the English ships, was a brief reappearance of the Scots.  On 9 April two sails 
were spotted which identified themselves as being from New Caledonia.  They had 
appeared at night and departed the following morning, but not before the Captain of the 
Germoon had occasion to log the frustratingly brief statement “Rear Admiral with Scotch 
vessels”.
253
   
 
The stalemate between Benbow and the Governor of Portobello continued until the arrival 
of the Maidstone on the 20th of April.  She brought urgent news in the form of the 
proclamations prohibiting any assistance by citizens of English dominions to the Scots.  
Copies were rapidly transmitted to Portobello authorities and appeared to produce a 
marked change of attitude.  After informing the Spanish Governor of the development, 
Benbow found himself treated “very civilly”.  He further noted that a French ship had 
sailed into port, offering its services against New Caledonia.  When Benbow notified his 
Spanish hosts that he was preparing to sail, he wrote that they now seemed hesitant to let 
him go  
 
for fear the Scotch should invade them, to prevent which I preferred to 
leave two ships with them.  The business of my demands not being 
adjusted I left Captain Pickard of the Soldado, Falmouth and Lynn . . . . 
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The Maidstone I sent to cruise the Gulph of Darien for ten days then to 
return to Jamaica.
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The orders prepared for Captain Pickard specifically address interaction with the Scots and 
clear intent to provide assistance against New Caledonia should it be requested by the 
Spanish.  Dated the 28
th
 of April 1699 they order the reduced fleet left at Portobello to 
maintain communication with the Spanish 
 
Unless it be their request that you stay to protect them from the Scotch, if 
so then you are to remain there, taking care you use no violence against 
the Scotch, without they are the first aggressors, and send one of the 
ships to Jamaica to advise of the matter . . . if the Spaniards . . . nor think 
well of ye proposal in assisting them, you are to depart that place.
255
 
 
 
The account from Portobello, not surprisingly, projected a different perspective, reflecting 
a continuing distrust of the motives for the presence of the English fleet.  Admiral of the 
Barlovento fleet don Andrés de Pez had returned from his mission to Panama to discuss 
operations against the Scots to find a message on his flagship from the English Admiral.  
The Spaniard sent a vessel after Benbow, who had left that afternoon, leaving the three 
ships behind “under pretext of embarrassing the Scotch in any unbecoming design they 
might seek to execute against us”.  De Pez believed that the actual purpose of the small 
squadron was “just the contrary, his object being to hamper operations which from here 
might be undertaken against said Scotch, by so standing watch over any movement we 
might make”.
256
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 MHS, Hart Collection, Darien Item 18 (Translation of letter from don Andrés de Pez to 
the Crown, 10 June 1699).  The translation includes the correspondence between de Pez 
and Benbow discussed in the following paragraphs. 
In his report to the Crown, the Spanish Admiral included copies of both the letter from his 
English counterpart and his subsequent reply.  Benbow wrote of his frustration at the 
Portobello Governor´s claim that nothing could be done about releasing a detained English 
merchant as the prisoner was in de Pez´s custody, at the same time complaining that there 
seemed to be an effort to directly obstruct communication between the two Admirals. De 
Pez was challenged to provide an explanation for the continued detention.  “I await your 
honor´s reply”, Benbow wrote, “if your honor wish to make one or not, in order to advise 
the King, my master . . . Since your honor wishes to be arbiter the world over, detaining his 
vassals and goods without any shadow of justice . . .” 
 
The reply illustrates the murky claims and counterclaims of contemporary maritime 
diplomacy.  De Pez explained he had just returned aboard his flagship and received his 
correspondence.  Listing the concerns Benbow had communicated, the Spaniard wrote that 
he has been entrusted with protecting the dominions of his sovereign not only against 
enemies, but also against illicit traders.  In the course of these responsibilities he had 
captured the brigantine of one Juan Fleuet off Havana.  Fleuet, recognized as English, had 
been found in possession of treasure salvaged from a sunken ship, “a grave offense . . not 
permissible even to Spaniards”257.  The case had been forwarded to the Council of the 
Indies in Seville, where it would be judiciously administered in “the procedure to conclude 
matters of this sort, and which will satisfy your honor”.  Regarding the detained English 
merchant 
 
It is true that I purchased his flour in Cartagena harbour.  News that the 
Scotch had settled in these dominions under patents issued by the British 
King was the reason of his arrest, it being plain that had no such news 
arrived he would by now be in his own country, a free man.  It is equally 
clear that my course is justified, for if vassals of the British king, having 
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no right to do so, proceed as though possessed of absolute authority to 
intrude upon and settle his majesty´s territory, thereby occasioning 
expense to his royal treasury, how much greater justification have I to 
hold his British majesty´s vassals´ property. .?  I have no doubt that your 
honor´s comprehension will be convinced by this explanation . . .                                                    
 
 
De Pez continued, recounting the numerous times he had offered assistance to English 
vessels, clarifying that he has included the information “not that the English nation may be 
grateful to me, but that the gallantry of Spaniards and Englishmen may be known”.  He 
then returned to the case of Fleuet, noting the hospitality the Captain had received when 
aboard the Spanish flagship.  “If it is true that he has complained, this is to the discredit of 
the English nation, for he has lied barefacedly, and he should be punished.  I am deeply 
grieved by the insolence, with which he has defamed the credit of Spaniards.”   
 
Finally turning his attention to the question of the Scots in Darien, de Pez acknowledged 
that Benbow´s assurances that New Caledonia had been occupied contrary to the wishes of 
King William were at odds with the letters and patents he had seen.  Nevertheless,  
 
Accepting as more reliable the statements contained in your honor´s 
communications, and realizing that a gentleman of your honor´s qualities 
and employment could not by any means fall short of the truth, I have 
forthwith extended to your honor my entire confident relief.  I could 
never persuade myself that his British majesty could employ duplicity 
and issue patents as they claim, for in this instance to do so would 
involve implications unworthy of utterance against such majesty as his, 
therefore I am persuaded that the Scotch claim to possess a patent is 
false. 
 
In closing, and further testifying to the negative impact the establishment of New 
Caledonia maintained upon English commerce, Benbow was provided the sole assurance 
that “as soon as I know that the Scotch have left these dominions” the English merchant 
and his goods would be liberated.
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258
 MHS, Hart Collection, Darien Item 18. 
Frustrated and without satisfaction of his demands, Benbow proceeded to depart Portobello 
for Jamaica, leaving behind Captain Pickard and the reduced squadron to cope with both 
Spaniards and Scots as stipulated in his orders.  On May 10th the remaining ships stood off 
Portobello, plagued by sickness decimating their crew.  The log entry for 17 May notes 
that two-thirds of the ship´s company was sick, and from the nineteenth to the twentieth 
“men dying”.
259
  By the end of the month the small English fleet left by the Admiral was 
anchored off Cartagena, where they witnessed the arrival from Cadiz of the city´s new 
Governor, don Juan Pimienta, accompanied by three ships and orders to eliminate the 
presence of the Scots.  The new royal administrator was saluted by the reduced English 
squadron´s guns, returning the same.
260
   
 
 
      
  
 
            LIFE, DEATH AND THE PURSUIT OF MERCANTILE INTERESTS 
 
Benbow had since arrived back in Jamaica, prompting renewed friction between himself 
and Governor Beeston.  In a letter to Secretary of State Vernon dated 18 August 1699 the 
Governor acknowledged the high mortality affecting the fleet, but complained that  
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To recruit them he Impresses all, and even the men that belong to this 
place, and have wives and Familyes here, which has caused our seamen 
to desert the Island, and will undo the place, he will not allow me to have 
any thing to do on the matter . . . so that I cannot Exercise His Majtys 
Authority nor protect his subjects who complain to me of the Injurys and 
Insults they receive . . .261 
 
 
Into the strife sailed survivors from the Company of Scotland, verifying the abandonment 
of New Caledonia by the first expedition and precipitating additional interactions with the 
Admiral.  Captain Colin Campbell, following the death of Commodore Pennycook and 
“most of our Sea Officers, and a hundred and thirty or fourty of our men”, brought the 
desperate St. Andrew into Jamaica.  He requested assistance from Governor Beeston, “butt 
he could by no means suffer me to dispose of any goods for supplying my men, altho´ they 
should starve”.  He then turned to Benbow, asking for men to bring the ship from its 
anchorage to Port Royal, “she not being safe where she is”, but was again refused any 
assistance.  Campbell´s dire circumstances were expressed in his report to the Company of 
Scotland, which declared the probability of the men mutinying, “for they have nott a 
weeke´s bread, and besides, they expect to have their wages here”.
262
    
 
The presence of Benbow´s fleet, coupled with the arrival of the desperate Scottish 
survivors, would appear to indicate the opportunity of a labor supply for the former.  A 
comparison of the pay lists for the Admiral´s ships and those of Company of Scotland 
vessels, however, does not give an indication that there existed any wholesale effort to take 
on the men from New Caledonia, at least not under their actual names.  Benbow´s pay lists 
do reflect recruits and impressments, not only in Jamaica, but also in Cartagena and 
Portobello.  The sole indication of Darien survivor(s) serving in the English fleet involves 
William and David Strachan, who are documented as coming aboard the Maidstone at Port 
Royal, Jamaica on 12 February 1700.  William may have been the “Guillermo Estrafan” 
who had been interrogated by the President of Panama the previous month, following his 
desertion.  He had identified himself as having served on Caledonia, but neither he nor the 
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like-named David are listed on that vessel´s rolls.  It is, however, possible that they were 
not originally seamen but land men and had endured the pragmatic and challenging naval 
training that their circumstances demanded.263 
 
That at least some of the survivors who arrived with the St. Andrew did find employment 
among English military forces is documented in the case of William Hutchinson.  He had 
arrived in Caledonia with a relief expedition to find the colony abandoned and witnessed 
the burning of the Olive Branch and her vital store of provisions.264  Evaluating the 
remaining food supply and realizing the shortfall, his group had sailed for Jamaica.  They 
discovered the St. Andrew there, expecting it to go to sea within two weeks.  The infirmity 
and mortality of both the sea and land men among her crew, however, dictated 
Hutchinson´s opinion that the ship would have to remain in port until the Company made 
alternative arrangements.  Hutchinson himself had been severely ill but was now recovered 
and had been approached by one Colonel Knight regarding potential service commanding 
the forces at Port Royal.  Hutchinson provided assurances to the Directors that his first 
priority remained the Company of Scotland and that he had consulted with the surviving 
officers present in Port Royal prior to accepting the position.
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The news of Benbow´s presence in the Caribbean, and the potential threat posed towards 
New Caledonia, had not failed to reach Edinburgh.  As relief ships were being dispatched 
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there was speculation about the Admiral´s whereabouts and orders.  George Hume, who 
had invested 500 pounds in the venture the initial day of subscriptions, wrote in his diary 
of the gossip . . . 
 
We hope that if Jameson and Stark continued their course and were not 
interrupted (as some say they are by Bambo) we have 9 months 
provisions aboard and knowing there were recruits soon to follow would 
continue in their places . . . . there is talk as if Bambo should all ready 
have taken possession.
266
 
 
As events in the Caribbean ricocheted from the first abandonment of New Caledonia in 
June of 1699 to the arrival of the second Company of Scotland expedition in November of 
that year to the final March 1700 capitulation to the Spanish, the region continued to 
maintain the normalcy of competing for commercial trade advantage, legal and otherwise.  
Captain Pickard, following orders to command Benbow´s reduced squadron remaining off-
shore near Portobello, was not exempt.  Subject to the lure of contraband profit, the 
Captain would eventually find himself court-martialed following a petition instigated by 
his own men.  Among the list of “misdemeanours” he was accused of committing was that 
he had overstayed his ordered departure after sixteen days, and instead “stay´d there as 
many more by the persuation of his Clerke as I heard from himself to relate to sell 
merchant goods”.267 
 
The intrepid factor of the Royal African Company, Josiah Heathcote, appeared in 
Portobello in October, reporting his alarm at the presence off shore of eleven French and 
Dutch ships.  Failing to write of the competition they might present to his own employer, 
he assessed them to be detrimental to each other´s trade.  In port, he discovered that an 
imposing ship of 60 guns, “loaded with goods”, represented a new French trading 
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disorderly”. NA, ADM1/5261, ff. 223r-226r. 
company.  Expressing his concern, he warned that the situation “doth oblige the Jamaica 
merchants to conserve themselves for to preserve that trade which decays everday”.
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Benbow´s ships continued their patrols, the Lynn standing off Portobello from the 16th of 
September to the 3
rd
 of October, then sailing to Cartagena.  On the 22
nd
 of October she was 
anchored at Santa Marta, where she was fired upon three times.  After sending in a boat to 
demand the reason, they were told it was because they were thought to be Scots.
269
 
  
There was also at least one more direct interface between Benbow and representatives of 
the Company of Scotland.  When the relief vessel Margaret of Dundee reached St. Thomas 
her command sought, as directed, to obtain all information available concerning the fate of 
the colony.  Among the news they received, including the blockade of New Caledonia by 
the Spanish, was that Benbow and the Company´s Captain Thomas Drummond had been 
on the island simultaneously in October.  Drummond was headed back to Darien with 
supplies acquired in New York and had maintained “good correspondence” with the 
English Admiral, dining with him and “being very intimate”.
270
  There is no record of the 
content of their exchanges. 
 
The final departure of Benbow from the Caribbean in February of 1700 appears to indicate 
he was fully aware that the Spanish initiated offensive against New Caledonia would be 
effective and his own fleet staying in the region would provide any needed assistance as 
well as intelligence.  Sometime after the middle of the month Captain Allan of the 
Maidstone filed a report to the Admiralty, expressing appreciation for his new commission 
and notifying them that he had returned from “enquiring after the Scotch Settlement”.  His 
assessment was that “they every Day doe the Spaniards some damage”.
271
  The Spanish 
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fleet under Governor Pimienta had indeed arrived off New Caledonia and the smaller 
English squadron remained in the vicinity.  According to Reverend Francis Borland´s 
account  
 
an English Sloop came into our harbour, pretending to be from Jamaica, 
but was really a spy from the Spaniards, as afterwards we understood, 
they had gone from us to the Spaniards, and were in their company, 
when some few days after this, the Spaniards arrived upon our coast with 
their Fleet.  Likewise about the same time, there were about nine French-
men that dropt in among us, in a small Periago with Tortoises to sell to 
our chief men, that were able and willing to buy the same: and these also 
afterwards were found to be among our enemies; for there was a mixture 
of several nations serving in the Spanish fleet that came against us.
272
 
 
 
Whatever her precise role in the final days of New Caledonia, the Germoon was in Jamaica 
on the first of April.  Her Captain Boye filed his report to the Admiralty, notifying them 
that Benbow had left about a month prior for New England and Germoon   was fitted both 
with its full complement of men and six weeks provisions. He requested a continuance “in 
these parts, being well acquainted with ye Countrey & my men all Seasoned to it”.
273
   
 
The negotiations of the Articles of Capitulation undertaken at New Caledonia during  
March 1700 give no indication of any other than Spanish and Company of Scotland 
participation.  Direct roles of interests other than the primary two, if they existed, are 
undocumented. While the Scots prepared for final abandonment of their Darien enterprise, 
the distressed survivors finally had a surprising and pragmatic opportunity for a small 
piece of the lucrative trade that had prompted their dream.  An informal market sprang up 
between the formerly opposing forces.  The men  
 
With the allowance of the General, came and traded with our people, 
buying several of their commodities, which our men were very willing to 
sell to them: and by this means some of our people came to be provided 
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with money to bear their charges, when they arrived at another port, 
which proved a favorable providence to many of them.
274
 
 
As the remaining seaworthy Scottish ships left the bay, the varied cast which had sought 
their removal returned to their other assorted missions, equipped with an expanded 
understanding of allies and adversaries.  Upon his return to Cartagena, Pimienta had to face 
a new onslaught of accusations from the Cacheo Company regarding his interference with 
the asiento.  From Jamaica, Governor Beeston hinted at his relief not only of resolution of 
the Scottish problem, but also of the absence of the challenges of authority presented by 
Benbow . . . “Now the ships of war are gone all in quiet and amity.”275  The small English 
naval squadron remained along the Spanish Main until June, the Germoon logs recording 
her presence in the vicinity of Portobello and the nearby San Blas Islands.
276
 
 
On the opposite side of the Atlantic there were obvious acknowledgements of relief 
following both the first abandonment and the final capitulation.  In response to receipt of 
the news of the failure of the first Scottish expedition, Ambassador Methuen reported from 
Lisbon on the “very joyful” receipt of the news at the Court, based on the “great hindrance 
the settlement was to . . . furnishing the West Indies with negroes by our means”.277  To the 
English Secretary of Embassy in Paris, Alexander Stanhope wrote from Madrid to say the 
Court there was “extremely pleased with the advice of the Scots´ removal from Darien”.  
He acknowledged the offers of French assistance, adding that “I assure you it was very 
lustily promised, and would have certainly have been accepted, if the news has staid a little 
longer”.278 He reiterated the French position in a second communication, emphasizing to 
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his Secretary of State the opportune timing of the news, for King Carlos II of Spain had 
been anticipated to “declare that very day his acceptance or refusal to accept French help to 
rout the Scots . . . France to furnish 40 Men of War and 1200 land men”.279 Finally 
witnessing the expected end of a most uncomfortable series of events, King William III 
could experience some sense of relief over conflicts caused by his northern subjects, about 
whom he wrote to the Pensionary Heinsius prior to hearing of the capitulation 
 
I am sorry to be obliged to tell you that affairs go on very badly in the 
Scotch Parliament.  People there are like fools, on the subject of their 
colony of Darien, which they will not tolerate in England: this causes me 
great annoyance.  What vexes me in particular is that this affair retards 
my departure for Holland, for which I long more than ever.  I shall 
become ill, if I have to remain here longer . . .
280
 
 
 
The Caribbean would experience only a brief respite before the long-anticipated death of 
the King of Spain in November 1700 and ensuing conflicts over the Spanish succession.  
The survivors from New Caledonia would face continued perils as they struggled toward 
any source of security, whether it be labor in Jamaica, a new life in the North American 
colonies, or even transport to Old Spain following shipwreck.  Admiral Benbow, now well 
versed in managing a fleet on duty in the West Indies, had successfully completed a 
delicate mission that simultaneously ensured Scottish failure, eased the concerns of 
English, Portuguese and Dutch merchants, and provided a salve to the irritation of the 
Spanish over Darien.  Colonial officials along the Spanish Main had experienced the 
novelty of both French and English offers of assistance in protecting a highly strategic 
region of their King´s sovereign lands.  Whatever the vantage point, experience gained 
from coping with the Scottish attempt at colonization ensured that all parties in its wake 
were wiser regarding their competitors and more conversant concerning the intricate and 
delicately restored balance of conflicting interests within the Caribbean basin.  
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CHAPTER 5 
THE LONG REACH OF SPANISH JUSTICE 
 
Reaction to the Company of Scotland´s attempt to establish a permanent presence on the 
Isthmus of Panama was not limited to the military campaigns undertaken from both Spain 
and her American dominions281 nor political and economic discord between England and 
                                                 
281
 For discussion of the extent and implementation of the naval and military response see 
Storrs, Disaster?, Hart, The Disaster, pages 97-120 and 139-141, and Garcia Casares, 
Historia del Darién, pp. 250-261.  
Scotland nor diplomatic wrangling pertaining to the detention of the ships involved in the 
asiento trade.  The decision to also involve Spain´s justice system through its Casa de la 
Contratación in Sevilla was a manifestation of New Caledonia in the administrative heart 
of Spain´s empire.  The development was supported by the highest level of government in 
Madrid and instigated through established interfaces with Spanish Governors in the 
Americas and the assistance of naval personnel providing the transport of prisoners across 
the Atlantic.  The resulting trial and conviction of members of the Company of Scotland´s 
first expedition ignited not only high anxiety for the men involved, but resulted in urgent 
and complex diplomatic negotiation, culminating in direct correspondence between King 
William III and King Carlos II and reflecting the vital concern both sovereigns held for 
resolving the provocative and destabilizing actions undertaken by the Scottish enterprise to 
interpret and ignore existing treaties for its own benefit. 
 
The examination of the legal proceedings presented in this chapter is only made possible 
following the identification of the previously undiscovered trial record and associated 
correspondence in the Archive of the Indies.
282
  Not only does the material verify the 
elevated priority Spain attributed to the Scottish incursion and the protection of her 
holdings across the Atlantic, but it also reveals the clear determination of the Casa de la 
Contratación to pursue financial redress from the Company of Scotland and its 
management and investors.  In addition, the example of the judicial procedure provides a 
review of the Casa´s legal function and its process against international defendants accused 
of violating treaty stipulations.  Lastly, the documented testimonies of the five defendants 
comprise a rich collection of new detail pertaining to both the Company of Scotland´s 
struggle to establish and maintain New Caledonia and the individuals who participated.  
While the resulting convictions and death sentences intensified the web of existing 
tensions, they also activated a coterie of English and Dutch diplomats working in Madrid, 
Cadiz and Sevilla to fulfill anxious directives from London, extending the influence of 
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New Caledonia far beyond the shores of the Central American isthmus and directly into 
the highest echelons of international diplomacy. 
 
 
   THE CASA de la CONTRATACIÓN, THE TREATY of MADRID and ARRIVAL of  
                                  PRISONERS from NEW CALEDONIA 
 
By October 1699, when word reached the Council of State283 in Madrid via London that a 
second expedition from Scotland had sailed with additional arms, supplies and colonists, 
discussion turned to the pursuit of judicial means as well as military force to eradicate the 
Scottish presence.  The members of the Council, questioning the sincerity of King 
William´s efforts to castigate his subjects, agreed that the gravity of the matter required the 
application of all solutions legal and possible.284  
 
The pursuit of legal recourse in matters relating to Spain´s dominions in the Americas 
rested in the Consejo de Indias or Council of the Indies and its administrative institution, 
Sevilla´s Casa de la Contratación.   Initially established in 1503 and receiving its first set 
of ordinances and a designated university-trained judge by 1510, the Casa included a 
judicial arm assigned jurisdiction over both civil and criminal cases pertaining to trade and 
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 With a reach extending over all individuals who violated ordinances 
designed to protect Spain´s monopoly over her vast American territories, the institution´s   
functions allowed that defendants could be sent from any portion of the Spanish King´s 
dominions to trial in Sevilla and would be remanded to the complete control of that court, 
subject to review solely by the Council of the Indies.  Further, the Casa had the authority 
to inflict whatever degree of punishment was deemed appropriate.
286
  “Strangers” were 
succinctly prohibited to trade in the Indies “without express license and permission from 
His Majesty” and the value of all confiscated goods were to be distributed in equal 
measure to the King, the judges and any informer.  All cases considered would be given 
both a hearing and a rehearing, with the options for punishment in criminal convictions to 
include “loss of life, loss of limb, exposing to public shame . . . and other corporal 
punishment”.
287
 
 
Providing the basis for prosecution specifically pertaining to the subjects of King William 
III at the end of the seventeenth century, remarkable for its listing of offenses realized 
through actions undertaken by the Scottish Darien initiative, was the Treaty of Madrid.  
Concluded in 1670 the treaty between the Crowns of Great Britain and Spain had been the 
latest attempt to assure the “composing of differences, restraining of depradations, and the 
establishing of Peace in America . . .” Towards those ambitious ends, the monarchs were 
entrusted with the responsibility to monitor the behavior of their own subjects to eradicate 
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“all Force and wrong doing”, further denouncing “whatsoever League, Confederation . . , 
which doth or may impugn against this Peace and Concord”.  Specifically included was the 
revocation of all commissions and letters of marque to take prizes or conduct reprisals.  
Criminal punishment was sanctioned for offenders, as was the requirement to make 
“restitution and Satisfaction for the Losses to the Parties damnified”.   
 
Of critical value to Great Britain had been the stipulation of the treaty formally conceding 
the possession of “any part of America” then held, which provided tacit sanction for her 
possession of Jamaica.  Although the island´s strategic location was instrumental in 
England´s lucrative commerce across the Atlantic and the Caribbean, the treaty also 
attempted to maintain Spain´s monopoly over general commerce with her own American 
holdings.  Allowed safe haven to seek shelter and harbour, ships of both nations were 
nevertheless required to stay no longer than the pertinent Governor or Chief Magistrate 
would allow.  The conduct of illicit trade, a continuing and perverse condition, remained 
expressly forbidden.  “The subjects of Great Britain”, the treaty declared, “shall not sail 
unto, and Trade in, the Havens and Places which the Catholique King holdeth in the said 
Indies”.
288
 
 
The arrival and establishment of the Scots on the Isthmus was regarded by Spain as a 
direct assault on her sovereignty and a breach of the stipulations of the 1670 treaty.  The 
February 1699 acquisition of prisoners, trade goods and incriminating documents resulting 
from the beaching of the Dolphin in Cartagena provided a wealth of both evidence and 
defendants to submit to the judicial arm of the Casa de la Contratación.  The arrival the 
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following month of an embassy from New Caledonia demanding the return of the ship, her 
cargo and her crew, coupled with threats of reprisals should satisfaction not be 
forthcoming, prompted a Council of War consultation and the immediate refusal on all 
counts by the Governor of Cartagena.  It was further decided that the prisoners should be 
submitted to Sevilla for trial to “give account to Your Majesty”.  Four individuals, Captain 
Robert Pincarton, Captain John Malloch, pilot James Graham and the boy David Wilson 
were designated to be transported, with the remaining surviving men to be distributed to 
supplement the crews of Spanish warships currently in the port.289 
 
From his prison cell, Pincarton had received word of the first abandonment of the Darien 
colony in June and had petitioned the new Governor to either free his men and himself or 
allow them to depart for one of the English islands.  In response, Pimienta had told him 
that the former Governor had given such a bad report of the Scottish Vice-Admiral and 
Councilor that release was not possible and that he would be remanded to Old Spain.  As 
promised, the three men and one boy were dispatched in September to Havana aboard an 
advice boat, recently fitted with the guns from the Dolphin, to initiate the long journey 
back across the Atlantic. Upon their arrival in Cuba they found themselves again 
imprisoned and in irons.290  It was also in Havana that they experienced an unanticipated 
reunion with the translator for the Company of Scotland, Benjamin Spencer, whose 
abandonment by his comrades and subsequent confinement and interrogation is discussed 
in Chapter 3.   
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The consolidated group of five defendants would next be boarded onto the homebound 
fleet of General of the Guarda Costa, don Martin de Aranguren Zavala.  Zavala, with his 
flagship San Ignacio and her two escorts, had arrived from Veracruz intending to proceed 
to Cartagena and on to expel the Scots from Darien. As word arrived in Havana 
corroborating initial reports of the abandonment of New Caledonia the relevance of the 
orders was reassessed.  Deciding to take advantage of the new circumstances, Zavala 
instead sailed for home on 2 October.
291
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          Figure 3:  The Long Journey Home:  Cartagena, Havana, Cadiz, Sevilla 
  Source:  J.H. Elliott, Spain and Its World 1500-1700 (New Haven 1989), frontpiece. 
 
 
Two days out of Havana communication with an unidentified ship from Jamaica 
requesting information about the prisoners would concern the Casa de la Contratación 
sufficiently that inquiries about the vessel would enter the questioning in the subsequent 
trial.  The prisoners, who were held aboard a ship other than the one communicating with 
the unfamiliar vessel, reported that they could identify the ship´s construction as being 
English, but that they had no knowledge of the content of or motivation for the dialogue 
that transpired.  John Malloch did report that the ship, which he recognized from the river 
in London, appeared to be that of Captain David Breholt.292 
 
Evidence indicates Malloch´s identification was correct, and that Breholt´s actual mission 
would have been of high interest to the Spanish had it been revealed.  The Carlisle had 
recently been active across the Caribbean, being documented in Montserrat in August prior 
to joining a chase after a pirate off St. Thomas on the seventeenth of the month.293  Entries 
in the log of the Falmouth, one of Admiral Benbow´s fleet, note that in the first days of 
September, the Carlisle, a merchant ship commanded by “Boryholt” had sailed “being 
bound on A Spanish wracke that lyes off of the Havannah”.
294
  Admiral Benbow also 
acknowledged the vessel, writing to Secretary of State Vernon that he had sailed from 
Jamaica in September in company of the Carlisle “in order to countenance Captain 
Brahoult who was going also on a wreck which was cast away two years since off the 
Havana with great treasure.  We all sailed together”.
295
  Although no documentation 
indicates any direct relationship with the Scottish prisoners, the inquiry made by Breholt is 
intriguing.  Certainly the English captain may have known Pincarton or the other men 
through their earlier mercantile careers and he would have heard while in Jamaica of the 
plight of the prisoners.  It may have been significant that Pincarton himself had experience 
recovering Spanish treasure, having served as boatswain for Sir William Phips during an 
expedition to the Caribbean during the late 1680s.  At the least, the incident is illustrative 
of the informal yet intricate communication networks that existed across the Caribbean and 
the Atlantic.296 
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 Apparently without additional unusual events, the homecoming fleet and her cargo of 
detainees sailed into Cadiz in mid December, where the five New Caledonia veterans 
would once again find themselves placed in irons.
297
  Their presence soon came to the 
attention of the port´s English consul, Martin Westcombe, who took up their cause and 
wrote to the Marquis of Narros, President of the Casa de la Contratación, pleading that the 
men had not been “found in the exercise of any thing that was prohibited, but were only 
sailing to the parts of the dominion of the King of Great Brittain with marchandizes of 
their own manufacture”.  The service of the prisoners on board the San Ignacio during the 
Atlantic crossing was cited, informing the Marquis of their “being the most forward on all 
occasions of danger that offer´d in the whole course of the voyage”.  This initial diplomatic 
effort requesting the men´s release realized only an oral reply, relaying that no resolution 
would be forthcoming without the King´s order.298  Nevertheless, the activation of 
involvement by Consul Westcombe and his deputy, a Scot named James Chalmers, 
                                                                                                                                                    
to attract official attention.  On 10 June 1700 Governor Nicholson of Virginia wrote to the 
Council of Trade and Plantations “Last night William Clay, master of the Endeavor of 
South Carolina, who is arrived in York River, told me that Captain Breholt, commander of 
the Carlisle, 36 guns and 120 men, who had been tried for piracy in South Carolina some 
time before and acquitted, sailed out of Ashley River about March 26, came to anchor 
without the bar, landed on Sallevard´s Island, and there killed a great many cows, hogs and 
goats, the best of which they carried on board.  He told Captain Clay he designed either to 
sail for Smith´s Island in Virginia, to get some provisions, or else to Cape de Verd.  I have 
no doubt you will put HMS Shoreham in a condition to cruise as soon as possible, and 
hope you may take this Captain Breholt.”  C. Headlam (ed.), CSP, Colonial Series, 
America and the West Indies, 1700 (London 1910), Item 523 xv (11). 
297 Burton, The Darien Papers, p. 103.  The five Darien survivors were not the only 
arrivals to face questionable circumstances.  General Zavala would come under suspicion 
and experience a short imprisonment by the Casa de la Contratación when he failed to 
complete his entry documents or allow the requisite inspection.  The matter was 
compounded by several accounts of French and English launches ferrying materials from 
his flagship on a moonless night.  Zavala responded that, due to his rank and status, he was 
not subject to the Casa´s jurisdiction and that the launches were only bringing foreign 
officers to express their congratulations on his successful sail, an action for which he was 
compelled to provide appropriate hospitality. AGI, Indiferente 2015 (unfoliated), report 
prepared by the Marquis of Narros, January 18, 1700.  The failure of Zavala to complete 
his own reporting while conducting whatever other activities he was undertaking appears 
to have created a delay in bringing the arrival of the prisoners to the attention of the Casa. 
298
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instituted what would become continuing efforts to mitigate the prisoners´ conditions and 
seek their release.  Immediate benefits were liberation of the men from chains and the 
instigation of communication with the Company of Scotland, the men´s families and the 
English Secretary of State.
299
  
 
Despite the seemingly positive steps, however, the prescribed examination by the Casa´s 
judicial arm proceeded.  At the end of March 1700 the men, still accompanied by the boy 
David Wilson, were again put in irons and loaded into a small boat for the trip up the 
Guadalquivir River to Sevilla, where the Casa´s own jail and the case against them and the 
Company of Scotland awaited.
300
  The log of the royal prison documents their arrival in 
custody of boat owner Diego Gomes in April 1700.
301
  The long reach of Spanish justice 
had retrieved the Scottish dream of a trading empire in Darien and presented it before the 
jurisdiction of the formidable and experienced Casa de la Contratación. 
 
 
                              ADJUDICATING THE DREAM OF EMPIRE 
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 The trial took place in Sevilla throughout the months of April and May 1700,
302
 punctuated 
by short recesses: translation services were secured from Benjamin Pitis, an Englishman 
and Catholic living in the city
303
 and Joseph Moreno, appointed as a special legal guardian 
for defendants David Wilson and James Graham due to their minority ages, was given time 
to prepare the defense of his clients.
304
  Once the initial examination of expedition 
translator Benjamin Spencer was completed, presiding Judge Manuel de la Chica ordered 
that the prisoners be restricted to separate quarters and prevented from communication 
with each other and outsiders.
305
  Each prisoner was brought twice before the tribunal to 
testify and outside witnesses were also solicited, notably Captain Don Bartolome Antonio 
Garrote of Sevilla, aboard whose advice boat the prisoners had been transported from 
Cartagena to Havana.
306
 
 
The critical importance of the study of the trial record, however, rests in the lines of 
questioning undertaken during the dual examinations of each prisoner.  These themes of 
interrogation (here identified as 1. Exploring the Intent to Invade the Dominions of his 
Catholic Majesty; 2. A Question of Trade; and 3. Indicting the Company of Scotland) 
indicate what were considered by Spain to be the most critical aspects of the Company of 
Scotland initiative.  They also illustrate the efficacy of intelligence gathered and 
transferred across Spanish institutions to reach inclusion among the points of inquiry 
pursued by the judges of the Casa.  Lastly, they explore the intent of the Spanish justice 
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system to seek recompense from the Company of Scotland and its principals, a motivation 
previously omitted from analyses of the consequences of the Darien expeditions due to the 
lack of knowledge of the trial record´s existence. 
 
1. Exploring the Intent to Invade the Dominions of his Catholic Majesty 
 
The trio of Spanish judges confronting the five defendants was incredulous that the 
Scottish fleet could not have known their destination or grasped its critical jurisdictional 
situation within their King´s American dominions.
307
  Why, they questioned Spencer, 
would anyone sail without knowing their destination?  What would happen in the case of 
separation due to storms or accident?
308
  The interrogators could not comprehend how the 
translator, in light of his testimony that he had worked in customs enforcement while in 
London, could not have comprehended where the expedition was intending to sail.309   
 
When it came to the professional seamen, the disbelief was just as acute.  In response to 
Pincarton´s account of sailing under a series of closed orders to be opened only upon 
reaching specific destinations, de la Chica and his fellows refused to accept that a Captain 
claiming over sixteen years of marine experience and holding membership on the seven 
man Council of New Caledonia appointed in Scotland could not have understood where 
the fleet was headed.
310
  Reiterating ignorance of their final destination within the 
dominions of the Spanish King, Malloch claimed that, prior to departure, some said they 
were going to Africa and others claimed they would sail to the Amazon, which appeared to 
them to be within Portuguese territory.311  
 
                                                 
307
 The contention by the defendants that they had not been privy to their ultimate 
destination would have seemed all the more implausible due to the fact that the Spanish 
had obtained word of the plan to go to Darien as early as 1697, when a letter submitted 
from Hamburg transmitted the departure for Scotland of two of the Company´s ships and 
stated they were intended for an expedition to Darien.  AGI, Panamá 159, f. 658. 
308
 AGI, Contratación 5726A, Ramo 2, ff. 32v., 56r. 
309
 Ibid, f.172v. 
310
 Ibid, ff. 53r-57v. 
311
 Ibid, f. 218v. 
Asked specifically about their understanding of the prohibition against sailing to Spanish 
territories without express permission, the men claimed a lack of awareness of the law until 
they had become prisoners in Cartagena and learned otherwise from Spaniards.  Pincarton 
did relate efforts to investigate the populations along the coast near their chosen site to 
ascertain current jurisdiction, but explained that those efforts discovered only natives and a 
few Frenchmen, none of whom identified the area as under Spanish control.
312
  Pincarton, 
Malloch and Graham all testified their sole interest in the expedition was their salaries, the 
Vice-Admiral emphasizing his responsibilities to his wife and family.313  Malloch admitted 
that he had recognized from maps the proximity of the site of New Caledonia to Panama, 
Cartagena and Portobello, but that the local Indians had assured them they were not within 
lands of the Spanish crown.
314
  
 
The judges also inquired about the military composition of the expedition and the intent 
and actions to establish a permanent, fortified presence on the Isthmus.  Demanding the 
reason for construction of the armed fortifications of which they had acquired detailed 
descriptions, the judicial panel received the response that the fort was for defensive 
purposes only.  Pincarton stated to the skeptical judges that the substantial quantity of one 
hundred cannon had not been intended as offense against the subjects of the Spanish King, 
but constituted a defense “against pirates, Indians or Spaniards that came like enemies”.
315
 
 
Repeating much of the content of interrogations obtained from a wide range of both 
foreign and domestic sources in Cartagena, Havana, and Portobello, detailed information 
regarding the military force and composition of the personnel of the expedition was 
acquired from each prisoner.  In addition to the inventory of the ships and their firepower 
and details of the constructed land defenses, the presence of an engineer was a point of 
inquiry.
316
  Spencer explained that, although the expedition did not include a professional 
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engineer, Captain Thomas Drummond, who had served the King of England for many 
years in Flanders, had gained knowledge of fortifications during that service and had been 
put in charge of construction activity at Fort St. Andrew.  In response to questions of 
manpower, the existence of companies of infantry on board the ships, the specific names of 
their Captains, and the ample complimentary inventory of arms were all detailed.
317
  
Throughout the entire testimony there was not a single reference to the “planter” moniker 
discussed in Chapter 2 and established by the Company of Scotland to profess a non-
militant motive for its expeditions. 
 
Exemplifying the arrival and review of intelligence from American officials, the reprisals 
committed by representatives from New Caledonia following the Governor of Cartagena´s 
refusal to relinquish the prisoners was also a point of scrutiny.  The judges asked Spencer 
why two armed sloops had been dispatched with orders to go along the coast from 
Portobello to Cartagena and imprison friars or persons of importance to negotiate for the 
held Scots.  Failing to locate appropriate individuals, two barques had been seized carrying 
corn, hens, sugarcane and beans and the goods transported back to the settlement.  
Following a reminder of the severity of the crime, Spencer´s defense was that he didn´t 
take part as he was neither a soldier nor an official.318 
 
Expressing particular alarm following intelligence confirming the November 1699 arrival 
in Darien of the second Scottish fleet, the judges of the Casa also probed into the potential 
future intentions of the Company of Scotland.
319
  Spencer, who had retained a presence in 
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 In October of 1699 Governor Pimienta had written the King, recommending occupation 
of the site of New Caledonia and warning “they may return with greater strength”.  Hart, 
the colony longer than the other four prisoners, could speak first-hand to the intent and 
conditions of the initial abandonment.  They had been seeking refuge in Boston, he related, 
to resupply and return to Scotland.  The decision to abandon the site had resulted from 
their scant supplies and the absence of any word of the relief convoy that was anticipated 
from Scotland.  They had simply lost hope, particularly after hearing of the proclamations 
of their own King prohibiting providing them any assistance.  New Caledonia´s structures, 
including 130 of wood and cane, two or three others built to sell rum, beer and other 
commodities, and the fort had been abandoned as they were because word had been 
received of forces coming against them and they were not able to defend themselves.  Fully 
one half of the population had been suffering from illness.
320
 
 
Regardless of their continual and prolonged imprisonment, the detainees reported that they 
had received information on the whereabouts of some of their expedition´s original ships.  
While in Cadiz they had been told by fellow detainees from England that the St. Andrew 
was in Jamaica, the Caledonia in Scotland and the Unicorn in New England.  Pincarton 
added that he had heard that it had been published in newspapers that another group had 
actually returned to Darien.
321
   
 
2. A Question of Trade 
 
At the end of the seventeenth century Spain had not been able to adequately supply its 
overseas dominions, nor had she been able to effectively halt contraband trade and foreign 
incursion.322  In particular, the coastal provinces of New Granada, notably Riohacha, Santa 
Marta and Cartagena, had become the most important sites within the entire empire for 
                                                                                                                                                    
The Disaster, p. 113.  Notification of the actual second arrival of the Scots was submitted 
by the President of Panama to the Crown in mid-January 1700.  Ibid, Appendix XXX, p. 
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 For a discussion of the interplay between theses economic realities see J.R. Fisher, The 
Economic Aspects of Spanish Imperialism in America, 1492-1810 (Liverpool 1997), 
especially Chapters 6 and 7. Clarence Haring´s Trade and Navigation between Spain and 
the Indies in the Time of the Hapsburgs (Cambridge 1918) provides a comprehensive 
account of the conditions within that shorter time period. 
accessing the lucrative illegal Spanish American trade.
323
 Considering both Treaty of 
Madrid prohibitions forbidding subjects of Great Britain to trade within the territories over 
which it held responsibility, and the unequivocal Company of Scotland effort to construct a 
permanent base on the strategic site of the Isthmus, the judges of the Casa de la 
Contratación was acutely interested in exploring the commercial intent of its defendants.  
The extraordinary February 1699 arrival on Cartagena´s beach of the Dolphin, the 
composition of her crew and cargo, the attempts of her Captains to identify themselves as 
English and fly English colors, and the collection of documents discarded hurriedly into 
the sea, comprised a strong case substantiating the Scots´ intent to conduct illicit 
commerce.
324
  There was also testimony from Captain Garrote, who had transported the 
prisoners on the initial leg of their journey to Old Spain, and would provide incriminating 
evidence substantiating the principal role of Captain Pincarton in the illegal commercial 
motivations of the Scottish Company.   
 
Not surprisingly, the general story presented by the Scots regarding the Dolphin´s mission 
and trading activities at New Caledonia painted an innocent picture of struggles to 
maintain expedition participants and denials of pursuing contraband trade.  Pincarton 
declared their linen and wool was destined for Baruada in exchange for much needed 
provisions.  If they were unable to secure the required goods, he elaborated, the Dolphin 
was to proceed to Scotland to give account of their perilous circumstances.
325
  Malloch 
gave the additional information that the Endeavor, which he had commanded from 
Scotland, carried a large quantity of linen while the stores aboard the beached vessel in 
Cartagena had included white and colored linen, shoes, silks and stockings.326  In response 
to questions about plans to establish sugar and tobacco works, Pincarton denied hearing of 
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any such intentions, but Graham divulged that he had indeed heard that such plans were 
under consideration.
327
  Graham also related that he hadn´t witnessed any commerce 
during his brief months at Darien except for limited barter of shirts and old coats to the 
native population in return for bananas and other agricultural products.
328
  The men did 
admit that a Dutch ship had entered their bay seeking refuge from the presence of the 
Barlovento fleet, one or two vessels had come from Jamaica to fish for turtle, a French ship 
was obtaining wood and water, and yet another arrival from New England had brought 
supplies of wheat and salted fish.329  Clearly, New Caledonia was attracting an 
international interest. 
 
The testimony of Captain Don Bartolome Antonio Garrote presented a contrasting portrait 
of the objectives of the Dolphin.  The Captain, a resident of Sevilla, informed the tribunal 
that he had received orders from the Governor of Cartagena to take four prisoners to 
Havana and forward to the Governor there the request that his passengers remain confined 
until they could be transported on to Old Spain.  He testified that it had been public 
knowledge that the Scots had been frustrated by their failure to instigate trade with the 
coastal areas of Santa Maria and Panama.  Furthermore, attributing the information to other 
prisoners in Cartagena, he had been told of Pincarton´s high position within the Company 
of Scotland and that he had expended up to 80,000 pesos
330
 toward the preparation of the 
squadron and that the goal of the enterprise was to establish itself in Darien and pursue 
trade with the Spanish territories of Tierra Firme and Peru.  Towards that end, he 
continued, the Scots were to dispatch small ships to the Darien River and penetrate into 
trading markets with the inland cities of Popayan and Antioquia, both part of the Spanish 
territory of New Granada.
331
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 AGI, Contratación 5726A, Ramo 2, ff. 152v-154v.  Garrote´s testimony is undermined 
by his own controversies with the Casa de la Contratación.  In December of 1699 he was 
required to make his own declaration as to the reasons why he had not completed his 
 The incriminating testimony was corroborated by Captain Philipe del Real, who had served 
in Garrote´s squadron.  The mariner, who resided across the river from Sevilla in the 
community of Triana, stated his acquaintance with the defendants.  Not specifying his 
source, he said he had learned during the transit from Cartagena to Havana that the 
establishment of the fort in Darien was to facilitate trade with New Granada, Tierra Firme 
and Peru, but that the Scots had been motivated to abandon the site due to its harmful 
climate.332   
 
As the defendants were brought forth for their second round of examinations, they were 
probed both on the damning information acquired from the Spanish naval personnel and 
further on the intent of the Company of Scotland to pursue contraband trade.  The latter 
was substantiated, they noted, by the specific appropriateness for the Spanish West Indies 
of the trade goods the Dolphin was transporting.  Although the judges were primarily 
investigating the commercial intent of the Scots, their auxiliary evaluation regarding the 
suitability of the cargo is in marked contrast to the general criticism and even ridicule that 
has been assigned to the product inventory throughout the Darien historiography.  Given 
the cumulative concern shown by the Casa, which for two hundred years had administered 
the governance and commerce of Spain´s American dominions, reappraisal of the degree 
of criticism leveled at the Company´s cargo is warranted.  Further, without clear definition 
of the intended market, which was the base of the arguments made in Sevilla, an accurate 
evaluation of the suitability of the cargo cannot be effectively undertaken.
333
   
                                                                                                                                                    
necessary documentation and had veered away from the convoy under General Zavala, 
instead entering the port of San Lucar.  AGI, Indiferente 2015, unfoliated.  Garrote´s 
conflicts with the Casa appear to have been habitual, as evidenced by continuing 
accusations of using his advice boat to transport unregistered cargo.  AGI, Indiferente 316 
(Papeles sobre el caso de Don Barme. Garrote, 29 November 1701).  
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 Michael Fry, exemplifying the criticism, writes in The Scottish Empire (Edinburgh 
2001) “English proclamations might have made no difference had the Scots carried with 
them goods that traders wanted to buy” (p. 29).  Douglas Watt addresses the issue in The 
Price of Scotland by noting that the “image of vessels carrying useless wigs and bibles has 
proved a powerful one, influencing historians down to the present day,” but counters that 
assessment with the explanation of the small per centage of the total cargo that these 
 Spencer, for instance, was again demanded to explain why, since the linens, wigs, lumber, 
staves for making pipes and woolens that were on board the Dolphin were commodities 
regularly traded to the West Indies and not to Africa or Asia, he could not have determined 
where the fleet was destined, particularly with his customs experience.  He responded that 
the expectation of the Scots had been to trade with English, Dutch and French, but not with 
Spanish.  He flatly denied knowing anything about trade with Panama or Santa Maria, only 
that the Dolphin had been ordered to Baruada.  The textiles they were transporting, he 
elaborated, were intended for Jamaica, the Baruadas and Montserrat, all territories of the 
English King.  In response to the specific accusations leveled by Captain Garrote, the 
linguist reiterated his claim that he knew nothing of plans to trade with Spaniards.  
Cautioned by the judges to tell the truth and reminded of the Company of Scotland 
documents obtained and submitted to them by the Governor of Cartagena, Spencer 
maintained his stance that, although the Company had been created with the sanction of the 
Scottish parliament and the King of England, they did not expressly say where a colony 
would be established, only that it would be in Asia, Africa or America in territory not held 
by any European prince.
334
  
 
Pincarton was recalled, told that he would be required to submit testimony for a second 
time, and given a review of the grave consequences provided for breaches of the treaty of 
peace between the Spanish and English Kings.  He was also reminded that the importance 
of his dual positions of Vice-Admiral and Councilor made him privy to the highest levels 
of decision-making by the Company of Scotland.335  Apprised of the information acquired 
from Captain Garrote, which was said to be originally provided by the very men he had 
sailed with to Cartagena on the Dolphin, he was asked to explain his substantial 80,000 
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peso investment in the Company, particularly when he had claimed ignorance of the 
destination of the fleet.  Forcefully denying the accusations, Pincarton claimed he had no 
funds other than his salary, especially since he had lost two ships to France during war 
between that country and England, having been imprisoned and his goods confiscated both 
times.
336
  Now, with the Dolphin in Cartagena, he had again lost everything. Furthermore, 
he had not even heard of the places known as Antioquia and Popayan until this very hour.  
He claimed complete ignorance of any motivation to trade with Santa Maria or Panama 
and reiterated that they had been sailing to Baruada when they were forced to run onto the 
beach near Cartagena.
337
 
 
Garrote´s accusations were also presented to Malloch and Graham.  The former flatly 
denied having said ten words to the Spanish Captain during the passage from Cartagena to 
Havana and claimed the major portion of the merchandise they transported was for the 
squadron itself, with the wigs, woolens and shoes to be utilized as trade goods for the 
English islands.
338
   Graham´s response was to explain that the goods they carried could be 
used everywhere and were to be sold in English and Dutch islands.   
 
 
3. Indicting The Company of Scotland 
 
The accusation of illegal trade had not been admitted to by any of the prisoners, but the 
Casa was well aware of the larger organization behind the four men and one boy held 
within their walls.  In turning its attention to testimony regarding the composition and 
authority of The Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies, the judicial body 
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of the Casa de la Contratación initiated an effort to secure redress far beyond the 
persecution of the five operatives held in Sevilla.  The judges acknowledged that 
Pincarton´s role as Vice-Admiral and Councilor identified him as the highest ranking 
among the men held in their custody and the accusations leveled by Captain Garrote 
indicated a position of greater influence than the prisoner would admit.  While the Scot´s 
actual status and orders would remain a point of contention, it was also well recognized 
that there were more elevated personages and an association of financial backers 
supporting the establishment of New Caledonia.  With their accumulated documents and 
intelligence in hand, the judges sought to gain additional evidence to pursue their case 
against the parent organization that had brazenly attempted to establish a permanent 
presence in Darien and secure influence over the broad territory of the Isthmus and its 
strategic position as the narrowest point between the waters of the Atlantic and the Pacific. 
 
The pursuit of information regarding the Company of Scotland corporate structure was 
understandably largely directed at Pincarton, who had admitted early in his testimony that 
he had heard from his wife that his employer was actively soliciting King William for the 
men´s release.  Asked for the specific names of those who comprised the authority of the 
Company as it was formed and sanctioned by the Scottish parliament, the Vice-Admiral  
and one of seven Councilors appointed in Scotland replied that he only knew that the major 
part of the nobility of the Kingdom of Scotland was involved.
339
  A less elusive response 
was forthcoming from the young pilot James Graham, who specifically identified the Duke 
of Hamilton, Lord Panmure and the Marquis of Tweeddale as among those instrumental in 
Company affairs, although he too related wide participation among Scottish nobility.  The 
widespread support had also been described by Spencer, who when asked to relate the 
number and status of investors, responded that there were between 150 and 200, including 
some women.  He couldn´t recall their names, but included among them was a wide range 
of individuals, from dukes, marquises, and counts to merchants and tradesmen, all from 
Scotland.340 
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During the second round of testimony the judges returned to identifying principals who 
had founded and funded the corporation.  Pincarton explained that none of them present in 
Sevilla had been party to forming the Company, nor did any of them hold any financial 
interest in it.  The Governor of Cartagena had in his possession a document, printed in 
English, which listed all the subscribers and the amount they had invested, as well as a 
copy of the patent received from the King of England sanctioning the Company.
341
 
 
Signaling an official Spanish recognition of the credibility of King William´s claims of 
ignorance of the Scot´s intent to establish themselves in Darien, Pincarton was reminded 
that the Company´s activities were not only an offense against the Spanish Crown, but that 
the enterprise had simultaneously represented an offense against its own King.  Why, the 
Vice-Admiral was asked, had they continued the occupation of their colony and 
construction of homes and fortifications when their own King had issued the proclamations 
prohibiting any form of assistance or interaction with them?  To this accusation Pincarton 
could justifiably respond that they were unaware of the proclamations when they left 
Scotland.  Perhaps the news of them had been one of the motivations for abandoning New 
Caledonia, but he could not say as he had been a prisoner in Cartagena during that time.
342
 
 
The remaining prisoners were also questioned both about the founders of the Company of 
Scotland and Pincarton´s specific status.  Malloch reiterated that none of his comrades 
before the Casa, including Pincarton, were among the names on the list he had read of 
individuals establishing the corporation.  In rebuttal to the accusation that Pincarton had 
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80,000 pesos invested in the enterprise, Malloch declared that it was totally false, for he 
had known the Vice-Admiral for many years and he knew that his personal fortune had 
never reached 2,000 pesos in all his life.343  Graham testified that he had never heard of 
any of his companions having any part in the establishment of the enterprise, nor Pincarton 
investing even a maravedi.  As for the proclamations from their own King, the pilot said he 
too had only heard of them during his imprisonment in Cartagena.
344
  
 
The weeks of questioning finally came to a conclusion with the second deposition of 
eleven year old David Wilson, still accompanied by his court-appointed advocate Joseph 
Moreno, on 15 May 1700.  The youth was pressed about what he may have heard from his 
father or others about the designs and interests of the Company of Scotland.  Sounding 
confused and anxious, likely echoing the emotions of the four men who had accompanied 
him across the Atlantic, the orphaned boy simply said he didn´t know or hadn´t heard 
anything about the matters.
345
 
 
 
          
 
 
 
             
       DEATH SENTENCE, DELAYED RESPONSE and LINGERING CONCERN 
 
It could have been no surprise given the content and tone of the court´s proceedings when, 
at the end of June, came the sentence from the Casa de la Contratación substantiating all 
negative predictions.  For their crime of having 
 
gone from the said Kingdom of Scotland to the country called Darien, 
with a squadron of five ships of war, carrying various articles of 
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merchandise, and for having built there forts and houses, and committed 
other acts mentioned in the report . . . we must pronounce them guilty on 
these heads.346 
 
Pincarton, Malloch, Graham and Spencer were all condemned to death, David Wilson 
being excepted and liberated on account of his age, but being prohibited from ever 
returning to Spain´s dominions in the Americas.  The time and manner of the four 
executions were to be determined.  All goods belonging to the men, as well as the Dolphin 
and her cargo, were to be confiscated.  The sentence was to be immediately dispatched to 
Governor Pimienta in Cartagena so that he could forward to Spain the proceeds from the 
sale of the ship and goods as expeditiously as possible. 
 
The judgment also addressed the broader scope of culpability . . . . 
 
The Duke of Hamilton
347
, Lord Panmure, the Marquis of Tweeddale, and 
others of the kingdom of Scotland who, although subjects of the King of 
Great Britain, formed without his permission a company to promote this 
armed settlement in Darien, Panecop (Pennecuik), commodore of the 
said squadron and other naval and military captains together with several 
other officers, as well as the members appointed as a board of the said 
company who embarked in the said squadron, all mentioned in the 
records of the said trial, and those who remained in the kingdom of 
Scotland, who are all worthy of punishment for so detestable an outrage, 
it has been ordered to the end that the good understanding between the 
crowns of England and Spain, which all the above accused have violated, 
be maintained, that there shall be drawn up a duly authenticated copy of 
the records proving the truth of these accusations, to be transmitted by 
the Lords of the Privy Council to the Spanish ambassador . . . to be 
communicate in the name of the King our Lord to the King of Great 
Britain, and that the said Minister make urgent appeal to his Majesty of 
Great Britain to order his Councils, Parliament, or other Courts of Justice 
to punish in an exemplary manner the said culprits, representing to him 
the great damage this outrage has caused the crown of Spain, and the 
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inconvenience which will result to the whole of Europe if they are 
allowed to go unpunished.  We also command that an account be made 
out in all the departments concerned of the whole expenses we have been 
obliged to incur in this kingdom by reason of this invasion, for the outfit 
of the squadron sent to Darien and to the Golden Islands to subdue them, 
and all the other expenses incurred in consequence, and that these 
accounts with the above proceedings be presented to his Majesty of 
Great Britain, to the end that he may order his councils and Courts of 
Justice to charge them to the said Scottish company, so that we may 
receive from them complete and just satisfaction, and that the result of 
the efforts made by our Minister together with these proceedings may 
enable the King and the Ministry of War hereafter to resolve what may 
be most fitting for the service of his Majesty.
348
 
 
 
The situation in Sevilla had been closely monitored from Company of Scotland 
headquarters in Edinburgh,
349
 but the eventuality of the sentence created a new intensity of 
concern.  The Court of Directors had submitted fifty pounds for the use of the prisoners 
and forwarded requested documents, also specifically requesting to its appropriate 
committee that “by any means an Extract of the Process against them be required and 
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obtained if possible to be transmitted hither”.
350
  After struggling to conduct business due 
to the inability to attract a quorum, the sentence imposed by the Casa was formally 
considered 20 August 1700.  Two hundred additional pounds of credit was dispatched to a 
merchant in Spain and a trio of officials, including the now officially indicted Marquis of 
Tweeddale, was designated to call upon the Secretary of State for Scotland, Lord Seafield, 
to ascertain the status of a previously promised letter from King William soliciting the 
freedom of the prisoners.
351
 
 
While the Company labored to obtain a quorum, international diplomatic efforts to secure 
the release of the five prisoners had been implemented at the highest level.  King William 
had been warned of mounting discord in Scotland and the need for intercession.  The 
Edinburgh Gazette for the week of 11 to 15 July 1700 had contributed to the public´s 
outrage through its publication of letters from the condemned prisoners, one of a stream of 
articles keeping its readership informed of events.
352
  The combined ferment over the 
proclamations prohibiting assistance to the Darien expeditions and threats to the men held 
in Sevilla had prompted the Treasurer-Deputy in Edinburgh to write to the King´s 
confidential minister, William Carstares, providing the warning “You may be assured this 
does not a little blow the coal here”.353   
 
Lord Seafield also struck the alarm, appealing to his fellow Scot Carstares to intervene 
with their monarch.  News of the men´s death sentence had been received from Spain and 
“if they suffer death, it will certainly much increase the ferment in Scotland”.  He further 
advised the Secretary “when you speak of this matter to the King, do it with great concern, 
and I am hopeful his letters may yet come in time”.
354
  Writing also directly to the King, 
Seafield tactfully reminded his sovereign of previous promises to solicit the men´s freedom 
and the urgency the death sentence implied.  The Secretary for Scotland had consulted, as 
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directed, with Secretary of State Vernon, who had promised to write to Spain on the 
prisoners´ behalf and also to “yor Mty for further orders”.
355
   The following day Seafield 
wrote again, forwarding numerous entreaties for intervention, including one from the 
father of the condemned John Malloch and another from the Council of the Company of 
Scotland stating that a letter from the King would save the men´s lives.  Seafield again 
expressed that he feared the action may come too late, simultaneously requesting his 
monarch´s pardon for “trobling you so often for the same thing”.
356
  
 
In Spain, King William´s consular corps, hampered by the current vacancy of their 
Ambassador in Madrid, had not ceased in their own efforts to free the prisoners.  From 
Sevilla in early July Consul Robert Godschall wrote Secretary of State Vernon that he had 
prepared and submitted an appeal, but that the previously promised letter from the King 
was required to secure the men´s release, for “they will suffer if they have not the Pious 
interposicion of His Mjty”.
357
  Consul Westcombe added his own concerns from Cadiz to 
an unnamed recipient later in the month, acknowledging his receipt of information that the 
case had been forwarded to the King and adding that Pincarton and his men were still 
incarcerated.
358
  Even the British resident in Brussels, Jacob Aceré Marmande, was 
requested to assist through his position in the seat of the Spanish Low Countries.  He was 
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directed to approach ministers in the city to advocate with Madrid, cautioning them that 
“an execution may be long kept in remembrance”.
359
 
 
The combined campaign finally resulted in action by King William from his Court at Loo 
on 22 July 1700.  In a letter to his “Most serene and potent Prince, very dear brother and 
cousin, . . . His Most Serene and Potent Prince Charles the Second” the King of Great 
Britain wrote 
 
We doubt not that your Majsty has heard what has recently happened to 
our Scottish subjects, how by agreement with your Majesty´s governor 
of Carthagena they left the country of Darien, how a short time before 
one of their ships sailing thence for other parts of America was cast 
ashore in the neighbourhood of Carthagena and was wrecked, and how 
those on board, when they repaired to the above-mentioned city to seek 
help, were seized and thrown into prison, were afterwards transported to 
Spain and were there condemned to death, and have now appealed to 
your Majesty´s supreme court at Cadiz for redress.  Such is your 
Majesty´s renowned and known clemency to all men that we most 
heartily commend to it those our subjects who have been thus 
condemned for their designs and attempts against your sovereignty, and 
have already endured such grievous suffering.  We believe that, when the 
condition of these men is known and considered, your Majesty will not 
hold them unworthy of that clemency.  Therefore we have given 
instructions to our minister, M. Schonenberg, to explain fully to your 
Majesty their circumstances, and the weighty reasons why their release 
and restoration to liberty may be hoped for.  We persuade ourselves that 
there will be easy access for his advocacy, and that as all our subjects are 
now withdrawn from those countries, nothing more remains of that 
unpleasant enterprise than that those unhappy prisoners may enjoy your 
Royal clemency and compassion.  Such an act so worthy of your 
Majesty´s noble and magnanimous disposition we well look upon as a 
singular proof of your Majesty´s goodwill towards us, and we will make 
suitable return as often as opportunity may arise . .
360
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King William had capitalized on current circumstances to fortify his diplomatic efforts to 
free the men.  The fortuitous recent capitulation of the Scots at New Caledonia had scoured 
the Isthmus of the Company of Scotland presence. The available expertise of the trusted 
Franciscus van Schonenberg, envoy from Holland to Spain, provided the required 
diplomatic stature and experience in Madrid.  Secretary of War Blathwayt was assigned the 
responsibility of soliciting the assistance of the Dutchman, who was entreated to intervene 
on the understanding that he knew “how these things come about” and, equally critical, the 
“stir in the world” the intrusion of Darien had created.361  
 
While Schonenberg´s skills were put to the test in Madrid, the consular corps was also kept 
apprised of and included in diplomatic developments.  Consul Westcombe was requested 
to provide the prisoners, at his Majesty´s pleasure, with “all the assistance and succour you 
can . . . by furnishing them with necessarys and endeavouring their release in the best 
manner”. The Cadiz official was also directed to correspond directly with the Dutch envoy 
“to bring the matter to resolution”.
362
 
 
The coordinated, concerted diplomatic activity forthcoming from Edinburgh, Loo, Madrid, 
Cadiz and Sevilla, coupled with the fortunate timing and communication of Pimienta´s 
successful land and sea operation at New Caledonia, resulted in the issue of an order from 
the Spanish King dated 17 September 1700.  Following consultation with his Junta de 
Guerra de Indias363, the King wrote that, while upholding the seriousness of the crimes 
and the sentence imposed by the Casa de la Contratación, the prisoners would be 
remanded to the British sovereign for his assured and appropriate justice.  The four men 
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and David Wilson were officially relinquished to the custody of Consul Godschall in 
Sevilla 1 October 1700.
364
 
 
Although the rush of international diplomacy had superficially completed a successful 
course, there remained the lingering concern over potential future implications of the 
Casa´s convictions, either from Spain or from England.  The prisoners had been released 
from their Sevilla incarceration based on King William´s promised custody and 
dispensation of justice.  There had been no pardon or dismissal of charges.  The forces 
behind the Company of Scotland found themselves in a vague and vulnerable legal 
position, tried and convicted of violating an international treaty, yet receiving no definitive 
word pertaining to potential future accountability.  The anxiety was evident over what legal 
process, if any, was to be pursued.  
 
Word had been received in Edinburgh via a June letter from Pincarton and the other 
condemned men of not only their own sentence, but also of the inclusion of the Duke of 
Hamilton, Marquis of Tweeddale and Earl of Panmure “and whom others of that 
company” as responsible parties.  The Casa had stated that the various individuals´ 
“estates should be confiscated, to make reparations and satisfaction for equipping of a fleet 
to the Indies, and for all other damages, and their persons to be seized”.
365
 
Notice of this “droll passage” was submitted to Lord Seafield on the first of August, along 
with the information that the alarming letter had been seen in the possession of one of the 
Company Directors.
366
  Later in the same month the Secretary of State for Scotland had 
                                                 
364 AGI, Contratación 5726A, Ramo 2, f. 329r.  The King´s command, dated 17 September 
1700, and a note signed by Godschall verifying receipt of the men comprise the final 
documents of the case file in the Archives of the Indies.  The log of the royal prison in 
Sevilla records an October 1700 date of release. AGI, Contratación 4887, Entrada de 
Presos.  The former detainees were informed by the Consul that they were to be considered 
prisoners at large until further direction was received from King William.  At their request, 
they were allowed to proceed to Cadiz, where Consul Westcombe told them “he had no 
order about us, and that we might go what way we pleased”. The liberated men and boy 
arrived in London by 31 October.  Burton, The Darien Papers, pp. 110-112 and NLS, Adv. 
83.8.5, f. 177. 
365
 McCormick, State Papers, p. 533. 
366
 Ibid, p. 586. The Advocate to Lord Seafield, Edinburgh, Aug. 1 1700. 
arrived in Edinburgh and could assess the situation for himself.  He wrote to Carstares at 
the end of August describing his estimation of the various factions in the Scottish 
parliament . . . 
 
What connects and unites the opposing party is that resolve concerning 
Caledonia; and the argument they use is, that, if the right of Caledonia be 
not declared, the directors themselves are not safe from being prosecute; 
for they have got information that the King of Spain will apply to the 
King, that it may be so . . .
367
 
 
 
The findings of the Casa de la Contratación had clearly caught the attention of Company 
of Scotland management and investors, who proceeded to seek protection for themselves 
from what was considered a viable threat.  Seafield remained in Scotland, attempting to 
resolve conflicts expected to infest the upcoming session of parliament, yet thwarted by the 
cloud of the Spanish sentence.  Writing again to Carstares he reiterated the concern . . .  
 
The great point that they stick upon, is still that matter of Caledonia; and 
they say plainly, that, unless the King and parliament declare their right 
of Caledonia, the managers may be prosecute; and that therefore their 
safety depends on the doing this.  I am of opinion, that there should be an 
instruction for passing some act for the security of the managers and 
directors of the company; but I cannot particularly condescend upon the 
words of the instructions . . . until I advise with the rest of his Majesty´s 
servants. 
 
 
He also included a word of caution that “should they carry a vote upon us in this, it is like 
it might unite them in other particulars. . . . . you may let his Majesty know what I have 
written”.
368
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A defensive campaign was also being waged from within the Company of Scotland.  On 
the 7
th
 of November letters were read before the Directors from both Consul Westcombe 
and Pincarton.  While they awaited the arrival of their Vice-Admiral in Edinburgh, it was 
decided to express written gratitude to the Cadiz diplomat, at the same time requesting that 
he procure and send the process against their convicted representatives.
369
  Failure to bring 
home these same legal documents issued by the Casa was also one of the five concerns 
Pincarton and Graham were asked to explain in a written deposition they submitted to the 
Directors of the Company on 4 January 1701.  They wrote that the Consul in Sevilla had 
told them that obtaining copies of the records would be costly.  When the men had pressed 
the issue and told Godschall that funds would be forthcoming from Edinburgh they were 
further advised  
 
 . . . He could not understand for what end we required it; and that, in 
regard it might give jealousy and raise ill blood, he would not appear in 
it, without a special order from the King his master, or from the English 
Secretary of State.
370
  
 
 
Contentious sessions of the Scottish Parliament held during 1701 witnessed heavy discord 
over preparation of an Act designed to assert the “our Right to Caledonia”.  Despite the 
efforts of the Duke of Hamilton, the submission of the draft to the King, declaring . . . 
 
that the said company´s colony in Darien, on the continent of America, 
was a legal and rightful settlement, precisely in the terms of the act of 
parliament and letters patent, by which the said company was 
established, and doth hereby ratify and confirm the same; and his 
Majesty and the estates of parliament will assist and support the said 
company in the lawful prosecution of the rights thereof, and protect them 
in the full and free enjoyment thereof . . . 
 
 
was refused.  The unsuccessful contingent of Parliament cited that only with the King´s 
assertion of the legality of the settlement could the Company and its participants be 
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protected from prosecution.  Otherwise, they remained subject to accusations of being 
“unjust invaders of the dominions of another nation”.
371
    
 
By July the Company of Scotland had sought an alternative path toward legal protection by 
presenting a petition to the Privy-Council in Edinburgh for their concurrence of an address 
to the King.  The document, subject to delays designed to effect its dismissal, required that 
no treaty be concluded with either France of Spain until the latter  “acknowledges the 
company´s right to Caledonia, and make up all their losses”.372  The campaign continued 
into the reign of Queen Anne, when it was again unsuccessfully petitioned that treaties be 
withheld until reparations could be acquired for “great losses and damages sustained by the 
injuries and violences of the Spaniards”.
373
 
 
The repetitive and unrequited pleas from Scotland testify to the vulnerability, whether 
perceived or actual, of the Company of Scotland and its individual constituents to 
prosecution by the King of Spain.  Although the degree that the liability was exploited, 
particularly during negotiations toward the Treaty of Union of 1707, cannot be defined 
from available records, it remains a factor meriting consideration.  The inclusion in the 
Treaty of the Equivalent, providing compensation for financial losses incurred pertaining 
to Darien, went a long way to assuring its passage, but the reality of continued influence 
over individuals, particularly those such as the Duke of Hamilton with estates to protect 
and finances in need of constant replenishment, maintained a tempting susceptibility ripe 
for manipulation.
374
 
 
Spain´s administrative and financial commitment to pursue legal redress for Scotland´s ill-
fated attempts to create a permanent trading establishment in Darien provides its own 
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eloquent testimony to the vital importance the Spanish Court assigned to the incursion.  
The scant scholarly attention given to the judicial effort, understandable due to the 
previous lack of knowledge of the trial record, can now shed additional light on the entire 
multi-national story of the Company of Scotland.  The judicial reach of Spain did literally 
extend across the Atlantic to transport operatives of the Scottish enterprise back to the Old 
World and place them before the tribunal of the Casa de la Contratación to answer to 
violations of the Treaty of Madrid.  The resulting international diplomatic effort to avoid 
execution of the defendants in Sevilla spread across Europe and culminated in direct 
correspondence between the Kings of Spain and Britain.   
 
The unintended consequences precipitated by the five ships sailing from Leith in 1698 
were, however, in no way halted by the eventual release of the prisoners to the custody of 
King William´s consular corps.  The lingering threat of prosecution by Spain, unresolved 
through any assurances of immunity, loomed over the Company of Scotland and its 
investors and administrators, influencing continuing conflicts following the final 
capitulation at New Caledonia.  Spanish justice had asserted itself on a major scale and 
created its own reciprocal intrusion into the affairs of the nation which had sought its own 
dream of empire. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
VIEW FROM THE AMERICAS I 
FROM LIMA TO EAST JERSEY 
 
 
On the 14
th
 of July of the current year 1700 common joy came even 
before dawn, the public rejoicing in the city of Lima being aroused by 
the merry peal of the bells.  This was commenced at the Cathedral at half 
past one in the morning, and was followed by other churches and 
chapels, and by religious institutions.  The joyful sound was so 
unseasonable and so untimely that it led people to believe that without 
doubt it portended good news to the city and to the country on the day of 
St. Bonaventure, news that might dispel the fear that reigned in their 
minds lest there should be a repetition within the same year of the 
earthquake that last year, on the same day and with a slight difference in 
the time of day, had violently laid the city in ruins.  Soon the news 
spread of the success that the army of His Majesty had in the 
dislodgement of the Scotch.
375
 
 
 
 
The celebratory reaction undertaken in Lima to the final departure of the Scots, far distant 
geographically from the site of New Caledonia, was one of many responses across the 
Americas provoked by the Company of Scotland´s attempt at colonization.  From New 
York and New Jersey to Jamaica and the Caribbean and throughout Spanish America there 
were numerous and highly-varied unintended consequences resulting from the enterprise.  
Although the vast majority of scholarly effort, including the previous chapter of this work, 
has been directed at exploring events in Europe, this chapter and the one following will, 
respectively, establish the substantive legacy of the Company of Scotland across the broad 
swath of the Americas and, more specifically, within the region of Darien.  Although New 
Caledonia would not survive it would produce both short and long-term consequences 
disproportionate to both its longevity and the size of its land-base.  While Scotland would 
experience its own sociopolitical convulsions following the failure of the Darien 
expeditions, the Americas would witness a panorama of political, social and economic 
impacts resulting from the intended colony as the region struggled to maintain peace and 
economic viability. 
                                                 
375
 Anonymous, Gazeta, p. 1.  The preparation and distribution of the Gazeta in Lima, seat 
of the Viceroy of Peru, testifies to the importance of the events it relates.  The first 
appearance of such a printed document had occurred in 1594, when news was dispersed 
regarding the capture of Richard Hawkins, the English privateer. Although such Gazetas 
usually extended up to four pages, the edition quoted here ran double that length.  It was 
not until 1793 that Lima would have what became the first daily newspaper in America.  
Haring, The Spanish Empire, pp. 230-231. 
 The examination of these impacts on the western side of the Atlantic also provides 
additional explanation for the critical concerns expressed by the judges of the Casa de la 
Contratación during the trial examined in the previous chapter.  Not only was the attempt 
to establish a colony on the Isthmus perpetrated at a time of palpable fear within Spanish 
America resulting from both a series of foreign raids and local unrest, but it also 
incorporated the unprecedented merging of two vital factors.  Firstly, New Caledonia was 
conceived to be a permanent and armed community and, secondly, its designated location 
placed it within the most strategic and valued geography bridging the Pacific and Atlantic 
Oceans.  The implementation of the plans of the Company of Scotland to establish and 
maintain international commerce from a fortified location upon the mainland dominions of 
the Spanish King constituted the gravest of threats to an already precarious order, 
simultaneously offering the promise of opportunity to old enemies and new allies.  
 
There was also the inseparable matter of religion, which would prompt comment from as 
far away as Boston and Rome and provoke the Papal Court to impose financial 
responsibilities on Catholic churches from Mexico City to Lima for over a decade.  Nor 
were the religious conflicts limited to those between Catholicism and Protestantism.  There 
would be an exacerbation of existing Jewish-English merchant struggles in Jamaica, 
coupled with attendant Spanish-American concerns over a Jewish presence within the 
Scottish undertaking.  
 
The impacts of the Scottish expeditions to Panama were, therefore, not limited to the royal 
courts of Spain or England, or to mercantile houses from Edinburgh to Lisbon, or to the 
halls of justice of Sevilla.   This chapter will demonstrate that the Company of Scotland´s 
short-lived attempt at permanent colonization in the strategic heart of Spanish America 
reverberated across the two American continents, imposing a myriad of stresses and 
change into the lives of highly varied societies and institutions. 
 
 
          THE VIEW FROM SPANISH AMERICA-A HISTORY OF OFFENSES 
 The Scots had unwisely inserted their own expectations into a volatile landscape 
characterized not only by a history of raiding, but also currently experiencing, as discussed 
in earlier chapters, a thriving and highly competitive contraband trade penetrating the 
coasts of the mainland.
376
  The depth and extent of the unintended consequences of the 
initiation of New Caledonia not only added a new cast member to the international high-
stakes game of illegal commerce, but it also directly impacted upon local populations.  It 
was the permanent residents who faced immediate threats and disruption to themselves, 
their families, and their financial resources. Royal officials throughout Spanish America 
were also well aware that their own appointments and thus their careers could be assigned, 
tested, threatened, or extended depending on orders issued and performances delivered. 
 
Nowhere were such causes more pronounced than in the case of Cartagena, where the 
memory of vulnerability and both communal and personal loss was still fresh. It had only 
been in 1697, the year prior to the arrival of the Scots in Darien, that a joint contingent of 
the French navy and French corsairs had appeared with a fleet of twenty-six ships, 5000 
men and 538 cannon, constituting nothing less than the largest invasion force yet 
mobilized in the West Indies.  Pushing its way into the city´s heavily defended harbour, the 
combined land and sea operation subjected the port to an initial round of treasure looting, 
only to be followed by a second wave of plunder when the buccaneer faction returned to 
compensate themselves for what they considered an unsatisfactory division of the spoils.
377
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DuCasse who offered to assist the Governor of Cartagena in ridding the region of the Scots 
in early 1699 had commanded the corsairs raiding the city in 1697. Galvin, Patterns, pp. 
64-65 and F.R. Hart, Admirals of the Caribbean (Boston 1922), p. 117.  Notably, the 
French scourge, like the Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies, had been 
funded by a private enterprise through the collection of subscriptions.  Ibid, p. 111.  For a 
discussion of the campaign, and particularly the conflicts between the leaders of the two 
French factions, see Chapter VIII, `Siege of Cartagena´ in Nellis Crouse´s French Struggle 
for the West Indies, 1665-1713 (New York 1966), pp. 212-245.  An additional source, 
providing an explanation of the funding of the expedition and ramifications among the 
 Among other indignities, Cartagena suffered a hole torn in its cathedral and the flight of 
much of its population,  “many being drowned on the way, buried in the mud and many 
more dying of hunger”.
378
  Of those that stayed some were subject to torture as homes and 
convents were sacked.  Among the worst atrocities, committed by aggressors who declared 
themselves practitioners of the same devout Catholic faith as their victims, was the murder 
of a friar attempting to prevent the despoiling of a golden crown adorning a statue of the 
Virgin.379 The degree of financial loss and fear of future depredations had been so acute 
that a substantial part of the commerce of Cartagena had moved itself inland to Mompox, 
where life and economic resources were considered more secure.
380
   
 
The scourge presaged major changes for the city, whose strategic location and expansive, 
sheltered bay had made it the primary trading center of the Caribbean coast.  It had, since 
its founding in 1533, established itself as the initial entry point for convoys coming from 
Spain as well as the ships of the asiento trade in slaves.  Concurrently, it had also evolved 
into the dominant military, governmental and ecclesiastical center of the region.
381
  
Although the Treaty of 1670 provided some assurance that English-perpetrated raids such 
as those of Hawkins in 1568 and Drake in 1586 would no longer occur, there was no 
equivalent agreement with the French, allowing the population to be terrorized for weeks 
until spared from permanent occupation by the onset of yellow fever among the 
unseasoned visiting navy.
382
 
                                                                                                                                                    
British and the Dutch, is William Morgan´s `The Expedition of Baron de Pointis against 
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 The decisive role of disease throughout the Caribbean is the subject of J. McNeill´s 
Mosquito Empires: Ecology and War in the Greater Caribbean, 1620-1914. Specifics 
regarding the raid on Cartagena are presented on pages 145-147.  McNeill stresses that the 
1690s witnessed particularly bad outbreaks due to increased arrivals of vulnerable 
 Cartagena had certainly suffered most recently, but other locations had experienced their 
own episodes of terror at the hands of foreign intruders.  Between 1655 and 1671 a total of 
eighteen cities, four towns and over thirty-five villages had been plundered, these totals 
only encompassing locations along the vulnerable and easily accessible Spanish-American 
coast of the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico.  Many communities had been subjected to 
multiple depredations, while locations in Cuba, Hispaniola and Central America suffered 
“innumerable times”.  After 1671 expeditions against Portobello, Campeche and Cartagena 
were undertaken, with that year´s January capture and sacking of Panama by Henry 
Morgan, who had departed Jamaica only a month following signing of the Treaty of 
Madrid, the most rewarding and renowned.
383
    
 
Regardless of treaties negotiated, the periodic presence of the Barlovento fleet and the 
development of a Guarda Costa, augmented after 1674 with piraguas specifically 
designed to monitor coastal and riverine waters,
384
 the danger did not cease.  As the French 
raid on Cartagena exemplified, malevolent foreigners came in a variety of categories and 
                                                                                                                                                    
populations as well as meteorological conditions conducive to the survival of the larva of 
Aedes aegypti, the yellow fever vector. Ibid, p. 147.  The author devotes an entire eighteen 
pages (105-122) to the virulent cocktail of dysentery, malaria, dengue fever and yellow 
fever that affected New Caledonia, noting that even veterans of the “years at sea or  . . . 
Flanders´ camps and barracks, both fine environments for improving one´s portfolio of 
disease immunities” would succumb. Ibid, p.121.  Not included in McNeill´s work, but 
relevant to the critical role of disease in the misfortunes of the Scots, is the documentation 
of a water-borne outbreak caused by supplies collected at Crab Island, a stop on the way to 
Darien.  Hector McKenzie, one of the surgeons on the expedition, wrote of the universal 
“general distemper” on board his ship. He noted that the suspected water had been 
collected from an “unsettled puddle that received it from the adjacent hills, unknown 
woods, shrubs, plants, etc., and all for the most part in a very deluge of rain”.  In this case, 
the Scots likely transported at least one form of contagion with them to their final 
destination.  Letter from Hector McKenzie to Laird of Gleneagles, December 1698, NLS, 
Adv. 83.7.4., f. 128r. 
383
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 The piraguas were well-suited to deployment in coastal areas as they were flat-
bottomed, having a draft of only a foot and a half.  They could accommodate a crew of 120 
and were typically armed with a single long gun located in the bow and four additional 
pieces in the stern.  Ibid, pp. 256-257.  The Guarda Costa, initiated in 1633, was composed 
of ships to be built and maintained within the colonies.  Ibid, p. 253. 
guises and could operate with or without a sovereign´s sanction, under a variety of 
financial schemes and regardless of professing a common religion. The Scots were only 
the most recent in a long line of interlopers whose attempts to share in the financial 
rewards of the Americas would impose a threat, but their intent to establish a permanent 
presence in a strategic region recently subjected to a devastating raid raised the alarm to 
the highest level.  
 
 
                 DISSEMINATING THE ALARM, PREPARING THE DEFENSE 
 
In sharp contrast to the pealing of bells portending good news described at the beginning of 
this chapter, a flurry of frantic dispatches ricocheted across Spanish America and on to 
Spain in response to reports of the appearance in the Caribbean, and eventual arrival at 
Darien, of the Scottish fleet.  In a remarkably comprehensive report sent from Caracas only 
weeks prior to the arrival of the first Company of Scotland expedition, Governor Francisco 
de Berroteran reported to the Conde de Adanero
385
 of notice he had received via the Dutch 
trading entrepot of Curacao.
386
  The document related the presence of a fleet of six vessels, 
identified as English but transporting 1200 Scots, bound to the vicinity of Darien.  The 
convoy “united thither all nationalities and qualities of persons, to make the settlement 
more populous”.  The group´s intent was to fortify themselves, with the expectation of the 
impending arrival of six more ships transporting building materials and equipment.  
Privileges had been awarded by the King of England, with printed copies of these 
assurances having been distributed in Curacao, even being submitted to its Governor.  The 
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 Curacao, acquired by the Dutch in 1634, was strategically situated for trade with the 
Spanish-American mainland and developed into a key crossroads.  Not only were 
warehouses and provisions available, but the port facilitated communication of intelligence 
from and between Europe, Africa and the Caribbean.  For a discussion of Dutch activity in 
the South Atlantic, see T. Benjamin, The Atlantic World: Europeans, Africans, Indians and 
Their Shared History, 1400-1900 (Cambridge 2009), pp. 251-255. 
militaristic intent of the group was substantiated by one of the clauses of the notice, which 
declared the intruders would make war against the vassals of the Spanish King should 
efforts be undertaken to interfere with their efforts. 
 
Berroteran then proceeded to elaborate on the hazards to Spain of such an initiative, 
pointing out that the intended destination of the Scots was within proximity of the gold 
mines in Darien.  Not only would this valued resource, which had previously been raided 
by the pirate Lorencillo,387 again be vulnerable, but there was the attendant threat of the 
introduction of illicit commerce.  It would be an easy and logical step to seek to cross to 
the Pacific and exchange trade-goods for large sums of gold.  Again referring to the history 
of raiding, the Governor reminded Adanero that this had been accomplished by pirates in 
the past, for the Isthmus was a mere eighteen leagues across.  Moreover, the intended 
establishment of fortifications exacerbated the threat, for it would increase the possibility 
of occupying Portobello, Chagres and Panama.  In response to the severity of the situation, 
the author explained he was writing also to the Viceroy of New Spain in order that means 
to check the situation might be deployed from Mexico City.  The President of the 
Audiencia of Santo Domingo, the Governor of Cartagena and the President of the 
Audiencia of Panama would also receive the intelligence so that appropriate responses 
could be formulated.
388
 
 
Given the distances, topography and means of communication available, the reaction was 
both swift and dispersed, reflecting the acknowledged severity of the threat.  For the same 
reasons, the response was plagued by lack of uniformity as officials grappled with often 
                                                 
387 Berroteran´s reference to Laurens-Cornelis Boudewijn de Graaf, or “Lorencillo”, 
exemplifies the degree of alarm being communicated.  The Dutch pirate, who had served in 
the Spanish navy prior to becoming a buccaneer, eventually entered the service of the 
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 MHS, Hart Collection, Darien Item 1 (Translation of letter from Francisco de 
Berroteran to Conde de Adanero, Caracas, November 15 1698), original from AGI, 
Panamá 163. 
incomplete and inaccurate information.  Strategies were debated, revised and sometimes 
obstructed as officials sought to justify their actions and decisions, or lack thereof.   
 
Berroteran had indeed dispatched the information to the Count of Monctezuma, Viceroy of 
New Spain, who had previously received confirmation of events from the Governor of 
Havana.  A Council of War had been convened in Mexico City where it was unanimously 
decided that the Guarda Costa fleet of General Zavala, then in port at Veracruz, would be 
deployed against the Scots.  In the midst of preparations, a dispatch was received from the 
President of Panama, transmitting additional information received from the President of 
Santo Domingo.  Adding to the present emergency was the even more alarming rumor that 
4000 of the enemy were anchored off the former Spanish settlement at Rancho Viejo, 
where they were anticipating reinforcements of six additional vessels, 6000 men, arms, 
ammunition and livestock.   
 
Despite the growing panic, the arrival of the Spanish fleet from Florida forced a decision.  
The French had entrenched themselves in Pensacola and it was decided by subsequent 
Council of War sessions in both Mexico City and Veracruz that the French incursion was 
the priority. As the months passed, however, the accumulation of new intelligence across 
the region dictated a shift of strategy.  Word had come via Guatemala that the General of 
the Barlovento fleet had been called to Portobello by the President of Panama to assist 
against the Scots.  The vital role of the asiento in information-gathering was reinforced 
when its commissioner in Jamaica, don Santiago del Castillo, reported the presence on that 
island of Admiral Benbow´s formidable fleet and the naval officer´s confusing assurances 
that the Scots had acted without the patent or authority of their King.  The decision to act 
against the French was reversed, based on the opinion that the situation in Pensacola 
“could do less irreparable harm”, particularly when English and Scots had been confirmed 
in the region.
389
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 Hart, The Disaster, Appendix XXI, pp. 299-305.  As discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, 
General Zavala would proceed with his Guarda Costa fleet from Veracruz to Havana, 
where he would be informed of the first abandonment of New Caledonia, prompting his 
return to Spain with the five Company of Scotland prisoners.  For a detailed discussion of 
the situation surrounding the Pensacola region, see Chapter 8, `Rivals Face to Face, The 
 While the Viceroy in Mexico City pursued preparations and debated tactics and priorities 
within the context of information and resources at his disposal, royal officials more 
directly threatened also were reacting.  Panama´s President, the Count of Canillas, had 
received word from a French Captain, within weeks of the Scots´ landfall, of both their 
presence and their intent to establish themselves and make war.  Further, the French 
informant had spoken with some of the indigenous Cuna who had actually been aboard the 
enemy ships and been offered treaties of peace in exchange for being allowed to occupy 
the land and construct fortifications.  Everything, from women to munitions, had been 
brought to create a settlement. 
 
In response, the President of Panama called his own Council of War.  Notice was quickly 
sent not only to the General of Portobello, the Governor of Cartagena and the local factor 
for the asiento, but also the Viceroys in Mexico City and Lima. In recognition of the 
international implications, Canillas also wrote the Governor of Jamaica expressing his 
concern over the latest developments and “insult”.
390
  In these and subsequent dispatches, 
the President also referred to the historical vulnerability of his jurisdiction, the threat to the 
Pacific coast and his decision to proceed with plans for a land operation while the fleets 
readied themselves.  The Scots had, he reported, been distributing printed invitations   
 
to their flag the pirate and foreign squadrons and single ships which in 
large number are off these coasts, it is feared that the strength of these 
settlers be daily increased by this sort of people, and if the fleet of six 
large ships, which they expect, arrive, the Windward fleet will not 
suffice to oppose them, even when joined by Don Martin de Zavala´s 
vessels and what other reinforcement might be assembled in New Spain. 
 
It was, declared the plans submitted to the King by his President in Panama, a question of 
preventing “the total ruin of these dominions”.
391
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Race for Pensacola Bay 1698-1699´ in Robert S. Weddle´s The French Thorn, Rival 
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 Hart, The Disaster, Appendix XVI, pp. 261-282.   For the content of the referred to 
declarations distributed by the Company of Scotland, see Appendix I of this work. 
From Cartagena it was Governor Rios who was experiencing the most direct repercussions 
of the Scottish threat.  In the midst of over-seeing seizures of foreign vessels “loitering” 
along the coast to participate in the contraband trade, it had at first proved challenging to 
differentiate the gravity of the Scottish activity.
392
  As reports began to multiply, including 
an anonymous warning of the intended “English establishment”, along with a list of the 
suspect vessels, he sent a launch to gather intelligence. While he anticipated its return the 
compilation of alarming dispatches continued from the Bishop of Santa Marta, the 
Governor of Portobello and a passenger arriving from Havana and Curacao.   Although the 
informants varied in the quantity of the enemy, there was full agreement regarding their 
actual arrival and their considerable supplies of munitions and building materials.
393
   
 
Upon the return of the surveillance vessel, which had been thwarted by a Scottish craft on 
watch, the Governor learned that land clearing had commenced and thirty to forty huts had 
been constructed.  The new information was disseminated to Madrid and fellow royal 
officials, while, in turn, Rios became informed of plans to initiate a land operation from 
Panama.  Turning his attention to the security of his own jurisdiction, he issued orders 
throughout his province requiring reinforcements to consolidate in Cartagena.
394
  The 
response was less than enthusiastic, typified by the report that came in from the Captain of 
Rio de Caucas that “people are escaping without wishing to obey”.
395
  The Governor 
complained of the situation to Madrid, adding that his efforts were further undermined by 
the actions of the President of the Audiencia of Santa Fe, who had “detained and 
embargoed all the appropriations” since the French raid of 1697.
396
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Spanish Empire, p. 115. 
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Rios was next presented with a request from Panama to dispatch the Barlovento fleet, 
which had arrived in his city, to Portobello to confer over plans to expel the Scots.  He 
doubted the wisdom of the strategy, however, citing the contrary winds and recommending 
that action be initiated directly from Cartagena.  In this he was “unanimously” supported 
by his Council of War, including the experienced pilots he had summoned to participate.  
The Governor was also adamant about the necessity of concurrence and on-going 
communication with the representative of the asiento, particularly since that company´s 
ships remained impounded.  A dispute ensued regardless of Rios´s self-professed best 
intentions and the advice of his Council.  The Admiral of the Barlovento fleet was 
determined to proceed to Portobello with the sequestered ships of the slave trade at his 
disposal.  Both the Governor and the asiento concessionaire objected, declaring the sail to 
be unnecessary expense without merit for the campaign.
397
 
 
Suddenly added to the chaos of broad and earnest debate over tactics, funding and 
deployment, came dubious offers of external assistance.  The French Captain Rache was 
the first to arrive, offering his services against the Scots.  Rios had the visiting frigate 
inspected, recording only subsistence, arms and water on board.  Feeling reasonably 
confident of the Captain´s sincerity he took his deposition, and was told the falsehood that, 
during the Frenchman´s recent stay in Jamaica, he had witnessed that island´s Governor 
provisioning the five Scottish ships.
398
    
 
Considering his options amid the rapidly evolving circumstances, Rios likely felt some sort 
of relief as he arrived at the decision to send the French vessel, under the watchful guise of 
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13v. 
the Barlovento fleet, out of Boca Chica and on to Portobello,399 thereby ridding himself of 
two problematic personalities.  Any respite, was, however, brief.  Within a few days two 
vessels arrived under the “blue squadron flag of the King of England, a surprising sight in 
these parts”.  Admiral Benbow, whose specific interaction with Rios is discussed in 
Chapter 4, had entered the bay, accompanied by a ship of the slave concession and 
claiming his mission to be removal of the Scots.
400
 Once again the Governor found himself 
hosting a foreign contingent professing the motive of assuring the failure of New 
Caledonia.   
 
Understandably, Rios´s report does not present the final release of the asiento ships as 
bowing to pressure imposed by either Benbow or merchants, but it does contain references 
to Article 22 of the Slave Trade Concession and the Governor´s self-professed responsible 
compliance with it as the ultimate motivation for permitting the vessels to clear.401  
Quickly returning to the theme of his efforts regarding the Scots, the Governor recounts the 
day following the English Admiral´s departure, when yet another offer of French 
assistance reached his hands.  This time the communication was from the same Monsieur 
DuCasse who had conducted the raid on Cartagena in 1697, subjecting Rios to the 
humiliation that would eventually cost him his position.402  In his role as Governor of 
Pitiguao, the Frenchman was now offering munitions, firearms and assistance.  He was 
expecting warships, he informed the Governor, “in which he will come to confer with your 
majesty´s president of the Audiencia of Panama, with your majesty´s Governor at 
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Portobelo, and with me, on the best method of expelling this evil people from these 
parts”.
403
     
 
Benbow had departed on the 12
th
 of February 1699 and the letter from Pitiguao had arrived 
on the 13
th
, but both events were overshadowed on the 15
th
 with the even more unexpected 
occurrence of the grounding of the Dolphin and the subsequent arrest, incarceration and 
interrogation of her crew.  With the concrete intelligence acquired from the prisoners, Rios 
was able to inform his fellow officials and his King of the actual conditions at New 
Caledonia, emphasizing the ambiguities and proximity of foreign interests in the entire 
affair and the requirement to avoid delay.  He would, he assured his correspondents, “take 
part with all my strength”.
404
 
 
Geographically isolated from the Councils of War, debates over tactics and financial 
arguments was the Count of Monclova, Viceroy of Peru.  Although the site of New 
Caledonia fell within his jurisdiction, he was separated from it by distance and topography.  
Having previously served as Viceroy in Mexico City, Monclova initially doubted the 
reports of the Scottish presence
405
, although he fully comprehended both the threat 
presented by New Caledonia and the challenges of a military campaign to check its 
progress.  Universally praised for his personal deportment, honest administration and 
bravery in battle, the Viceroy had completed three years of service in Lima and, regardless 
of a campaign by prominent citizens in Mexico City to have him reappointed there, he was 
anticipating the arrival of his replacement and a return home to Spain.  Instead, he found 
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 Monclova wrote that he doubted King William would risk a war with Spain by sending 
an enterprise intended to settle a colony.  AGI, Lima 91 (Count of Monclova to the King, 
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himself in receipt of orders from Madrid, extending his tenure in Peru by three years due to 
the alarm created by the Scots.
406
 
 
Not only was his anticipated retirement denied, but Monclova was also ordered to 
personally travel to Panama to command the offensive.
407
  Having been initially informed 
of the presence of the Scots via the December 1698 notice from President Canillas, the 
Viceroy had responded with 300,000 pesos and quantities of supplies, which he sent by 
warship up the Pacific coast the following month.   A contingent of 500 soldiers was also 
deployed from Lima to augment existing military personnel in the impacted region.
408
 
 
From his opposite side of the continent, across the formidable obstruction presented by the 
Andes, Monclova attempted to respond to the responsibilities of his position, the requests 
for assistance, the changing scope of the situation as the Scots first abandoned their colony 
and then returned, and the mandate from his King sent July 1699 that he  oversee the 
military response. Although events would eventually negate the need for his presence, he 
attempted to explain to Madrid the challenges involved with some of its requests.  The 
transportation of the mandated artillery to Cartagena, initiated after the French raid on that 
city and increased in importance with the arrival of the Scots, for instance, was plagued by 
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the conditions of the Isthmus, making impractical both land or water transport.
409
  There 
were only three months when land operations could be successfully undertaken with any 
intent of success due to the great intensity of rainfall the remainder of the year. Attempting 
to communicate the impact of the vast distances, “which cannot be understood by those 
who have not been here”, the Viceroy explained that they were a serious impediment to 
coordinating any response among different locations.  He illustrated the claim with the case 
of New Caledonia:  he had received on 9 March notice that the Scots had returned to 
Darien to reoccupy the site.  On that very day, he would eventually receive notice 21 July, 
General don Juan Pimienta and his vessels out of Cartagena, united with those of Admiral 
don Francisco Salmon out of Portobello, were present off New Caledonia assuring the 
expulsion of the Scots.
410
  No less than “the loss of America”
411
 had been prevented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          SUCCESS AND AFTERMATH 
 
Following the humiliating French raid on Cartagena the government in Madrid had 
decided to replace that city´s Governor.  Don Juan Diaz Pimienta y Zaldivar, possessing a 
lengthy resumé of military experience and family honor, had been named to the position on 
17 June 1698.  He sailed in the company of Captain Diego de Peredo, 500 infantry, 110 
pieces of artillery and munitions, and arms intended to improve both the security and 
morale of his beleaguered jurisdiction.   Pimienta would take possession of the city the 
same afternoon of his arrival on 7 June 1699.  Not only would his presence relieve the 
disgraced Governor Rios of having to manage the continuing crisis in Darien and pressures 
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related to the thriving contraband trade, but his soldiers, supplemented later by those who 
arrived with the armada sent from Cadiz to expel the Scots, would appreciably alter the 
population of a city which had shrunk to 2500 white inhabitants.412 
 
In late August the new Governor prepared his report for Madrid, reviewing the conditions 
he had found upon his arrival, a summary of events concerning the Scots and the status of 
his original orders to eliminate the threat of New Caledonia.  As he had immersed himself 
in preparing the offensive, he wrote, news reached him that seven prisoners released by the 
Scots had reported the abandonment of the colony.  A vessel sent to verify the news had 
returned 22 July with confirmation, also providing details on the structures and conditions 
at the site, including the presence of 400 graves outside the fort and two within its interior.  
Accompanying Pimienta´s report to Spain were four Scottish prisoners from Darien, being 
transported in order to provide direct account to the Casa de la Contratación.413   
 
Pimienta sent the King a duplicate of this same correspondence in early October via a 
Portuguese vessel headed directly to Lisbon. Included was an update of conditions, 
reporting the continuing decimation of his troops due to illness and death and pleading for 
competent reinforcements.  He explained that negligence committed in Spain had 
contributed to the situation, for those manning the ships at departure 
 
only attend to passengers, traders to whom they sell or grant the favour 
of a passage to the Indies and who go off to the places whither their 
interests have brought them, leaving your majesty´s ships deserted, 
rendering useless the expenses your majesty has incurred on them . . . 
 
                                                 
412 Pimienta´s troops had been raised largely in Andalucia, particularly Cadiz, San Lucar 
and Sevilla.  Their combined presence with later arrivals under the command of Don Pedro 
Fernandez de Navarrete would not only markedly increase the census of Cartagena, but 
would integrate a distinctive Andalusian character into civic life.   Del Castillo Mathieu, 
Los Gobernadores, pp. 79-80.  The significance of emigration from Andalusia over a 
wider timeframe is recognized by Carlos Martínez Shaw in La emigración española a 
América, 1492-1824 (Colombres, Asturias 1994), particularly in Chapter V, `El 
Restablecimiento Del Flujo Emigratorio en el Siglo XVIII (1700-1824)´, pp. 163-246. 
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 AGI, Santa Fé 79, unfoliated, dated August 1699.  The prisoners were Robert 
Pincarton, John Malloch, James Graham and David Wilson, whose subsequent trial is 
related in the previous chapter. 
 The Governor continued with a more current warning.  He had received notice that one of 
the departed ships of the Scots had been in Jamaica and expected that the others were 
dispersed around the region.  He advised the occupation of the site of the colony, for it had 
been mapped by the intruders during its occupation and it was possible they “may return 
with greater strength, especially when the measures that are taken in America to repulse 
any enemy are so costly and useless, as your majesty will have experienced in what 
happened at Panama with the Windward fleet and land forces opposed to said settlement of 
Scots at Darien”.414  Of greatest importance, however, were the Governor´s concluding 
remarks.  He had received notice via a sloop from Panama only the day before that two 
ships of Scotsmen were once again present in their original location.  Pimienta was 
preparing his expedition to confront the situation, but did not waste the opportunity to 
inform the King of the impact of diverting valuable resources away from Cartagena.  He 
would take necessary troops with him, but “yesterday I dispatched orders for the same 
number  . . . to enter this city as I withdrew . . . I do not exaggerate to your majesty how 
difficult it is to do this for besides the trouble it costs to drag these troops to anything that 
looks like fighting your majesty lacks everything here.”  The Governor included his 
personal assessment regarding the exploitation of the emergency by the French Governor 
of Pitiguao  
 
 . . . your majesty will observe that the governors, and particularly this 
Frenchman with all his offers and all his compliments, are only seeking a 
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way, be it under the pretext of driving away Scotsmen from Darien 
(though hard) or of cleaning these seas, to get into our ports loaded to the 
brim with merchandise.”415 
 
 
Pimienta´s identification of the opportunity seized by the French to ingratiate themselves 
with the Spanish and his concerns over unchecked illegal commerce, both exacerbated by 
his necessity to deal with the Scottish threat, provide evidence for two of the major 
immediate impacts of the attempt to establish New Caledonia.  Not only would merchants, 
legal and otherwise, be free of the Governor´s interference while he commanded the 
situation in the Bay of Caledonia, but the same man who had participated in devastating 
Cartagena two years earlier was in active pursuit of obtaining redemption through offers of 
military assistance. 
 
Regardless of the impacts of his absence, the reemergence of the Scots demanded a 
definitive response and Governor Pimienta initiated his expedition against New Caledonia 
on 12 February 1700.  He departed Cartagena in the squadron of Governor don Diego de 
Peredo, with whom he had transitted the Atlantic the previous year.  A vital addition to the 
contingent, signifying the critical status of the campaign, was the military engineer Juan de 
Herrera y Sotomayor, who had just arrived from Havana and been entrusted with 
overseeing the construction of trenches and bastions.
416
 
 
                                                 
415 Ibid, Appendix XXVII, p. 321.  The accuracy of the Governor´s assessment is reflected 
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 Del Castillo Mathieu,  Los Gobernadores, p. 80.  As Pimienta departed a letter to him 
from the King dated 11 January 1700 had been dispatched, notifying the Governor of the 
existence of yet another Scottish fleet and ordering him to do everything possible to 
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The tribulations and eventual success of the coordinated effort of forces from Panama, 
Portobello and Cartagena, well-documented by Pimienta´s diary,
417
 culminated in the 
negotiated capitulation of the Scots on 11 April 1700.  The following day a message was 
sent to Canillas in Panama, conceding the future governance of the site to his discretion 
and offering him the opportunity to forward word to Spain.  In the same dispatch, a request 
is made that all assistance possible be directed to Don Antonio de Paredes, who is being 
ordered to “proceed to Lima as fast as he can to inform the Viceroy of the state of this 
region”.418 
 
Pimienta returned in triumph to Cartagena on the 8
th
 of May, filing a full report to the King 
dated 1 July 1700.  With the submission he included two maps produced by his military 
engineer, documenting both the surrounding area and specific site of New Caledonia, as 
well as the fortifications involved in the recent campaign.419  There was no opportunity, 
however, for a respite from any of his duties as Governor.  Two activities demanded his 
immediate attention and energy.  With the Scottish threat resolved, the services of Herrera 
could now be applied in Cartagena, where the repair and strengthening of the city`s 
defenses became a priority.
420
  Pimienta also, as he had anticipated, resumed his attempts 
to control the continuing and rife illegal trade of his jurisdiction, submitting a report in 
early October testifying to the “excesses, frauds, and introduction of textiles and negros” 
by the factors of the asiento.421  There had also been one more requisite negotiation with 
the Darien Scots.  Only two days following his own return to Cartagena the Hope from 
New Caledonia had arrived on one of the off-shore islands with twelve men, seven of them 
Scots.  The pilot, Alan Waugh, spoke Spanish and entered the city to report their presence 
and their proposal.  The small vessel had been taking on so much water and the crew so 
decimated by illness that they were unable to continue their voyage.  An Irish resident of 
Cartagena was summoned to translate and it was soon understood that the men had agreed 
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among themselves to attempt to sell their vessel and its contents to the Spanish and trade 
their personal possessions to fund their way home.  The Hope was deemed unworthy for 
royal service, but declarations were taken, a full inventory completed, a price negotiated 
and the men allowed to depart.
422
 
 
Over four months following the capitulation in New Caledonia Cartagena witnessed the 
arrival of the squadron of Pedro Fernanadez de Navarette y Ayala.  The armada had 
departed Cadiz the 19th of June 1700 and anchored in Cartagena the 18th of August, having 
been deployed specifically in response to the Scottish threat. Preceded by additional 
engineers, the introduction of the new force, accompanied by ample supplies, arms and 
ammunition provided a welcome supplement of personnel and resources.
423
  Despite 
having lost 180 men during the Atlantic crossing and putting 60 into the two Cartagena 
hospitals upon arrival, Navarette´s remaining contingent of healthy crew members could 
nevertheless be diverted to substantially improving the region´s defenses.
424
  
 
While disputes resumed between the returned Governor of Cartagena and the asiento and 
Navarette´s fleet had been crossing the Atlantic expecting to engage the Company of 
Scotland, don Antonio de Paredes reached Lima to report to the Viceroy the 21st of July 
1700.  He had completed his journey from New Caledonia, across the Isthmus, and down 
the coast to Lima in slightly over three months.
425
  His arrival in the city with the fortunate 
notice of the expulsion of the Scots, however, was not unanticipated.  Pimienta´s emissary 
had been preceded by a communication through the prosecuting attorney for the Viceregal 
court of Quito, who had been in Guayaquil and duly forwarded several private notices 
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from Panama recounting the positive outcome at Darien.  Thus, even before official word 
was received, Lima celebrated.  The same day the Viceroy received the initial notice . . .  
 
 . . .His Excellency with the Royal Tribunal, the Finance Board and the 
City Council went to the Cathedral to give Our Lord thanks for such a 
happy outcome.  Accompanied by musical instruments the Te deum 
laudamus was sung, and there was a solemn high mass with exposition 
of the Sacred Host.  After this, he was congratulated by the Archbishop, 
Tribunal, Councils, religious bodies, and members of the nobility, and he 
ordered religious services and masses to be conducted and said as acts of 
thanks.  The news was celebrated in all kinds of ways, as it was a victory 
of the religion and faith against heretics, to the glory of Our King and 
Lord, the reputation of his arms, and for the peace and purity of these 
countries, for there should be fear of heretical teachings that might 
impress the Indians and other uncultured inhabitants. 
 
That night the city celebrated with fireworks and illuminations, the 
Viceroy Palace, the balconies of the archbishop´s house, the galleries of 
the Town Hall, and Main Square being all decorated with long candles of 
white wax.  His Excellency ordered that solemn high mass be sung the 
following day at the Presidio of Callao, and this was done with many 
artillery salvoes.  Said fortress celebrated for three days with bullfights in 
a ring with parapets. . .  
 
 . . .And in order that the due and just happiness resulting from such good 
news might not be marred by the unpleasant regret for the severe 
punishment and sad death of three unfortunates who already were in the 
death house ready to be hung next day, His Excellency, who until then 
had been inexorable to the insistent pleas of those who appealed to his 
clemency for their pardon, in commemoration and honor of the happy 
event saved their lives, commuting the sentence of death to perpetual 
exile in the Presidio of Valdivia, that they might serve the King in the 
fortress.
426
 
 
While the pardoned prisoners adjusted to their new circumstances created by the expulsion 
of the Scots, another confirmation arrived from Quito on the 16th, followed by the entry of 
the first eyewitness, Paredes, on the 21
st
.  The Viceroy was briefed on the details of the 
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campaign,
427
 which were also recounted in the Gazeta for public distribution.  Not 
surprisingly, the printed document emphasized Pimienta´s responsible orchestration of 
operations, but it also noted the vital supportive roles of the military engineers and the 
critical intelligence provided by the ample number of deserters, the French, and allied 
natives.
428
 Pimienta´s denial of an earlier offer of peace was related, along with his 
explanation to the Scots that they were “a company of merchants; that if they were troops 
of their king he would, and not otherwise, as it would be a disgrace to the troops of his own 
king”.429  Paredes himself had served as a hostage during final negotiations, hosted by the 
enemy on one of their ships for twenty-two hours.  Other details, some of which are 
included in the following chapter, included troop movements, the specific placement of 
cannon, mortars and bombs, the dimensions of batteries and the size of enemy shells.  
There was a recounting of the negotiations leading up to the final capitulation and the 
conditions that the agreement contained.  Events undertaken to evaluate and relinquish the 
infrastructure at New Caledonia to Spanish control and deal with those Indians who had 
allied themselves with the Scots were related.  Also mentioned was the role of the “Scotch 
boy”, a servant to Pimienta, who confirmed his loyalty by reporting “he had heard one of 
the newcomers say that reinforcements of 2200 men and 300 women were to come”.
430
 
 
In closing, the account included Pimienta´s later communication that the Scotch had finally 
sailed from the site on 26 April and a notice had been sent to Spain on the 29
th
.  A 
contingent of 200 Spanish troops remained behind to secure the site.  The final words of 
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the Gazeta, communicating the triumph and power of Spain to the population of Lima at 
the behest of the Viceroy, reiterated the underlying premise . . . “May the Lord be thanked 
for all.”431 
 
 
                                   FAITH AND FINANCE 
 
In addition to the elimination of the economic and territorial threat the establishment of 
New Caledonia had presented, the Viceroy was expressing gratitude for the preservation of 
the Catholic faith.  The Council of the Indies, in a May 9 1699 consulta to the King had 
expressed its “great regret and pain” over confirmation of a Scottish foothold in Darien. 
Citing the dire consequences of allowing the foreign intrusion to go unchecked, the 
Council wrote “the Catholic religion will perish, which is what will most deeply grieve 
your majesty´s Catholic heart”.432   
 
The absolute necessity to protect Catholicism from the heresy of the Scots is well 
illustrated in the words of the Gazeta and the religious nature of the events conducted in 
response to the capitulation, yet the church did not restrict its activities against such an 
affront to conducting masses or enforcing royal edicts regarding evangelizing the native 
population.  The Bishop of Santa Marta submitted intelligence to the Governor of 
Cartagena regarding the first arrival of the Scots that, although incorrect in many details, 
did provide an additional confirmation of their presence in the region and their intent to 
establish themselves near Golden Island.
433
  The new Bishop of Panama, Juan de 
Argüelles, had immediately ascertained that “civilization” of the troublesome indigenous 
groups in his bishopric was hampered by the unrest created by New Caledonia.  Having 
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 AGI, Panamá 215, ff. 5v-6r.  The submission from the Bishop, which the Governor  
forwarded to Madrid, related that 3000 men and 500 women, all Scots, had come in 
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only arrived on the Isthmus in 1699 he nevertheless prepared a “detailed” report to the 
King following the final abandonment of the colony.
434
  
 
Nor was the church´s role in protecting the faith relegated solely to the provision of 
intelligence or analysis of events by ecclesiastical officials.  A lasting and significantly 
more concrete affirmation of the degree of concern was witnessed by the financial 
responsibilities assigned to churches and associated facilities across Spanish-America.  
Generally exempted from forms of taxation required of secular sources, there was no 
equivalent prohibition against imposition of the donativo, or “free gift”.435  Once the 
necessary Papal permission was granted to the King, the ecclesiastical institutions would 
find themselves designated to provide revenue assigned to improve the defenses of Spain´s 
West Indian dominions.  The resulting revenue-producing campaign would last over a 
decade and its records would state clearly and repeatedly that it had been motivated by the 
attempt of the Scots to establish New Caledonia.
436
 
 
Pope Innocent XII had, in 1693, set a precedent by creating a subsidy to be paid from the 
incomes of churches, convents and hospitals in the Spanish Indies for a period of three 
years.437  The declared purpose of the fund was the repression of piracy and, although it 
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initially failed to be implemented, its basic form and function was revitalized in response 
to the Papacy´s recognition of the threat presented by the Company of Scotland. 
438
  Not 
only did the church actively intervene with a warning to the King “that, although the 
Scotch have abandoned the country of Darien, your majesty should now be more than ever 
alert”
439
, but on July 14 1699 the Pope issued a revision and reconfirmation of the earlier 
dispensation of one million ducados.
440
  The new brief explicitly designated the funds for 
“repression of the attacks of the Scottish squadrons in America”.
441
  The King followed 
with a set of instructions, signifying that the resources were to be used to assist in 
preparing for war against “heretic Scots that intended to populate Darien” and others who 
might attempt to occupy or commit hostilities against the American dominions.  
Accompanying the royal orders were copies of the brief itself, translated from the original 
Latin and printed for distribution.
442
 
 
The necessary mandates to implement collection of the subsidy, to be comprised of 10% of 
annual income until the eventual sum of a million ducados would be reached, were 
prepared in Madrid in duplicate and triplicate for the prelates in the Americas.  In addition 
to their submission to the Archbishops and Bishops for further dispersal, they were also 
sent to the officials of the Inquisition in the Americas.  The geographical extent of the 
order was vast, ranging from Puebla and Michoacan in New Spain to Guatemala, 
Nicaragua and Honduras, Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Venezuela and Lima.  
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443
   
 
The impact of the financial imposition across the ecclesiastical communities was expressed 
by the Archbishop of Lima in a letter to the King, assuring the sovereign of compliance but 
also describing the intense hardships already faced by diminished sources of revenue.  The 
extreme poverty of the region, he explained, had been exacerbated by repetitive 
earthquakes over the previous decade, destroying homes and reducing the fertility of the 
soil, simultaneously causing a reduction in the church´s income of over a third while 
increasing the demands for assistance.
444
  That actual collection of the funds became a 
challenge can be assumed from the resubmissions of the order that were issued in 
November 1713 to all the prelates of Peru and their Viceroy.
445
   Regardless of the 
problems inherent in the administration and success of the program, however, its existence 
continued to be attributed to the Scottish intrusion and the intensity of the threat it had 
presented, reminding both the population and the church of the continued danger of foreign 
heretical influences.   
 
 
                    AMERICAN VIEWS FROM OUTSIDE SPANISH AMERICA 
                                       ENTERPRISING MERCHANTS 
 
Earlier chapters have presented a range of consequences of the Darien initiative in the non-
Spanish Americas. From the dispersal of deserters and political discomfort caused the 
Governor in New York (Chapter 2) to the fears of Governor Beeston that the lure of New 
Caledonia and rumors of gold would prove irresistible to his island´s populace to 
subsequent Jamaican efforts to secure valuable military experience from Darien survivors 
(Chapter 4), the impacts were varied in character and intensity.  Indicative of the economic 
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environment, opportunities for adding New Caledonia to existing trading links, often 
building on preexisting relationships, caught the immediate attention of Jamaican 
mercantile interests.   
 
During the first expedition´s October 1698 stopover in St. Thomas to secure a pilot, 
William Paterson renewed his acquaintance of years earlier with Captain Richard Moon of 
Jamaica.  Convinced to divert from his journey between New York and Curacao, Moon 
followed the Scots back to the remainder of the fleet anchored at Crab Island, where 
negotiations for trade were undertaken in the hope of acquiring much-needed provisions.  
When an accord failed to appear, Paterson warned his fellow colonists of the “ill 
consequence for us not only to miss such a quantity of good and new provisions, but the 
report he might give of our goods being overrated would unavoidably be an ill preparative 
for others”.  As his pleas had gone unheeded and Moon was preparing to sail, Paterson 
again approached the Captain with the recommendation “if he and his friends would send 
us a sloop with provisions from Jamaica, and also come himself as soon as he could, I did 
not doubt but he would dispose of them to his sufficient satisfaction”.
446
 
 
Whatever the specifics of Moon´s subsequent report, the mercantile traffic entering the bay 
at New Caledonia began to establish itself under the clear motivation of exploring mutual 
interests.  On the 20
th
 of December a sloop dispatched by Moon and under the command of 
Edward Sands arrived at the colony.  Negotiations were successful and the Scottish goods 
in payment for desperately needed supplies were to be transferred to Captain Moon upon 
his return to the colony in approximately a month.447  The return passage to Jamaica also 
provided transport, and further strengthening of ties and communication, as the colony 
dispatched its first emissaries to report to the Directors in Edinburgh.
448
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 Soon after Moon´s departure came the return of Captain Sands, accompanied by a second 
vessel under one Pilkington, both successfully negotiating the sale of their cargo to the 
colony.  Taking advantage of the Jamaican vessels´ appropriateness for local conditions
449
, 
the men were subsequently dispatched on missions for the colony, the former to hunt turtle 
and the latter to take a load of goods to trade along the Spanish coast.450  The latter 
assignment, reported by William Paterson in his subsequent written report to his Council 
of Directors, substantiates the intent of the expeditions to indulge in the illicit commerce 
that was such a great concern to the judges of the Casa de la Contratación. 
 
In the second week of February 1699 two additional Jamaican sloops arrived in close 
succession.  Although the principle motivation for the latest visitors was fishing the French 
wreck in the bay451, they also carried provisions and were willing to consider a sale, but 
only in exchange for money, a commodity in insufficient supply in the colony.  Regardless 
of the visitors´ awareness of the serious needs through “the murmurs of the people and 
other circumstances” they adhered to their stipulations for doing business and retained 
their cargo.
452
   
 
Captain Pilkington returned to New Caledonia in early March, having experienced little 
success in selling the trade goods “due to the unsuitableness of the cargo”.  He also 
                                                                                                                                                    
complaining that he could have the goods the Scots offered “as cheap, if not cheaper, in 
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brought the news of the capture of the Dolphin and her crew.  Both Pilkington and Sands 
suddenly found themselves hired for a diplomatic assignment which involved transporting 
a messenger from the colony to Cartagena to demand the Dolphin and her personnel.  If 
that mission was unsuccessful, the Jamaicans were both provided with commissions 
allowing them to commit reprisals.
453
  Both vessels and the messenger were back in New 
Caledonia by the end of the month, communicating the complete failure of the effort and 
bringing a letter of refusal from the Governor of Cartagena.  
 
The Articles of Agreement with Sands and Pilkington were a clear expansion of contacts 
with the Jamaican merchant community.  Not only did the contracts arrange for hire of the 
men´s ships, but they constituted nothing short of letters of marque, allowing for shares of 
any prizes taken and compensation for wounded and disabled men.  The document is 
notable in that it also includes one of the few references to any involvement in the slave 
trade.  The 5
th
 Article, considering compensation for disability incurred during the voyage, 
assures that “in such case, the same man shall have and receive six hundred pieces of eight, 
or six able slaves, if so much be made in the said voyage”.
454
   
 
Although Paterson´s later report to the Company Directors indicated a poor financial return 
from the reprisals
455
, Walter Herries once again provides a contrasting opinion that 
intimates illegal and aggressive activity.  The surgeon included in one of his pamphlets that 
Pilkington and Sands “sometimes shared 2 or 300 pieces of eight a man (tho´ little came 
into your colony´s treasury)” and related that the two Captains ranged along the coast 
“snapping up every Spanish thing that came in their way”.456 
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Regardless of the relative success or failure of their efforts, while pursuing the reprisals the 
two hired Captains received disturbing news from Jamaica threatening them for involving 
themselves with the Scots.  Upon their return to New Caledonia they informed the colony 
of the communication and returned to Jamaica, Pilkington promising to send another sloop 
with provisions and eventually to return himself, accompanied by his family and effects.
457
   
 
 
                                    JAMAICAN FAITH AND FINANCE  
 
Indications of the discord in Jamaica that greeted Pilkington and Sands upon their return 
are recorded in the Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica.  A controversy had first been 
acknowledged on 14 March 1699, when a paper attributed to “Mears and Sadler” was read 
before the body, resulting in an order to take the authors into custody based on the content 
being “a great grievance and prejeudice to the island, and contempt of his majestys 
government”.  Messengers were dispatched to Port Royal to seize the pair´s books and 
papers, their boats were to be stopped and Mears was to be confined to close custody 
without pen, ink or paper. 
 
The cause of the furor was a paper entitled A Scheme for the improvement and good 
management of a trade for the Scots colony at Caledonia in America, effectively a 
business plan for profitable commerce with the Company of Scotland.  It had been signed 
by Jacob Mears and John Sadler in Port Royal on the previous January 23
rd
 and listed 
seven points to assure a lucrative trade development: 
 
1) Jamaica had the most to offer the colony, including the supply of provisions and 
negroes. 
2) Jamaica was the most advantageous site for communicating with Europe. 
3) The Company of Scotland should assign a factor to reside in Jamaica, securing his 
protection from the King to assure the Governor would not interfere with his 
efforts. 
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4) A sum of cash should be provided the factor so that advantage could be taken of 
low prices for provisions, liquors and negroes. 
5) The Spanish trade would be served by sending large parcels of goods to Caledonia, 
which should realize substantial profit within a year. 
6) Because the Spanish will not conduct trade with the Scots, or anyone who sails 
under their flag, sloops should be purchased in Jamaica and outfitted with English 
colours, under English command and include some English crew.  The said ships 
should go to Caledonia, load their respective goods, and proceed on for trade, “by 
which means neither Spaniards nor any other nations can imagine otherwise than 
that they belong to Jamaica”. 
7) The designated factor should be well-acquainted with affairs of both Europe and 
America, and particularly the Spanish trade, in order to provide the best advice to 
both the colony and the Company Directors in Scotland.458 
 
 
The investigating committee reported back to the Assembly on 21 March that they had 
found a letter dated December 1698 that appeared to be a solicitation to become a factor 
for the Company of Scotland from a Joseph Cohen D´Asvedo.459  Other evidence included 
additional letters “in a strange character, we understand not”.  Further, there was 
correspondence pertaining to a debt Mears was attempting to recover for a client from a 
man purported to be a member of the Assembly, a circumstance the investigators thought 
“it obliged to shew some resentment thereon”.
460
 
 
Sadler and Mears petitioned to be heard.  Appearing before the Assembly´s Committee of 
Grievances on 29 March they explained they had discussed supplying the Scots with 
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provisions with Mr. Cunningham
461
, who had promised substantial gains.  They had also 
consulted with Sir James del Castillo, the local factor for the asiento, after which they had 
drawn up the controversial proposal.  The involvement of Castillo caused additional alarm, 
and the factor found himself before the committee the following week.  He was informed 
that aspects of the subject document “contained many things reflecting upon his majesty, 
and that they were directly tending to the ruin of the interest and trade of this island”.  Told 
he was considered to be “aiding and abetting”, Sir James replied he recalled seeing the 
paper, but had no hand in creating it.  Sadler and Mears were then recalled and informed 
they were guilty of no less than “endeavouring to subvert and turn the current of the trade 
of this island . . in contempt of his majesty´s authority and government”.  They were fined 
and consigned to good behavior for twelve months.
462
 
 
An explanation of the conflict´s context, indicative of the extent of concern it provoked, 
was provided by Secretary of State Vernon in a report to the King dated 13 June 1699.  
Initially the Secretary related several items of troubling news from Jamaica, including “a 
Scotch agent trying to promote the enterprise”.  He then addressed a dispute between 
Jewish and English merchants over access to potential profits in trade with New Caledonia.  
“The Assembly of Jamaica had taken notice cognizant of it upon finding there was an 
inclination to give a preference to the Jews”, Vernon wrote.  He continued, attributing the 
information to “Herries the surgeon” while criticizing Governor Beeston for “making no 
mention of any of these particulars”.
463
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 Traces of the debate would also find their way into the highest level of Spanish 
correspondence and acknowledge concern over religious threat from other than solely 
Protestant sources.  Ambassador to London Canales, who of course was receiving 
intelligence from Herries, reported his concerns to his King in late August  
 
What I observe here, sire, is that business begins to assume the aspect of 
Conquest, and especially the element of the Jews, which element is 
strong in capital and altogether unchecked by Law, Divine or human.
464
 
 
 
                           FORCED ADAPTATION AND ACCOMMODATION 
 
Competition for the New Caledonia trade was soon muted by the issuance of the 
proclamations forbidding commerce or assistance to the colony and the final capitulation 
to Pimienta´s forces.  Governor Beeston, in spite of Secretary of State Vernon´s 
insinuations of a lack of zeal in thwarting the designs of the Company of Scotland, was the 
first to issue a ban in the King´s name on 8 April 1699.   Shortly to follow were equivalent 
orders from Barbados, Virginia, New York, Rhode Island, Massachusetts Bay, East New 
Jersey, Connecticut, South Carolina, New Hampshire, New Providence and Maryland.
465
 
In addition to their targeted impact on New Caledonia, the proclamations also affected 
those that were prepared to trade with the Scots.  Inadvertently, they also mapped the 
geographical extent of interest in the venture.  A significant percentage of the far-flung 
locations issuing the proclamations would receive numbers of survivors, adding an 
unforeseen and unsolicited contingent of newcomers to their communities. 
 
Due to its location and commercial activity, Jamaica had found itself inextricably tied to 
the fortunes of New Caledonia.   Besides its piqued economic interests, the island also 
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served as a communication entrepot between Edinburgh and those coming and going from 
Darien.  Capitalizing on the existence of an established community of Scots
466
, the conduit 
for much of the contact was one Dr. Blair, who is credited with directly corresponding with 
the Directors in Edinburgh, updating them as to the arrival of relief ships and the 
acquisition of pilots for the remaining crossing to the Isthmus.
467
  Although Blair resided in 
Kingston, where he had routine exposure to the events of the port and the seat of royal 
government, a Dr. Stewart residing near the eastern anchorage of Port Morant often 
provided the first point of contact.  As designated in her sailing orders, the relief ship 
Margaret of Dundee made her initial call in Jamaica at that port, from where the Captains 
sought Stewart and Captain Robertson, “both Scotsmen, who will either come, or send 
such intelligence to you as they can from thence”.
468
  
 
In the aftermath of successive abandonments of New Caledonia, many of the survivors 
also either transitted through or settled in Jamaica.  Following the capitulation, the 
Reverend Francis Borland would reside for a month in the home of planter Charles Graves.  
Preaching and baptizing, he moved on to Port Royal, where he was gifted with “things for 
his voyage” to New England by a lengthy list of residents, including the aforementioned 
Dr. Blair.469 
 
The substantial needs of Jamaica created permanent opportunities for a significant number 
of other survivors recorded in various histories of the island.  According to Dr. Henry 
Barham´s unpublished work, “many of the Scots came to Jamaica and although they 
missed of a settlement in Darien they soon found very good ones . . . God be thanked, by 
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marrying rich fortunes”.
470
  Douglas Hamilton writes that Darien survivors “swelled the 
Scottish numbers” of Jamaica and identifies the specific community of Argyll in the 
western part of the island as dating from the period.  At the center of the settlement was 
Colonel John Campbell, who became a member of both the Assembly of Jamaica and its 
Council and would entice additional immigration from Scotland “based on kinship and 
locality”.
471
 
 
Charles Leslie, in his 1740 A New History of Jamaica, From the Earliest Accounts, to the 
Taking of Porto Bello by Vice-Admiral Vernon, provides a wider perspective of the arrival 
of the survivors.  He writes of the two ships that reached Jamaica experiencing high 
mortality, but also that “several lived to make fine Estates in this Place.”  Among those 
who thrived were Colonels Guthrie and Dowdall, the former initially employed as an 
overseer, “but his good Parts could not lie long concealed, he soon raised himself, was 
distinguished by the successive Governors, and now enjoys a fine Estate, and the first 
Honours of the Island”.
472
   
 
Between the extremes of continuing mortality and marrying great wealth likely existed the 
majority of survivors.  What appears to be one such group, which “ruined in their fortunes 
and starved out of their possessions, solicited, and, at length obtained, permission to join . . 
. planters in Jamaica.  They established themselves between Bluefields and Luana point; 
where they may yet be traced at Culloden and Auchindown”.
473
  The net result was the 
introduction to a marginally-populated colonial island of a seasoned group of survivors 
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who had expected to settle elsewhere, but now effectively adapted to their unforeseen 
circumstances.  In the words of Governor Beeston, who had expressed his concern over 
losing population to the Scots, “it is far better they were here to strengthen this country 
than to go amongst the French or Dutch, where they will be lost to His Majesty on his 
service”.
474
 
 
Although Jamaica witnessed its emergence as a “settled colony” as a result of the Scots´ 
desperation475, it was by no means the sole locality in the Caribbean to be impacted.  In 
March of 1700, as Pimienta´s fleet anchored off New Caledonia, a controversy sprang to 
the forefront of problems confronting Governor Grey of Barbadoes.  A George Duncan, 
the royal official wrote to the Council of Trade and Plantations, had “spoke several 
seditious words against His Majesty” in the offices of the Clerk.  Depositions were taken 
and a prosecution was undertaken.  A “scandalous” book supporting the Scottish right to 
Darien had infiltrated the island by some “disaffected persons”, resulting in the 
encouragement of several of “the people of that nation to take a greater liberty in talking 
than is fit for me to suffer”.  The Governor added that he was confident that the example he 
made of Duncan would suffice to keep the Scots in order. For his part, the defendant had 
been declared drunk, but not before expounding his opinion that “the Scotch were as good 
as the English, no subjects of King William, and that there would soon be a change”.
476
  
From Nevis came alarm of a different claim associated with New Caledonia.  Intelligence 
from the Virgin Islands warned that the notorious pirate, Captain Kidd, was heading to 
Darien to join forces with his countrymen.
477
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Resentment and suspicion would not readily disappear as the Scots strove to integrate 
themselves into their new communities.  In 1707 Governor Park of the Leeward Islands, 
writing during the War of the Spanish Succession concerning the vulnerability of his small 
domain, added a postscript with a plan to solve multiple problems  
 
If the Queen will not spare English troopes, send us Ten Thousand 
Scotch, this Warm Climate will Meliorate them, and make them of a 
more Sociable Religion, the Queen need be at no great Expence, only 
furnish them with arms and Transports, and Some Oatmeal, we will join 
them with what men can be spared here.  If We take Martinique the 
Queen gains a fine Island, the Scotch shall have the Land, and we will 
have the Plunder.  The Queen ventures little, and may gain the Sugar 
Trade , This will be a better Project than their beloved Darien, and if they 
. . . out all Zealous Kirk men, I promise they shall never trouble the 
Queen´s affairs more, If they do not take Martinique I will get them 
Disposed of; And I think that will be some Service. 
478
 
 
 
Farther to the north events in Darien had been followed with high interest, not solely of a 
commercial nature.  Judge Samuel Sewall of Boston had been particularly intrigued by the 
potential religious opportunities the Company of Scotland might create.  Writing in his 
diary that the intentions of the Scots “Makes much Discourse in Town”
479
, Sewall offered 
his own private assessment, reflecting on his firm beliefs relating to the prophecies of 
scripture, that the “Company of Scotland is the Sixth Angel”.
480
  He took it upon himself to 
write to the surviving ministers in New Caledonia, providing his support and concern lest 
Governor Pimienta, “a Low-Country Souldier, should come upon you while you are few, 
and not well settled, and somewhat dispirited by reason of the late Dissipation”.
481
 It was 
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also indicative of the web of interrelationships that linked New Caledonia with the other 
colonies of the Americas that the Judge was a friend of local merchant John Borland, who 
not only received New Caledonia correspondence from William Paterson,482 but would 
also house his own brother, Darien survivor Reverend Francis Borland, during his sibling´s 
recuperation in Boston from September 1700 to April 1701.
483
 
 
Another clergyman, Archibald Stobo, did forge a new life in the Americas.  He had 
accompanied Borland on the second expedition, reaching Charleston, South Carolina 
following the capitulation.  Surviving the hurricane-caused shipwreck of the Rising Sun 
while in that port, he would practice the ministry within the colony until his death in 
1741.
484
   
 
The dispersal of survivors also contributed to the population of the Jerseys, where 
simmering hostilities had surfaced, exacerbated by events on the Isthmus.  Governor Basse 
documented his frustration following passage of the Jamaica Act by the Assembly of East 
Jersey.  The legislation was, he explained, aimed at privateers and pirates, but was 
vehemently opposed by “the Scotch gentlemen, who among us are grown to a very great 
height from the prospect of a gentleman of their own nation filling the seat of government 
in these provinces by his Majesty´s approbation, and the success that their countrymen 
meet withal in the settlement”.  The principle traders of not only East and West Jersey but 
also Pennsylvania were Scots, Basse reported, and there were active assertions that “His 
Majesty dare not interrupt them in their settlement.”  Furthermore, the troublesome Scots 
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were “encouraging the inhabitants of these colonies to go thither to trade and settle on the 
proposals made them by the Council of State in Calidonia.”  The Governor offered the 
only effective means of resolving the situation was to effect “a total exclusion of them 
from any share in the Government of these plantations”.
485
 
 
Basse would do his part to prohibit the commerce with Darien by issuing the requisite 
proclamation 1 August 1699.
486
  His action would not, however, prevent the influx of 
survivors who chose to establish themselves near the existing Scottish community of 
Perth-Amboy, creating a new settlement known as Scots Plains.
487
  Among them was 
Captain John Anderson, who had commanded the Unicorn to safety following the first 
abandonment of New Caledonia.  Anderson´s role in his new home would run counter to 
Basse´s recommendations, for the Scot would establish himself as a trader and planter and, 
despite efforts to block his nomination, serve on His Majesty´s Council for the Province of 
New Jersey, becoming President of the body just prior to his death in 1736.
488
 
 
                                  THE CASE OF SAMUEL VETCH 
 
Also reaching New York and New England, but following an entirely different course after 
the first expedition, was Samuel Vetch.  Having been educated at Utrecht and rising to the 
rank of Captain during service against the French in the Netherlands
489
, he would, 
according to his biographer, become a citizen of the empire, motivated by “the uneasy 
aspiration of the three groups which had struggled separately until now without success: 
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British imperialists, colonial expansionists, and his fellow Scots”.
490
 Initially struggling 
into New York with the Drummonds following the 1698 expedition, Vetch elected not to 
return to Darien, opting for marriage into the family of prominent local Scot Robert 
Livingston and participation in trading ventures which adroitly maneuvered between 
legality and practicality.
491
  Building on the established community network of Scottish 
trading interests, he became an associate of the previously introduced John Borland of 
Boston.
492
 Following an unsuccessful request for a commission as Captain of one of the 
Crown companies stationed in New York493, a 1705 prisoner exchange requiring a voyage 
to Canada presented convenient cover for the more commercial motives of the Borland-
Vetch enterprise.  Having raised suspicions, the vessel was seized upon its return, to which 
Vetch responded that stormy weather had forced him into Acadian ports, after which he 
was compelled to trade to assure the security of his vessel and crew.
494
 
 
Capitalizing on both his Darien and Canadian experience, Vetch began to formulate a plan 
to defeat France in a northern offensive.  He offered Scots as practical colonists for 
Canada, explaining that the region was “a healthful place and more agreeable to a people 
bred in cold countries than the West Indies, which proves a grave to (an) abundance of 
people that go there”.  Submitting his scheme to the Board of Trade in 1708 he emphasized 
the interconnectedness of the colonies and the potential for France to drive “the English out 
of the continent all together”. Supported by a cast reminiscent of Darien: William Paterson, 
Seafield, Carstares, and the Duke of Hamilton, his proposal was approved and forwarded 
to the Privy Council.  The scheme conveniently not only strove to expel the French from 
portions of their Canadian territory, but also provided a mechanism to ameliorate the 
lingering dream of a Scottish colony and residual opposition to the Treaty of Union.  In 
February 1709 orders were signed and sealed for the campaign.  Vetch would receive a 
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commission as colonel and oversee preparation in the colonies, serving under a British 
field officer but to be rewarded with the Governorship of the resurrected Nova Scotia.
495
 
 
The new Colonel returned to the colonies and proceeded with provisioning. Harkening 
back to Darien experience, the indigenous population and former prisoners of the French 
were used to obtain intelligence but anxiety increased as it was realized that news of the 
impending campaign had reached the adversaries.  As the organized colonial forces 
anticipated the arrival of the fleet from England, they instead received notice that the 
expedition had been “laid aside”, the fleet having been diverted to Spanish waters.
496
   
 
Seemingly undaunted by the setbacks, Vetch strove to take advantage of successive 
opportunities.  Understanding that plans were also being formulated to reduce New Spain, 
Vetch was quick to capitalize on his New Caledonia experience, offering that he was 
“ready to contribute my mite of advice and assistance, having been formerly upon that 
coast”.  Yet another turn of strategy from London, however, resulted in a smaller 
expedition to the northern port of Annapolis Royal, where Vetch achieved his appointment 
as Governor.  Surviving a harsh winter of death, illness and desertion, and under constant 
fear of attack, Vetch found himself recalled to New England in the summer of 1711 to 
command forces designated to attack Quebec.  Success also eluded that campaign, with 
colonists and English forces blaming each other for its failure.
497
   
 
Turning his attention to the survival of the outpost at Annapolis Royal, Vetch attempted in 
vain to determine what negotiations in Utrecht to end the War of the Spanish Succession 
would mean for the status of the tiny colony.  Coping with the need to sustain his forces, 
Vetch finally received word that he would continue as Adjutant General to the new 
                                                 
495
 Ibid, pp. 101-119.  For a discussion of the previous attempt at Scottish colonization in 
Nova Scotia between 1629 and 1632, and its demise as a negotiating tool to end hostilities 
between England and France, see George Pratt Insh´s Scottish Colonial Schemes 1620-
1686 (Glasgow 1922), especially Chapter II, `Nova Scotia´, pp. 40-90. 
496
 Waller, Samuel Vetch, pp. 122-156. 
497
 Ibid, pp. 173-231.  For comprehensive discussion of the 1711 campaign and its failure, 
see Adam Lyons, The 1711 Expedition to Quebec: politics and the limitations of British 
global strategy (New York and London 2013). 
Governor of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, finally becoming Governor himself in 1715.  
His expertise was also requested in London to serve as a Commissioner investigating the 
boundaries between France and Great Britain in the Americas, a position providing 
opportunities for audiences with the Board of Trade and a platform to continue advocating 
for additional colonists in Nova Scotia.  His proposals remained unfulfilled, however, and, 
suffering yet another reversal of fortune, he would die in Debtor´s Prison in London in 
1732.
498
  Perhaps more than any other individual, Vetch had taken his practical experience, 
including the months in Darien, and attempted to apply it to future attempts at 
colonization.   
 
Far from the huts of New Caledonia, the arrival of the Company of Scotland on the 
Isthmus produced a litany of consequences across the Americas, forcing communities 
throughout both continents to come to terms with novel sets of circumstances and fears of 
uncertain and threatening changes.  From the residents of Spanish America anxious over 
again losing personal wealth and security, to expedition participants fighting for survival in 
locations they never expected to settle, the conditions of an insecure future created similar 
anxieties.   For the men representing King William III and King Carlos II, futures were 
diverted by a scheme that, though short-lived, constituted a major aggression and opened 
the door to new allies and enemies.  As the unintended bands of survivors dispersed across 
the map of British America from Jamaica to New York, often echoing prior paths taken by 
deserters, they would alter the face of Atlantic colonies, assisting in forging new 
communities and adding to discord in others.  Spanish America would find itself taught a 
difficult lesson, reminded of its vulnerability and the acute need to restore both internal and 
external security in its most strategic region.   
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CHAPTER 7 
THE VIEW FROM THE AMERICAS II 
DARIEN CONSEQUENCES 
 
The location chosen for New Caledonia was far from an isolated territory devoid of its own 
history and society.  Not only was the site currently surrounded by populations of native 
Cuna, well versed in interaction with international interests following two centuries of 
European contact, but there were also pronounced indicators of foreign presence, 
exemplified by the French inhabitant who greeted the Scots upon their arrival.
499
  This 
chapter will examine the complex local sociopolitical fabric into which the Company of 
Scotland inserted itself and, conversely, the short and long-term consequences the colony, 
regardless of its ephemeral establishment, imposed on the region.  Unlike the remainder of 
the Americas, which either coped with the arrival of groups of expedition survivors or 
celebrated their departure, the province of Darien and its people would experience an 
intensified and disquieting focus of attention. Although eventually empty of would-be 
Scottish colonists, the area would nonetheless be severely impacted by their aborted effort, 
convulsing through both the attempts to establish the settlement and the reciprocal military 
effort to assure its demise.  The lengthy and volatile record of interaction between the Cuna 
and the Spanish
500
 would be exacerbated by the former´s alliances with the Scots, resulting 
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 Among those making immediate contact with the newly arrived Scots was the 
Frenchman, who had resided locally for four years and provided an informed review of 
Spanish-Indian politics.  Also on the list of welcoming parties were two native captains 
who expressed their enthusiasm for new allies against the Spanish.  Insh, The Company, p. 
129. 
500
 David Weber calls Spain´s relations with unconquered indigenous groups “the most 
consistently vexing challenge Spain faced” across Spanish America, adding that “Prior to 
in new campaigns to bring the notoriously independent native populations under colonial 
control.  The Company of Scotland´s flagrant attempt to establish a permanent settlement 
provided an eloquent reminder that Darien possessed not only uniquely strategic assets and 
valuable resources, but that these same benefits were highly vulnerable to domestic threat 
and foreign incursion, both of which demanded a strong response to assure continued but 
tentative Spanish domination.  
 
 
                                A CROWDED AND TURBULENT STAGE 
 
By the time of the arrival of the Scots, the local Cuna had established their own history of 
both protecting their sovereignty and successfully accommodating the presence of 
foreigners.  Although Rodrigo Bastides had first sailed along the Darien coast in 1501, and 
Columbus would touch upon the coast during his fourth voyage a year later
501
, it was the 
establishment of Santa Maria la Antigua del Darien in 1511
502
 that initiated protracted 
interaction between the Spanish and indigenous groups of the Isthmus.  To their advantage 
                                                                                                                                                    
1700 the Habsburg dynasty had enforced Spain´s humane and paternalistic law unevenly, 
never resolving the tension between its wish to protect Indians and its interest in exploiting 
Indian labor.”  D. Weber, Bárbaros: Spaniards and Their Savages in the Age of 
Enlightenment (New Haven 2005), p. 5.  The situation faced with the Cuna and their 
failure to kneel to any form of civil or religious subjugation is a prime example of the 
“vexing challenge”.  Elman Service explores the issue in his study of how the Spanish 
attempted to force indigenous groups to adapt to aspects of colonial policy; but, 
conversely, had to adapt its policies to accommodate the wide range of indigenous society 
within its colonial empire.  E. Service, `Indian-European Relations in Colonial America´, 
American Anthropologist, Vol. 57:3 (June 1955), pp. 411-425. 
501 David Howarth, The Golden Isthmus (London 1966), pp.14-15.  The story of 
Columbus´s foray on the Isthmus, hardly establishing goodwill among native groups, is 
recounted on pages 14-29.  Assuming knowledge of the behavior of the Spaniards spread 
among the various tribes it is intriguing to consider just what the Cuna heard of this initial 
period of interaction. 
502
 Ibid, p. 38.  A group of survivors of a Spanish expedition had expropriated the native 
village, renaming it after a church in Sevilla and adding Darien in deference to the native 
name for the adjacent river.  The group was led to the village by a veteran of Bastides´s 
earlier voyage whose name would become inextricably linked with the Isthmus, Vasco 
Nuñez de Balboa. For the detailed story of the initial Darien settlements by the Spanish 
and relations with the Cueva, Cuna and other indigenous groups, see Kathleen Romoli, 
Balboa of Darien: Discoverer of the Pacific (New York 1953). 
the Cuna then inhabited lands on the periphery of this initial interface with Spain.  From 
their vantage point they would have had the opportunity to witness initial favorable 
relations with Governor Vasco Nuñez de Balboa, his beheading by fellow Spaniard and 
successor Pedrarias de Avila, and the decimation through disease and slavery of the 
contemporary resident indigenous group, the Cuevas.
503
 By 1519, when the Spanish 
removed themselves and their livestock to what were anticipated to be improved 
conditions in Panama, lessons had been learned. The Cuna expanded into the newly 
vacated region, firmly anti-Spanish and predisposed to alliances, assistance and commerce 
with other foreign interests, particularly those seeking a share of the wealth of the 
Americas at the expense of Spain.
504
  
 
Regardless of the abandonment of their initial settlements, however, Spanish officials fully 
comprehended the necessity of asserting a semblance of control over the Isthmus and 
struggled to contain the dual threat of foreign penetration and domestic strife. The actuality 
was that colonial policies were not achieving either goal.  Attempts at evangelization and 
the reduction of the native population into Spanish-style nuclear villages were met with 
tenacious and violent opposition
505
 and restrictions aimed at controlling Cuna access to 
weapons and tools served only to assure the continued welcome of Dutch, British and 
French smugglers offering the desired goods. The appointment of Julian Carrisoli, a 
Spaniard reared by Cuna, to the position of Protector of the Indians provided some 
measure of relief when, in 1645, it was reported that the Dutch had landed on the northern 
coast of Darien and promised accommodation of Cuna customs in return for support of a 
                                                 
503 Romoli describes the Cuevas as “the Indians they (Spanish) knew best, treated worst, 
and admired even as they destroyed them”.  Ibid, p.130.  Differences between the Cuevas 
and Cunas are further explored in R. Torres de Arauz, `Nuevo Edimburgo del Darien, Los 
Cunas: Anfitriones de Los Escoceses´, Loteria, Vol. 314-316 (May-July 1982).  
504
 The “disaffection” created by Pedrarias is noted by the Spaniard don Antonio Arevalo 
in his 1761 report on conditions within the area.  A. Cuervo (ed.), Colección de 
Documentos Inéditos sobre la Geografía y la historia de Colombia, Sección Primera, 
Geografia y Viajes, Tomo II, Costa Pacifica, Provincia Litorales y Campañas de los 
Conquistadores, p. 256.   
505
 Two attempts by the Capuchin order, departing from Cadiz in 1647 and 1681, to 
evangelize the Cuna and establish missions resulted in complete failure.  A. Castillero 
Calvo, Conquista, Evangelización y Resistencia, ¿Triunfo o Fracaso de la Politíca 
Indigenista?  (Panama 1995), p. 227. 
settlement.  Carrisoli´s diplomatic and language skills, reinforced by ties of kinship, were 
used by the emerging leader to persuade the group of approached Cuna to refuse the 
proposition, a success that deeply impressed Spanish officials.506  Nevertheless, there was 
to be no reign of uniform or persistent peace in the region.  A plea to Madrid for military 
assistance from Panama in 1651 described the latest insurrection . . . 
 
as if they were one man, the Indians of the province of the Darien rose 
up in rebellion.  They were motivated solely by their own natural 
malevolence, since they had received nothing but good treatment from 
the Spaniards acting in your name.507 
 
The continuing lure of Darien´s gold mines, coupled with treasure shipped from Peru for 
transport across the Isthmus and on to Spain, provided unrelenting enticement for foreign 
intrusions, a point which was reinforced by a series of piratical raids conducted between 
1680 and 1695.
508
  Although Luis Carrisoli, now serving in his father´s role, had measures 
of military success with his Cuna defensive forces, other groups of Cuna simultaneously 
established vital roles for themselves as guides and informants for the cast of plundering 
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 For a discussion of Carrisoli´s unique role in Darien sociopolitics, see Gallup-Diaz, The 
Door, pp. 43-53.  The author emphasizes the convenience of Carrisoli´s unique 
circumstances in the ambiguous geographic interface between the jurisdictions of Panama 
and Cartagena.  It was the Governor of the latter who made the appointment of Protector of 
the Indians, a frequently used position denoting authority over both the native population 
and Spanish activities within the designated region.  Ibid, pp. 44-45.  Carrisoli´s dual 
sanction by both the President of Panama and the Governor of Cartagena is also indicative 
of the multiple jurisdictional administrative world into which the Scots intruded.  Carrisoli 
would eventually be rewarded with titles and lands assuring him and his descendants a 
future in the history of the Isthmus.  Ibid, p. 52. 
507 Ibid, p. 50.  Original in AGI, Panamá 31 (Letter of the Cabildo of Panama, 20 
November 1651).  Gallup-Diaz adds that Madrid, lacking the resources for a military 
offensive, responded with silence. 
508
 Among those attracted to the aggregate of adventure and potential fortune was Lionel 
Wafer, a surgeon whose experience living with the Cuna for four months while he 
recuperated from wounds would gain him fame and financial reward. Wafer´s subsequent 
return to London and intent to put his story into print for profit came to the attention of the 
Company of Scotland and would provide much of the impetus for the designation of 
Darien as the destination of choice.  Wafer would ultimately be brought to Scotland to 
consult with the “Secret Committee” regarding the assets of the Isthmus.  The individual 
tasked with escorting the surgeon out of Edinburgh following his stay was none other than 
Walter Herries.  Insh, The Company, pp. 109-114. 
and trading foreigners.  It was clear that the sociopolitical situation was profoundly 
fragmented and subject to rapid and unanticipated change. 
 
This kaleidoscope of entangled and shifting alliances, chaotic at best, is what preceded the 
arrival of the Company of Scotland fleet into what would become Caledonia Bay.  Within 
days of their arrival the Councilors had every indication that they had entered a world as 
complex as any they had left behind.
509
  Captain Andreas was one of the first Cuna to 
approach the Scots, asking if they were friends of the Spanish, expecting that they intended 
to cross to the South Sea, and relating his friendships with English privateers.
510
 Four days 
later came a group of visitors including the previously mentioned Frenchman and two 
individuals from Martinique, one of which spoke Cuna fluently.  They explained that the 
story the Scots had been told about a supreme leader over all the Cuna was untrue and 
went on to relate the intricate network of diverse contemporary leaders, their territories, 
and their political affiliations.  Captain Diego, with an estimated 3000 men under his 
control, was regarded as the most powerful and had spent the last year at odds with the 
Spanish over gold mines within his jurisdiction.   Most recently, the strife had resulted in 
the murders of 20 Spaniards and three priests. Captain Paussigo´s lands lay between those 
of Diego and Andreas, the latter allied with his brother and residing closest to the Scottish 
settlement.  The two siblings had traditionally maintained a more amicable relationship 
with the Spanish, even allowing some of them to reside in the area and keep officials in 
Panama abreast of events.  All had changed within the previous two months, however, 
when Captain Ambrosio, quasi-leader of yet another adjacent territory, had convinced 
them to join him in the killing of ten Spaniards on nearby Golden Island.511   
                                                 
509 Bridget McPhail contends similarities between the Scots and the Cuna positively 
contributed to the interactions between the two groups, citing the former´s own history 
with clan-based society. Through a Glass, p. 141. 
510
 Burton, The Darien Papers, pp. 64-65, Entry from Mr. Rose´s Journal for 2 November 
1698. 
511
 Ibid, pp. 66-67, Entry for 6 November 1698.  Corroborating the information transmitted 
to the Scots in Caledonia Bay is a Spanish consulta provided by the Council of War to the 
King dated from Madrid the following July.  The document relates a message from the 
President of Panama dispatched just prior to his being informed of the presence of the 
Scots, describing the “uppity” posturing of the Indians in Darien and their killing of three 
Franciscan priests and 32 Spaniards.   AGI, Panamá 105 (The Council of War to His 
 The various Captains also possessed a range of personal resumés reflecting their individual 
acquisition of skills and experience that allowed them to promote their interests both 
within their own territories and on foreign soil
512
, a circumstance that would deeply 
influence their individual reactions during the periods of Scottish residence.  Ambrosio´s 
son-in-law Pedro was a fluent Spanish-speaker, having learned the language in Panama 
while being kept there as a slave.  His language skills also included French, which he had 
acquired while living in Pitiguao.  French support was also characteristic of Captain 
Corbete, who had assisted a group of French privateers and been offered compensation 
from Governor DuCasse.  Sailing to meet the Governor, Corbete had been captured by the 
English and taken to Jamaica, where he was sold into slavery along with two other Indians.  
Monsieur DuCasse had eventually learned of the incident and demanded the release of the 
three, which was realized, allowing Corbete not only to travel twice to the French 
stronghold at Pitiguao, but also to Cartagena.  Neighboring Corbete´s lands was Captain 
Nicola, who had been brought up among the Spanish and was not only a fluent speaker, 
but able to read and write.  He had remained a Spanish ally until only twelve months 
earlier, when he had relinquished a treasured French firearm, acquired from a buccaneer, to 
a Spaniard for repair.  The weapon had captured the attention and been retained by the 
                                                                                                                                                    
Majesty, 14 July 1699).  Herries provides additional details regarding the recent murders, 
relating that, following the killing of the priests and the robbery of the chapel of its 
furniture, Diego´s son had “brought the vestments and chalice to Captain Fraser at New 
Caledonia”.  Ambrosio, for his part in the murder of the Spaniards on Golden Island, 
“never expected to be pardoned”.  W. Herries, A Short vindication, p. 35. 
512
 Langebaek elaborates on the importance of these foreign experiences and their related 
acquisition of both exotic goods and knowledge as instrumental to attainment of prestige 
and position within the Cuna communities.  Whether or not the tradition had existed prior 
to European contact, the move of the Cuna closer to the coast facilitated their interaction 
with a variety of international interests.  C. Langebaek, `Cuna Long Distance Journeys: 
The Result of Colonial Interaction´, Ethnology, Vol. 30:4 (Oct 1991), pp. 371-380.   The 
phenomenon of Cuna (or Tule) acquisition of authority and its symbiosis with European 
interests is explored by Gallup-Diaz in The Door of the Seas and Key to the Universe, 
particularly in Chapter Two, `Teaching the Tule to Become Tribal, 1640-1667´, pp. 25-52. 
Governor in Portobello, with the result that Nicola could now be counted among the 
enemy.
513
  
 
The Scots were also quickly made aware of not only differences but discord among the 
Cuna communities.  Ambrosio, who appeared to be very frank about his outlaw status 
among the Spaniards, warned that Andreas was not to be trusted and was functioning as a 
spy.  Later questioned about the accusation, the latter Captain related a critical account that 
was to be echoed following the eventual departure of the Scots.  Andreas explained that 16 
or 17 years prior his people had assisted French and English in raids on both sides of the 
Isthmus, receiving promises in return for continued protection from Spanish reprisals.  
Two years later, however, once the raids reaped sufficient treasure, the foreigners departed 
and the Cuna groups were “expos´d to the Cruelty of the Spaniard, who have cut off most 
of the Indians thereabouts, and that for several years they were oblig´d to live obscurely in 
the Mountains”.
514
 
 
The situation was further complicated by other, non-indigenous constituencies.   
The presence of Frenchmen had been, of course, quickly made obvious to the Scots.  These 
ex-buccaneers had integrated themselves into Isthmian society, rearing half-Cuna families. 
They welcomed the Scots as another intruding group who would not only provide trading 
opportunities, but would also serve as a deflection from unwanted Spanish attention. 
515
   
 
                                                 
513 Burton, The Darien Papers, pp. 67-69. Entry from Mr. Rose´s Journal for 6 November 
1698.   
514 Herries, A Defence, pp. 58-59.  Following attempts by the Scots to negotiate between 
the Cuna leaders, the discord between Andreas and Ambrosio would eventually erupt into 
a physical altercation and the death of Andreas from a suspicious fall through an open 
hatch on one of the Scottish vessels.  Ibid, p. 60.  Indicating censorship aimed at reporting 
nothing short of unmitigated success (also discussed in Chapter 2 in regards to problems 
with desertion), the fatality of their native ally was not transmitted to Edinburgh, the victim 
simply disappearing from any further communication.   
515
 Gallup-Diaz, The Door, pp. 108-109.  The author emphasizes that this group was 
essentially stateless, conducting themselves from the perspective of inhabitants of Darien, 
not representatives of their King.  In 1740 the group would petition to become vassals of 
the Spanish King.  Ibid, p.109, ft. 9. 
The non-resident French community was also active, and provided its own narrative of 
sociopolitics within Darien.  Captain Thomas of the Maurepas, the French vessel which 
would eventually sink attempting to sail out of Caledonia Bay on Christmas Day 1698 (See 
Chapter 3), related to Commodore Pennycook the information that about eight months 
prior there had been a slave revolt in Portobello.  The original 700 rebels had rapidly risen 
to 1500, aided by arms and ammunition from English, French and Dutch traders.  The 
Governor had been “forc´d to come to very dishonourable terms . . . to allow them to be a 
free people”.516   
 
Although the specific Portobello insurrection related by Thomas could not be verified, the 
account is indicative of a series of local slave-related quests for freedom.  Inevitably, the 
acquisition of slave labor in the region had created an attendant problem of slave escapees, 
which could reach up to 300 of every 1000 individuals.  The sheer numbers, coupled with 
the jungle environment that provided unique conditions of shelter and security, resulted in 
the creation by 1570 of at least three settlements of fugitives on the Isthmus.  The largest 
of these, Ronconcholon, was said to include 1700 fighting men and maintained not only a 
level of tension across the area, but also a reserve of conspirators for the host of 
intruders.517  As early as 1572 Francis Drake had discovered the benefits of allying with 
such communities, which provided invaluable survival and guiding skills, as well as 
intelligence on all-important movements of Spanish treasure.
518
  Returning to England, 
Drake passed on the assets of the alliance, assuring its future use.
519
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 Insh, Papers, pp. 92-93, Captain Pennycook´s Journall from the Madera Islands to New 
Caledonia in Darien, entry for December 12, 1698. 
517 Howarth, The Golden Isthmus, pp. 64-65. 
518 Ibid, pp. 72-73.  A group of these escaped slaves, or maroons, guided Drake across the 
Isthmus to Panama, stopping in their town of fifty-five homes and deeply impressing the 
Englishmen that it was “kept so cleane and sweet that not only the houses but the verie 
streets were verie pleasant to behold”.  Ibid, pp. 76-77.  The earlier history of escaped 
slaves in the region is examined by Armando Fortune is his four-part series `Los negros 
cimarrones en Tierra Firme y su lucha por la libertad´, Loteria, Vols. 171-174 (Feb-May 
1970). 
519
 Frederick Rodriguez, Cimarron Revolts and Pacification in New Spain, the Isthmus of 
Panama and Colonial Colombia, 1501-1800, unpublished PhD thesis, Loyola University 
of Chicago, 1979, pp. 143-144.   While Rodriguez uses the term cimarrones (maroons) to 
encompass renegade slaves and indigenous individuals, Howarth (Panama: The Golden 
 In return, desperate to retain the necessary source of labor, some modicum of security, and 
prevent the potential for wholesale revolt, Spain attempted evangelization, general amnesty 
and military action, resorting to mutually beneficial capitulations only in extreme 
circumstances.
520
  By 1607, illustrative of the durability of the problem, it was recorded 
that ninety-four menacing cimarrones resided in the vicinity of Panama, subsisting off 
small farm plots but able to mobilize quickly and avoid capture.
521
  The threat, and the 
economic strain created by military deployments attempting to remedy it, resulted in the 
imposition of a cimarron tax on local slave owners in 1639.522   
 
While the recent purported capitulation in Portobello related by the Frenchman may have 
created an apparent pause in slave insurrections, the current situation also presented both a 
new concern and a potential opportunity for the Spanish.  Acknowledging the reality of 
possible assistance to the Scots by remaining fugitive maroons, in May 1699 the Council 
of War of the Indies recommended via a consulta to the King that the enticement of 
amnesty be offered to secure communities of remaining outlaw slaves in return for 
assistance in the campaign to eradicate New Caledonia.
523
 
 
The dynamic conditions of the Isthmus at best verged on unchecked disorder, devoid of 
Spanish control.  In addition to problems related to established residents, there was the 
vague mission of the newly arrived French, currently resting in the bay alongside the Scots 
                                                                                                                                                    
Isthmus) defines the term as delineating solely the former.  Howarth´s more specific 
meaning is used here. 
520 Ibid, pp. 4-7. 
521 Ibid, p. 152.  The date of the study is variably typed in the manuscript as 1607 and 
1697, the latter most likely the true date. 
522
 The tax, intended to subsidize the military, had previously been established in Mexico 
City, Cartagena and Havana.  Its imposition on the Isthmus was to be collected from the 
slave-owners of Panama.  Ibid, pp. 152-153. 
523
 AGS, Estado 4183, Consulta dated 12 May 1699.  As noted later in this chapter, 
negroes and mulattos were frequently recorded as accompanying Spanish forces in action 
against the Scots.  Emphasizing Spanish concern over the potential role of the two 
populations, Rodriguez states that the Viceroy of New Spain had expressed concern that 
blacks and mulattos in Pacific ports might join with the Scots in securing the Isthmus from 
Spanish control.  Rodriguez, Cimarron Revolts, p. 155. 
and purportedly hunting pirates.  There was also the ill-defined expedition of Captain 
Richard Long.  Claiming to be searching for old wrecks, the Englishman had been on the 
coast for about a month prior to the Scots´ arrival.  His furtive presence made even the 
Scots suspicious, with the resulting adoption of a policy to indulge the Captain´s 
propensity for alcohol “in order to find out his Designes”.
524
  Revealing no firm 
intelligence, the English Captain did leave a small English presence on the Isthmus when 
he left three men and one woman behind with the Cuna Captain Diego.
525
 As if any 
Spanish official needed a reminder of the incessant and potentially violent equation of 
local unrest and foreign intrusion, there were now five well-armed ships of Scots in the 
heart of the Isthmus.  Not only were they expressing their intent to establish themselves by 
constructing fortifications, but they were actively forging alliances with the Cuna while 
awaiting substantial reinforcements from Scotland.  
 
 
 
                              A POWERFUL AND COSTLY REHEARSAL  
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 Insh, Papers, pp. 88-89, Captain Pennycook´s Journall from the Madera Islands to New 
Caledonia in Darien, entry for November 20 1698. 
525
 Ibid, p. 93, Entry for December 14 1698.  One of the individuals left by Long would 
arrive in New Caledonia on 19 December 1698, reporting that his small group, joined by 
the local Indians, had killed seven Spaniards.  He requested “some powder and shot but we 
would spare them none”.  The visitor also reported that Long had told some of the Spanish 
Indians that the Scots “were a pack of Theives and robbers”.  Ibid, p. 94, entry for 
December 19 1698. The full range of Long´s motivations are open to debate, but a 
communication from Secretary of State Vernon to the Lords of the Admiralty, dated over a 
year before the Scots departed from Leith, discusses Long´s proposed search for gold and 
“two Plate Wracks”.  Ibid, p. 97.  A 15 February 1699 letter from Jamaica to the Duke of 
Leeds, written by Long himself, discusses his investigations into the gold mines of the 
Isthmus, as well as his efforts to establish good relations with the various indigenous 
groups of the area and his interactions with the Scots.  Ibid, pp. 97-106. The submission of 
the report to the Duke is made more intriguing by Leeds´s uncharacteristically consistent 
attendance in the House of Lords during debate related to the Scots in Darien.  A. 
Browning, Thomas Osborne, Earl of Danby and Duke of Leeds 1632-1712, Volume 1, Life 
(Glasgow 1951), p. 549, n.1.  Gallup-Diaz notes Long´s efforts to cement agreements with 
the Cuna Captain Diego, including the Englishman´s warning against dealing with the 
Company of Scotland representatives.  Gallup-Diaz, The Door, pp. 114-115.  As late as 
1707 Captain Long was still promoting the treasure to be realized by a voyage to the 
Isthmus, writing a letter to the Duke of Hamilton soliciting funds for a private expedition.  
NAS, GD406/1/5437 (See also the related story of George Chine in Chapter 2).  
 
 
While initiating their settlement there was no lack of sources of intelligence reaching the 
Scots warning of impending Spanish reaction.  The visiting French Captain Thomas 
relayed the news that the President of Panama had alerted officials in both Portobello and 
Cartagena of the Company´s arrival and that “the Spaniards all along the whole Coast are 
in a wonderfull consternation”.  Although he declared that the Spanish supposition was 
that the Scots´ “designe was on the River Messissippi” and ships had been dispatched 
there, three vessels of the Barlovento fleet were currently at anchor in Cartagena.  
Furthermore, “Mexico was all in a confusion”, to the degree that the Viceroy there “will 
speedily set up for himself”.
526
  The aforementioned Captain Long had also contributed 
intelligence regarding the Barlovento fleet, notifying the newcomers that it was “taking in 
provisions to attack us in a few days”, prompting the Scots to make “haste in our baterie” 
and position their ships in a battleline across the mouth of the bay.
527
  From the Cuna 
Captain Andreas came word of the actual mobilization of a ground force marching from 
Panama to Portobello to augment a naval contingent consolidated from Portobello and 
Cartagena.
528
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 Insh, Papers, pp. 92-93, Captain Pennycook´s Journall from the Madera Islands to New 
Caledonia in Darien, Entry for December 12 1698.  Thomas´s assessment of the intensity 
of the reaction from Mexico, discussed in the previous chapter, was correct.  The Count of 
Monctezuma, Viceroy, Governor and Captain General of New Spain wrote of the threat 
not only to Portobello and Panama, but also to the South Sea and even the Philippines.  
Citing his responsibility to take action “against any other nation attempting to set foot in 
these seas”, he issued his own orders, eventually rendered unnecessary by the first 
abandonment of New Caledonia, to the Guarda Costa fleet of General Zavala .  Hart, The 
Disaster, Appendix XV, pp. 258-260. 
527
 Insh, Papers, p. 93, Entry for December 14 1698. 
528
 Ibid, pp. 93-94, Entry for December 16 1698.  Unfortunately, Captain Pennycook´s 
journal terminated December 28 with the departure of a Jamaica sloop transporting the first 
emissaries and dispatches back to Scotland.  There had been time, however, to include an 
account of the French ship´s abortive attempt to depart New Caledonia.  The vessel had 
crashed apart against the rocks, resulting in the drowning of twenty-four crew members 
and the loss of  “60,000 pieces of eight in Gold and Silver, besides 30,000 more in goods 
and cloath”.  The Captain and his Lieutenant were saved, “but both almost dead and sadly 
bruis´d and wounded”.  Ibid, pp. 95-96, Entry for December 25 1698.   
The providers of intelligence, however, did not restrict themselves to communicating with 
the intruders.  The value of information as a commodity was fully comprehended and 
exploited by a selection of native Captains who not only possessed the highest degree of 
proximity and access to events at New Caledonia, but also the knowledge of how most 
efficiently and effectively to transmit the information, and to whom the substance of the 
message would be of greatest importance.  The President of Panama, while highly critical 
of Cuna truthfulness prior to the arrival of the Scots, soon found himself formulating 
strategies based largely on the intelligence they provided.529   He had originally dispatched 
Spanish Captain Betancur to assess the threat of the French presence and arrest the Cuna 
Captains Ambrosio and Pedro for the recent murders, with orders to burn their villages as 
punishment.  Instead came the even more disturbing report that five Scottish warships were 
in the vicinity.  Much of the information had been acquired during an interview with 
Corbete, who readily conceded he had actually been aboard one of the Company of 
Scotland´s vessels, also noting that 18 Cuna captains had declared themselves allied with 
the new arrivals.
530
 
 
Corbete´s remarks encompassing the alliances forged with the Scots were accurate, for a 
written treaty was formulated between the Council of Caledonia and Chief Diego and 
signed on the 24
th
 of February 1699.  The document, while declaring the parties to 
“henceforward be friend and confederates, and are hereby obliged mutually to defend the 
persons, lands, territories, dependencies, and properties of each other by land and sea”, also 
included a critical stipulation mirroring the potential for a broader alliance.  According to 
its fourth provision, the agreement provided that 
 
It is herby likeways agreed that Captain Corbet of Conception River, 
Capn Ambrosio of Coco, Capn Nicola of Sept, Capn Pansego of Carreta, 
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and Capn Pedro of Golden Island, and their people, shall, upon 
application, be admitted into this treaty.
531
 
 
Notably, the Scots had included the specific pair of Cuna leaders the royal administrator 
had sought to have arrested.  New Caledonia had not taken long to firmly enmesh itself in 
the convoluted political world of Darien. 
 
The first campaign against the Scots, instigated from Panama, was led by President  
Canillas and, as reported to the King
532
, portrayed both the environmental challenges of 
Darien which thwarted Scot and Spaniard alike, and the extensive and varied human 
resources which were drawn upon in support of operations.  As companies of Spanish, 
creole and negro volunteers were organized to reinforce regulars guarding Panama, 
Portobelo and Chagres533, a 52 day campaign extending through March and April 1699 
was undertaken to check the Scots before “they could finish fortifying, and before the rainy 
season should set in among the mountains”. Although Canillas was careful to include in his 
report the concession that the intended land expedition  
 
might not inflict becoming chastisement upon the enemies, expelling 
them from their fortifications, it would alarm them and let them know 
that in this kingdom there is force and inclination to oppose them in the 
very province through which they must pass, crossing it, in order to 
fortify themselves on the Pacific coast or to navigate the waters beyond 
that coast  
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Civic security and defense was typically provided by militias, composed and stratified to 
reflect the society at large.  During periods of actual combat there was a high percentage of 
desertion, particularly among the lower ranks.  Among the command, prestige often took 
precedence over military prowess or experience.  Mario Gongora, Studies in the Colonial 
History of Spanish America (Cambridge 1975), pp. 115-116.  
There was, however, a vital additional benefit that the President expediently noted . . . 
 
the Indians of that province have been six months, now, in rebellion, and 
have done some killing. . . this movement of our arms would terrify the 
Indians, who would perceive that we have the means to punish them 
whenever Your Majesty may permit it, for they have been advertising 
that without them the Spaniards can accomplish nothing.
534
 
 
 
The resources deployed for the mission were impressive.  Ten large barks were used to 
ferry troops on the six day sail to El Escuchadero on the Pacific side of Darien.  From there 
an assembly of canoes was to transport men and supplies to the outpost of Tubacanti, a 
plan that had to be altered when the inadequate capacity of the vessels was realized.  Led 
by native guides through “those impenetrable forests penetrated only by some few Indians 
reared in that wilderness”, Canillas instead marched overland to the outpost, where he 
joined four companies of militia under Carrisoli, creating a combined force of 1500 men.  
Conditions worsened as the troops now had to carry their own 10 day supply of rations in 
addition to “muskets, arquebuses, and rifles . . . bags of shot, and fifty balls which each 
soldier carried loose”.  Darien´s topography severely impaired the march, as the men “first 
had to cross a river shut in between cliffs and full of boulders . . . and had to march through 
the actual bed of the stream”.  Falls were common, wetting rations, but progress continued. 
The men traversed the range, “extremely impenetrable, both because of the height of the 
mountains and . . . the precipices encountered at every step”, eventually reaching a marshy 
area two leagues from New Caledonia.  From their campsite the Spanish forces could hear 
regular intervals of artillery fire, taken as an indication of the Scots´ knowledge of their 
presence.  During that night heavy rains began to flood the camp and, over the following 
three days, continued to both restrict any movement and destroy diminishing food supplies.  
The dire conditions were underscored when “although a hundred negroes arrived on the 
second day with biscuit and cheese (all wet), these carriers were half drowned and had lost 
their lances”.  The inability “to advance over the intervening distance to meet the enemy or 
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accomplish anything when we should encounter him, for all the arms and munitions were 
wet” forced a decision to retreat.
535
 
 
The aborted campaign of the land forces was accompanied by the abandonment of a 
concurrent strategic effort.  In return for ten thousand pesos to be delivered upon 
completion of the task, a contingent of Frenchmen, with native support, had been 
positioned to undertake the burning and/or the cutting of cables of Scottish vessels once 
Spanish troops were within sight of New Caledonia.  The combined French-Cuna 
company, however, had been subjected to the same problems of incessant rainfall and 
insufficient food supply.  Upon notification of their condition, and the critical factor of 
their perception by the Scots, they were also recalled.
536
   
 
The anti-climactic initial assault on New Caledonia did, however, witness the first incident 
of armed conflict between the Scots and Spanish forces.  In his account of the colony´s 
history, Borland describes “one small skirmish” with a forward patrol approaching the 
colony “either to spy  . . . or to see if they could apprehend any . . . stragglers in the woods, 
or to entice the Indians to forsake our men”.  Informed of the Spanish presence by native 
allies, the Scots deployed 150 men under Captain Montgomery.  In their company were 
two previously apprehended Spanish prisoners who successfully shouted a warning as the 
New Caledonia force moved forward through thick woods.  Firing began, killing two Scots 
and wounding 14 as the Spanish patrol, vastly outnumbered, retired.
537
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 Borland, The History, p. 21.  The Spaniards who provided the warning to their own 
contingent appear to have been captured during the operation, for Borland reports that they 
knew “where their countrymen lay hid”.  Ibid.  The skirmish was also the incident which 
  
The failed outcome of the Panamanian operation, regardless of the initial abandonment of 
New Caledonia by the Scots in June 1699 and the accompanying assumed elimination of 
the threat, would cost Canillas dearly.  Pending an investigation, he would find himself 
relieved of his Presidency in early July 1699.  The suspension would be short-lived, for 
reinstatement would occur on 23 December of that same year following a letter from the 
King, particularly citing the value of the President´s military experience.
538
   
 
Significant changes in the administration of Darien were not limited, however, to the 
disgraced President in Panama.  Initiated by Canillas prior to his suspension, a new 
Governor of the province of Darien had presented himself, his appointment threatening to 
supplant Luis Carrisoli and the decades of supremacy his family had held over the conduct 
of local affairs.539  Arriving from Cadiz with the daunting mandate to populate his 
jurisdiction, pacify the natives and impede the activity of pirates
540
, don Miguel de 
Cordones
541
 would find himself not only with an established and resentful local authority, 
                                                                                                                                                    
resulted in the acquisition of the Spanish prisoner de la Rada, whose circumstances and 
eventual return to his countrymen are discussed in Chapter 3. 
538
 AGI, Panamá 113 (unfoliated), (The King to the Count of Monclova, 14 August 1699).  
Canillas´s lack of popularity among his fellow administrators is specifically noted by 
Manuel Maria Alba in Cronología de los Gobernantes de Panama 1510-1967 (Panama 
1967), pp. 104-105.  Contributing to the suspension was the hostility of the supporters of 
the President´s predecessor, the Marques de Mina, who Canillas had both replaced and 
imprisoned.  Gallup-Diaz, The Door, p. 112, n. 1. 
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Pimienta and naval commander Peredo as a recipient of orders to “exercise care and 
vigilance to the most important end of preventing the Scots from establishing a footing in 
those parts, for, although his majesty had previously resolved to erect a fortification at 
Darien to settle that territory and protect it against foreigners, there had not been time to 
carry this resolution into effect”.  Hart, The Disaster, Appendix XXVII, p. 322, original in 
AGI, Panamá 161.  As previously discussed, efforts to secure the region had been erratic 
and unsuccessful, with the recent murders of Spanish soldiers and friars by groups of Cuna 
and the presence of English, French and Scots all testifying to the degree of lawlessness.  
but also the immediate crisis of the new wave of Scots arriving in Darien, willing to use 
military force to secure their colony. 
 
 
           RESTORING AUTHORITY OVER THE KING´S LAND 
 
 
While the second expedition of Scots struggled to reestablish themselves in New 
Caledonia, one commodity consistently in ample supply was intelligence about the forces 
assembling against them.  A visiting Jamaican brigantine, attempting to market its cargo of 
dry goods and 40 slaves near Portobello, had been chased by a Spanish warship, reporting 
it to be part of a force to be consolidated with “four men of warr come from Old Spain” to 
move against the Scots.  The threat was underscored by word that the bakers in Portobello 
were “all busy baking bread for the expedition”.542  As February 1700 progressed, such 
communications began to be a daily occurrence, culminating in a specific alarm from Cuna 
allies of a force approaching by land.  On the 13th, under the newly arrived Captain 
Campbell of Fonab, a company of 200 Scots, joined by 60 natives under Captains Pedro, 
Augustine and Brandy, left New Caledonia.  Marching to the Spanish outpost at Tubacanti, 
on the 15th they engaged in heavily forested terrain with a mixed contingent of 300 
“Malatoes, Creolleos, Negroes, and Indians” under the new Governor Cordones, killing 
nine or ten and taking three prisoners.  Casualties within the allied New Caledonia force 
numbered eight dead and 18 wounded.  Among those requiring the attention of the Scottish 
surgeons was Captain Campbell, as well as Captain Pedro, the latter among several Cuna 
commended for their service.543 
 
Any relief or elation following the Tubacanti action, however, was soon overshadowed by 
the reality of the composition, size and strategies of the emerging Spanish military 
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operation under the command of Cartagena´s Governor Pimienta.  As introduced in 
Chapter 4, the Reverend Francis Borland documented visits to gain intelligence by both an 
English sloop “pretending to be from Jamaica” and a group of nine Frenchmen purporting 
to trade in tortoises, but eventually exposed “to be among our enemies”. 
544
  Borland, a 
witness to these events, relates that as fears of the ultimate arrival of the Spanish increased, 
a flurry of activity was undertaken to repair and enhance the batteries around Fort St. 
Andrew.  Simultaneously, two sloops and the Rising Sun´s longboat were dispatched to 
discover the identity of vessels detected off the coast.  Chased by their prey, which were 
Spanish, the sloops made it back safely, but the longboat was abandoned along the coast as 
her crew fled, resulting in the loss of a key resource.
545
 
 
The anticipated arrival of the full offensive force was recorded on the 23
rd
 and 25
th
 of 
February, comprised of “eleven sail of Spanish vessels great and small”.  As Borland 
attests 
 
We daily expected their coming into our harbour to attack our Fort and 
ships . . . all hands, sea-men and Land-men, were put to work, to fortify 
the place as well as they could: They also made several Fire-ships of 
their smaller vessels, putting themselves in as good a posture of defence 
as they could.  But the Spaniards did not come in with their ships, for 
they knew this harbour well enough, which is easy for great ships to 
come into, but difficult and dangerous to get out again; the wind this 
season of the year, generally blowing right into it.  So they went another 
way to work, less dangerous to themselves, and more disadvantageous to 
us, which was, To hem us in both by sea and land. 
 
  
While the naval blockade guarded the mouth of the bay, Pimienta landed men near Caret 
Bay, merging his own forces with those “that came over land from Panama and Santa 
Maria, accompanied with numbers of Indians, Negroes and Molattoes, who were expert in 
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knowing the woods, and cutting passages through the thorny thickets of the woods in their 
way”.
546
   
 
Fully realizing the strategic value of New Caledonia´s wind-locked bay, the Governor had 
indeed arrived and ordered the landing of men on either side of the bay´s entrance.
547
  
Accompanying him was chief military engineer of Cartagena Don Juan de Herrera y 
Sotomayor, who provided a graphic representation of the proceeding strategy (See Figure 
4). 
 
As illustrated in Herrera´s map, a strangle-hold was created and gradually tightened around 
New Caledonia (“A”) as the Spanish deployed both land and sea forces.  Denoted by the 
letter “D” are the initial points where the Governor landed troops at Rancho Viejo and 
Careto, on either side of the Scots, followed by a later landing at Caleta (“F”).  Following 
engagement with the Scots at their forward point (“E”) on the 11
th
 of March, the progress 
of confining the colonists is demarcated by the advancing locations of the third (“G”), 
fourth (“H”), fifth (“I”) and, finally, sixth (“L”) Spanish encampments, the last of which 
was established with artillery on the 7
th
 of April.  
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faltered, reminding the Scots of their vulnerabilities by lamenting that his own vessels 
would have difficulty “in getting out of it in two months”.  Ibid, p. 380.  
         
Figure 4 Spanish Campaign, 1700  (Source: AGI, Mapas y Planos, Panamá 120)548 
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 Instrumental to both Herrera´s work and Pimienta´s tactics was the attendant continual 
stream of sound and timely intelligence.  With the arrival of the impressive allied Spanish 
forces, the diverse and fluid Cuna factions had to expediently evaluate the anticipated 
outcomes of the impending armed conflict. Not only were the actual confrontations taking 
place within their home territory, but they also had to consider their own and their 
families´ futures within the context of the two volatile centuries of contact with both 
Spanish governance and foreign intruders.  The opportunity to ingratiate themselves to 
Pimienta´s command would at least provide some measure of future security over the less 
attractive alternative of continued allegiance to a faltering and unstable group of intruders 
who had only months previously abandoned their fledgling colony. 
 
Reaching the Isle of Pines and waiting to assemble with the vessels dispatched from 
Portobello, Pimienta had sent a launch from his flagship to secure information.  It returned 
with an unidentified “Indian that had deserted from the Scotch” who provided critical 
details “about the fortress, the fortified dock and battery, and said that they had 23 pieces 
of artillery, 700 able men, 200 sick, supplies for two months and help from the Indians in 
the form of agricultural products”. The initial landing at Careto not only included 200 men, 
three captains, two engineers, and three Frenchmen, but also the omnipresent Corbete, 
serving as “Indian guide” to help reconnoiter the mountainous terrain.
549
  That detailed 
knowledge of the site was highly valued was acknowledged in Pimienta´s own campaign 
diary entry for 13 March 1700. Having been thwarted by the impossible disembarkation 
and placement of artillery at Careto due to the “roughness of the mountains and the rivers 
which surrounded the place”, his engineers had acquired knowledge from “certain natives” 
of an inlet closer to Caledonia that was “suitable for landing the artillery, subsistence and 
other stores”.
550
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Native participation from other parts of Darien was also evident with the arrival of Louis 
Carrisoli from his station near the gold mines at Cana, commanding a force of “100 Indian 
allies”.  The group of Pacific natives, constituting a domestic incursion into local Cuna 
territory, was assigned to protect rear positions as the Spaniards advanced, Pimienta later 
complaining that they “did nothing but devour stores.  For what little they brought for our 
men they got a good price”. 
551
 
 
As the Spanish, reinforced by a diversity of both regional and foreign participants, and the 
Scots, successively reduced to operating from within their fortifications and cut off from 
their water supply, played out their conflict, the changing political conditions and growing 
discomfort facing the Cuna did not go unrecognized by either principle party.  With the 
Spanish stranglehold increasing at New Caledonia and an estimated 2000 men engaged in 
the immediate area, Borland noted the impact of the loss of relief previously provided by 
“our Indian friends”, who now had to “shift for themselves, for fear of the Spaniards”.  He 
also commented on the pragmatic fact of Darien existence, that “some of them had gone 
over to the Spaniards, and had secret correspondence with them; for they commonly join 
with the strongest side, and little trust is to be put in most of them”.
552
  The Spanish 
perspective was somewhat equivalent, Pimienta directing that the natives be cordially 
welcomed, but maintained under a watchful eye . . . 
 
The Indians who may come aboard these ships they will detain, or, if 
they desire to join me, they will send to my port.  They will treat these 
Indians well and in such manner that they shall not resent their detention, 
seeking pretexts to keep them aboard; especially if they come aboard 
with their bands they will send them to me with the first vessel going to 
Carreto, assuring these Indians always of our friendship.553 
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         ATTEMPTING TO RESTORE CONTROL OVER THE KING´S SUBJECTS  
 
As negotiations progressed towards the capitulation and ultimate abandonment of New 
Caledonia, the Scots made an attempt to assure the welfare of their Cuna allies.  Article VII 
of a draft of the agreement included a stipulation that “the Indians who have been friendly 
to us, and conversed with us, since we came hither, shall not be molested upon that 
account”. Asserting his King´s jurisdiction, Pimienta vetoed the proposal and directed 
particular anger at the Scottish Reverend Shiels, who had presented the specific petition. 
“The Indians were the king of Spain´s subjects”, the Governor stated, “and he knew best 
how to treat his own subjects, and if the Indians would keep out of his way, he would not 
search after them”.
554
  The proposal and subsequent refusal of amnesty was also included 
in the account related in the Gazeta extraordinaria, printed and distributed in Lima later in 
the year, with the explanation that Pimienta had not regarded the condition as 
advantageous to his King.
555
 
 
A deliberate and public assertion of control over the native population continued as the 
Scots prepared to embark and the Spanish force began to occupy the site of the colony. 
Pimienta, having entered the formerly Scottish harbor and landed at its fortified dock, 
dispatched men to inspect the ships of the “enemy and to bring on land all the Indians he 
should find.  Only eleven were found and they were brought before Señor Pimienta who 
ordered them to be taken handcuffed to the inlet, and to be kept under guard.” That night 
“three musket shots were heard, alarming everybody, who immediately seized their 
weapons.  It was learned that two of the Indians that had been brought as prisoners had 
thrown themselves into the sea, and that the sentinels had fired on them.”  Orders were also 
given a Spanish officer to take twenty-five men to find and arrest the Cuna Captain Brandy 
“who the Scotch said was the one who sold the land to them”.
556
 Yet another incident 
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557
 
 
There is a marked silence in contemporary documents regarding eventual action taken 
against the seized Cuna, with the exception of that provided by Walter Herries.  As noted 
at the end of Chapter 3, the writer-surgeon-spy reported a number of the native allies were 
“impaled alive” by the Spaniards for the service they had provided the Scots at 
Tubacanti.
558
  Taking into account the murders committed prior to the arrival of the Scots, 
coupled with obvious continued alliances forged with intruders, it is not inconsistent that 
Pimienta elected to impose on both foreign and native populations a dramatic and explicit 
demonstration of Spanish authority over rebellious subjects.559 
 
While addressing the issue of native betrayals, the Spanish simultaneously turned their 
attention to the fortifications of New Caledonia and the artillery and ammunition they had 
acquired.
560
 The Governor, following the signing of the capitulation at 5 p.m., had ordered 
a force of 200 men to occupy Fort St. Andrew, now renamed St. Charles after the Spanish 
King, that same day.  “Accompanied by officers and some curious persons”, Pimienta 
                                                                                                                                                    
consequences” regardless of his suspicions, the Governor elected to have him “entertained 
as the others had been.”  Hart, The Disaster, Appendix XXXI, p. 366. 
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“went into the fortress and found it to be fairly strong”.  In addition to the structure itself, 
there were 28 or 30 pieces of artillery and “the houses, as many as seventy, . . . of thatch, 
and in their midst the headquarters, and the storehouses near the dock”.561 Having taken 
formal possession, the Governor then retired to his own camp, “where remained only 
invalids, negroes and mulattoes, leaving Campmaster don Melchor Ladron de Guevara in 
command of the infantry within the fortress”.
562
 
 
Once again, the vital skills of the military engineers were mobilized to document what had 
now, with the inadvertent assistance of Scottish lives and labor, become a Spanish military 
outpost in the trouble-plagued region of Darien. Documentation of the infrastructure of the 
new Fort St. Charles, along with its situation related to the Spanish encampments, was 
completed (See Figure 5), illustrating the fortifications of the Scots (“A”), their 
warehouses (“B”), their batteries (“C”), the principal encampment of the Spanish forces 
(“D”), the sequence of offensive positions and fortifications established by the Spanish 
(“E” through “I”), the aforementioned embarkation point for the Spanish artillery (“L”), 
the routes utilized to implement the campaign (“M”), the Scottish flag (“N”) and the 
housing area within the fort (“O”).
563
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                                  Figure 5:  Plan of New Caledonia, 1700  
Source:  AGI, Mapas y Planos, Panamá 119 BIS 
 The active participation of the engineers was instrumental to not only the implementation 
and documentation of the military success in securing New Caledonia, but would have far-
ranging impacts regarding the body of institutional knowledge of the geography of the 
region.  The institutionalization of engineering units within the Spanish military had 
evolved significantly during the final decades of the seventeenth century, and would spread 
across Spain´s American dominions, no where better exemplified than by the activities of 
the brothers José and Juan de Herrera y Sotomayor.  The latter, whose efforts supported the 
Darien campaign, would eventually be appointed the King´s leading military engineer in 
the Americas.
564
  His and his colleagues´ work, cited frequently in Pimienta´s diary
565
, 
would also be acknowledged in an anonymous 1739 Spanish manuscript on Darien.  The 
author writes of the expulsion of the Scots and the priority given the area´s security 
following its final resolution . . . 
                                                 
564 David Buisseret, `Spanish Military Engineers in the New World before 1750´, in 
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provided by the spy Walter Herries to Ambassador Canales in London (see Chapter 2). 
565
 In one of his numerous entries recording the laudable efforts of the engineers, Pimienta 
relates that he ordered Herrera to construct a cannon-proof battery “on a salient a pistolshot 
from the enemy, which point commanded all his place.  He was busied in this all night.”  
Hart, The Disaster, Appendix XXXI, pp. 387-388. 
 I was able to learn all that had happened and was carried out from the 
same officers who served then and from the experts who were taken 
along as well as about the survey they made of the country, mountains 
and the places which were then inhabited by the same Cunacuna 
Indians.
566
 
 
 
As the Spaniards reimposed their authority upon the Darien region of the Isthmus, the 
engineers completed their surveys and mapping, and the Cuna sought whatever security 
they could determine, a reassertion of the Catholic faith was also conducted.  While the 
Scots struggled out of their wind-locked bay, finally succeeding “with the help of the 
Spaniards, who were glad to be rid of us, as we were of them . . .”
567
, Pimienta did not fail 
to acknowledge religion or King, designating one of the now vacant warehouses as the 
“first temple, where the first mass was said, consecrating the place to Saint Charles”.568 
 
 
                                       NO RESTORATION OF PEACE 
 
A flurry of activity followed the cessation of military action on Darien soil, although peace 
continued to elude the region on several fronts.  The President of Panama, recently restored 
to his post, had remained in Portobello with reinforcements, where he received regular 
correspondence from Pimienta regarding developments.  Canillas duly included these 
documents in his report to the King, along with references to his own sacrifices, the 
“prompt measures I took . . . for the extermination of the Scots”, and the complaints he had 
received regarding the Governor of Cartagena´s administration of the campaign.  
Characteristically, the President had not been reluctant to offer his advice, and Pimienta´s 
reaction to the unsolicited commentary, particularly following Canillas´s initial failed  
overland campaign against the Scots, likely included a high degree of disgust . .  . 
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Only my considerate regard entreats your excellency to reflect that this is 
not a country in which to do what according to military regulations 
should be done, since this is precisely what cannot be done; and to 
ponder how necessary it is to alter the plan of those general lines along 
which in Europe one advances and fights, for conditions in this realm are 
not such that one can succeed by use of means which there are 
successful.
569
 
 
 
For his efforts, however questionable, the President of Panama would be amply rewarded 
with appointment as interim Viceroy of Peru.570  The diversion of credit did not go 
unnoticed, for the 1739 anonymous source quoted above regarding the instrumental role of 
the engineers also recorded an analysis he had received in Cartagena regarding the 
appointment . . . 
 
At this time the count of Canillas who as reward for the successful 
outcome of this undertaking was made Viceroy of peru, in spite of the 
fact that it was the afore-mentioned Governor Pimienta who 
accomplished this by personally conducting the expedition.  The said 
count did not leave Panama and his help was of no importance for the 
results of this significant triumph which was reached by the capable 
people of the country and by the defenders of the forts which Pimienta 
had been able to collect in Cartagena and by the naval unit which had 
control of this harbor.571 
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Panamá, 110, unfoliated, (Resolution of the Council of the Indies, 8 April 1701).  
Unfortunately, the Viceroy would die before his retirement and homeward journey could 
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 Wassén, Anonymous, pp. 111-112.   
For his part Pimienta appears to have opted out of debate with the President of his 
neighboring jurisdiction, from which he had just commanded the successful expulsion of 
the enemy, instead issuing an order for an officer and 200 men to remain in New Caledonia 
and returning to the formidable challenges of his own government in Cartagena.
572
  In his 
notification of eventual success to Canillas the Governor tactfully acknowledged that New 
Caledonia was in Panamanian territory without glorifying his own role in the military 
mission.  Pimienta related that he was leaving the fort in a secure condition “that it can be 
held as long as your lordship may desire”.  Two men had expressed their wishes to be 
placed in charge of the garrison, one being Canillas´s appointee to the Governorship of 
Darien and the other being Campmaster Melchor de Guevara.  The decision as to which 
man would receive the appointment Pimienta deferred to Panama´s President, “for I wish 
the selection to be whichever your lordship finds more suitable and to your lordship´s 
taste.”573 
 
The intended permanent presence of Spanish forces at the newly acquired outpost would 
not last.  Admiral Navarette, following his orders to assess the state of regional defenses 
should his resources not be needed to eliminate the Scots, had visited the site and, in his 
report written from Cadiz in April 1701, noted that the majority of the guard had either 
deserted or died.  He related that he had provided a reinforcement of 100 men and 
provisions, along with a chaplain sent by Governor Pimienta.
574
 These supplementary 
resources failed to eliminate the challenges of the assignment and an attack by 22 pirates in 
the summer of 1701, along with the opportune arrival of a brigantine providing a source of 
evacuation, provoked Spanish abandonment of the fort.  Citing the lack of supplies, the 
prevailing illness of the men, and the resulting inability to protect themselves either from 
the recent or any future assault, a junta held in “Plaza Caledonia” produced the unanimous 
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 Hart, The Disaster, Appendix XXXII, p. 394. The conflict was not resolved by Canillas, 
for a letter from the King dated 20 October 1700 acknowledges the dispute between the 
two contenders for the position and defers the decision to the Viceroy in Peru.  AGI, 
Panamá 113, Ramo 3. 
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 AGI, Panamá 181 (report of Alm. Gen. Don Pedro Navarette, Cadiz, 6 April 1701). 
decision to evacuate.
575
  Despite King Carlos II´s recent declaration of Santa Theresa as 
patron saint and protector of Darien, and the assignment of an annual local fiesta in her 
honor to commemorate the successful expulsion of the intruders576, the reality of 
challenges facing sustained occupation of the former New Caledonia continued to thwart 
the establishment of a permanent European presence.  
 
The Cuna lacked, of course, either a viable alternative or desire to vacate what was their 
homeland, yet their situation was no less problematic. Although it was their territory that 
had suffered both the influx of the mixed Spanish-mulatto-cimarron-external native forces 
and witnessed the actual combat, there were no assessments or documentation of losses 
asked of them and their opinion was not solicited by either the colonial administration or 
Madrid.  Nevertheless, two intriguing sources addressing their reaction can be elicited from 
later documents.  The first is contained in annotations accompanying the Anonymous 
Spanish Manuscript from 1739 on the Province Darien.  The editor, Henry Wassén, relates 
that, although the episode of interaction with the Scots was not included in the oral 
chronicle of Cuna history dictated to ethnographer Erland Nordensklold, the latter´s Cuna 
collaborator, Ruben Perez, did clarify that 
 
The Scots are mentioned in their stories only in the case of Nele 
Patignana´s having let loose illnesses which the Scots could not 
withstand and which therefore forced them to leave the country.
577
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 Carlos II issued the declaration 28 September 1700, signifying the 15
th
 of October (the 
day designated as the first abandonment of the colony by the Scots) to become the day of 
the Festival of Santa Theresa of Darien.  Biblioteca de la Presidencia de Colombia, 
Historia documentada, pp. 252-253. 
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 Wassén, Anonymous, p. 126.  An English translation of Nordensklold´s and Perez´s 
work was published in 1979 as An historical and ethnological survey of the Cuna 
Indians/by Erland Nordenskiold, in collaboration with the Cuna Indian, Ruben Perez 
Kantule; arranged and edited from the posthumous ms. and notes, and original Indian 
documents at the Gothenburg Ethnographical Museum by Henry Wassen (New York 
 Commentary of a contrasting and more historically explicit stance is found in another oral 
history documented by the Governor of Portobello in 1741 during the visit to his city by a 
group of Cuna including an individual able to converse in Spanish.  The informant related 
that disparity and autonomy among the various groups of Cuna had been reflected in 
interaction with foreigners, French and English often being accepted for the tools and 
textiles that they brought.  The people identifying themselves as Scots, however, had 
solicited a license to establish themselves in the area.  The novelty of that request had 
created a substantial level of discord, as some factions supported the Spanish effort to 
expel the newcomers and others did not.  Perhaps more importantly, promises of continued 
defense against the Spanish included in the forged alliance proved false, for “16 months 
had not passed when they abandoned the place”, leaving their allied Cuna once again 
responsible for their own security.578 
 
 
                                                DARIEN EPILOGUE 
 
While ramifications of the failed Scottish expeditions across the remainder of the Americas 
were reflected through the dispersal of its survivors, lasting impacts in Darien centered on 
reinvigorated attention by the Spanish to secure the continuing lures of the resources and 
                                                                                                                                                    
1979).  The comment is especially pertinent to the discussion of critical epidemiological 
factors and their relationship to the failure of the Scottish expeditions presented in J.R. 
McNeill´s Mosquito Empires:  Ecology and War in the Greater Carribbean, 1620-1914 
and addressed in the previous chapter.  For an explanation of the powerful leadership role 
of Neles (or Leres) in Cuna society, see Gallup-Diaz, The Door, especially Chapter 1, 
`Mythohistories of Ibelele and Tiegun: The Nature of the Tule Leres´ Power´.  The 1739 
date of the manuscript is pertinent due to the concurrent failure of efforts by Spain and 
England to avoid the War of Jenkins´ Ear, which was provoked by the extent of England´s 
illicit commerce with Spanish America and Spanish depradations on English trading 
vessels.  See Harold Temperley, `The Causes of the War of Jenkins´ Ear´, Transactions of 
the Royal Historical Society, Vol. 3 (December 1909), pp. 197-236. 
578
 AGI, Panamá 307, ff. 1197r-1209v.  A portion of the manuscript is also discussed by 
Torres de Arauz in Nuevo Edimburgo del Darien, pp. 137-138, where the anthropologist 
notes that it provides a political and geographic context for what sometimes is regarded as 
a characteristic erratic tendency of Cuna society.  
geography of the Isthmus.  As the physical infrastructure of New Caledonia, successively 
rebuilt and fortified by the Spanish, would serve as a concrete reminder of vulnerability to 
foreign intrusion, relentless domestic strife would continue to seed the potential for 
dangerous native-foreign alliances.   The audacious attempt by the Scots to establish 
themselves in the dominions of the Spanish King would not be forgotten as attempts to 
pacify the region continued through the decades of the eighteenth century. 
 
The attraction of the territory´s attributes would rapidly reassert itself, exacerbated by open 
conflict during the War of the Spanish Succession.  Darien was subjected to an assault on 
its gold mines in Cana by a force of 700 English and 300 rebel natives in September 1702, 
two and a half years following the Scottish capitulation.
579
  This and a number of 
subsequent raids, afflicting primarily the southern side of the Isthmus, were followed two 
decades later by a major region-wide native uprising led by the mestizo Luis Garcia.  1725 
and 1726 witnessed the abandonment not only of the aforementioned mines, but also 
livestock, sugar and timber operations along the Pacific slope.  The severity of the 
insurrection, according to L.E. Joyce, was so acute that not only “for the next fifty years 
Spanish lives were unsafe”, but long-established French and French-Cuna families were 
also killed.580  
 
While internal tumult suppressed Spanish economic enterprises, the world of illicit 
commerce continued to thrive. The newly appointed President of Panama, Don Dionisio de 
Alsedo y Herrera, had been specifically reminded in his 1742 orders of the former Scottish 
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incursion, and how Cartagena, Portobelo and Panama had been left without defense during 
the New Caledonia campaign.
581
   As the new President made his way up the coast from 
Cartagena towards his post the following year, surveying his jurisdiction and attempting to 
ascertain how some measure of control might be attained, he gathered first hand 
knowledge of the challenges he faced.  In his report he documented his interviews with 
Cuna who verified an active “English presence”.  He was given the specific information 
that one “Major Cunningham” had been there the previous year and traded substantial 
quantities of arms and ammunition.  After surveying the ruins of New Caledonia and 
considering all he had seen and heard, he commented that the native population had been 
living in complete liberty, benefiting from foreign traders, but devoid of any benefits from 
the Spanish.
582
 
 
A dramatic illustration of the benefits to be derived from foreigners was later described by 
the Jesuit Jacob Walburger in his 1748 Relacion sobre la Provincia del Darien, in which 
he recorded the case of two sons of one of the “Captains of Caledonia” who had some 
years earlier gone to Jamaica, where the “English” had taught them their language and to 
read and write.  The brothers returned a year and a half later, impressively dressed, bearing 
gifts, and soliciting additional Cuna men to return with them to the island.  From that point, 
according to the Jesuit,  “it was not permitted to say anything negative regarding the 
English”.
583
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1698.  According to Herries, Cunningham was the individual that requested the surgeon 
refrain from submitting any criticism of the Company of Scotland to Edinburgh.  Herries, 
A Defence, p. 160. 
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 AGI, Panamá 307.  The Jesuit´s comments regarding “English” in Jamaica are 
particularly noteworthy due to the number of Scots settling there following their failed 
attempt to establish New Caledonia.  A record of parallel lessons is provided in the 
manuscript attributed to “Gentleman lately arriv´d”, which describes a language exchange 
during the Scottish presence at New Caledonia. Gentleman Lately Arrived, The History of 
 The continuing failure to establish either domestic peace or effectively stymie illegal 
commerce584 mustered support for a far-reaching plan in the final two decades of the 
eighteenth century that would once again emphasize the strategic importance of the former 
Company of Scotland site. By 1785 Governor of Panama Andres de Ariza had initiated the 
construction of a road towards Caledonia Bay, supported by the fort of El Principe 
approximately half way across the Isthmus.   Heading to the military outpost from 
Caledonia three years later, a Spanish engineer would report the sighting of Cuna rebels.585  
Their presence could have only underscored the urgency of the administration´s full 
intentions for the area, for more than military subjection of the territory was intended.  
Elaborate plans had been formulated to establish five communities inhabited by both 
civilian and military personnel, one of which was to be Caledonia.  The network of new 
settlements would be strategically located not only to secure anchorages along the coast, 
but also to establish influence in the interior, thus imposing a living statement of 
possession while simultaneously providing for communication and a semblance of 
civilization.  In addition to military support,  
                                                                                                                                                    
Caledonia: or, The Scots colony in Darien in the West Indies: With an account of the 
manners of the inhabitants, and the riches of the countrey (London 1699), pp. 43-44, 51. 
The combined circumstances of trade with the individual identified as Cunningham and the 
language effort indicate there may have been continued communication with the Cuna and 
their former Scottish neighbors settled in Jamaica.  At least two references document Cuna 
interaction with Jamaica in the first half of the eighteenth century but after the 
abandonment of New Caledonia.  The island´s Governor in 1706, Thomas Handasyd, 
wrote that four “Chief Indians from Darien” had requested arms and munitions following 
purported murders by the French.  “It was unanimously agreed on in a Coucil of War that 
they should have thirty-five arms given them with powder ball and flints proportionable 
after which I sent them home in the same sloop that brought them”.  NA, CO 137/45, f. 
351v.  A 1741 Memorial from the agent of then-Governor Trelawny lists an expenditure 
for “presents to the Darien Indians”.  NA, CO 137/48, f. 157. 
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failure to subdue the Cuna population.  For a review of the period and the efforts to resolve 
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each site was to include the various professions necessary to make a viable community.  
Among the minimum 50 families at each location would be 10 or 12 carpenters, a 
bricklayer, two blacksmiths, a surgeon and a chaplain.586  The plan, in fact, shared some 
characteristics with its predecessor implemented by the Company of Scotland.  Probably 
reflecting the understandable hesitancy of any local Spaniard to participate in the 
enterprise, the colonists were to be imported from outside the area (in this case, the newly 
independent United States, specifically Philadelphia) and were to be an international group 
(113 English, Irish and German individuals, along with 15 French who had previously 
been in Caledonia).  Unlike the Scots before them, however, these expectant settlers would 
never reach their destination.  Arriving and maintained in Cartagena at the Crown´s 
expense, they would find themselves reboarded on a Spanish vessel and sent back to 
Philadelphia, never glimpsing what was to have been their new homeland.
587
  Citing 
enduring concerns over establishing foreigners in such a strategic area, the new Viceroy of 
New Granada had cancelled the project.
588
  
 
Perhaps the best witness to the unmitigated insecurity of Darien is a letter from the 
Governor of Jamaica to the Viceroy dated November 1785. Responding to concerns 
expressed over the activities of English merchants, the island´s Governor Clark repeated 
virtually the identical claims his predecessor Sir William Beeston had made during the 
occupation of the Scots almost a century before.  “The persons calling themselves British 
subjects, who have dispersed themselves into Caledonia Darien”, he wrote, “ . . . have had 
no encouragement from this government.”
589
 
 
                                                      CONCLUSION 
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 Writing in the 1950s of his recent archaeological surveys across the Darien, José Maria 
Cruxent described the early abandonment of the Atlantic coastline by the Spanish, with the 
result that other Europeans, motivated by the riches of the New World and fortified by 
alliances with the native population, were drawn to the region.  Most of the incursions, the 
Spanish-born Venezuelan explained, were essentially raiding parties and inconsequential to 
his scientific studies.  The major exception was the uniquely different Scottish arrival in 
1698 with its intention to establish a permanent presence on the Isthmus.590  Cruxent had 
located the site of their Fort St. Andrew, easy to delineate due to its defensive canal 
excavated in coral-rock and bricks unique among the other sites he examined across the 
area.  Also documented were the scattered ceramics, dated to the latter seventeenth century 
and identified as having been produced in the “Lower Rhine and exported to England and 
its colonies in great quanitity”.591 
 
In his cataloguing of the anomalous infrastructure and dispersed artifacts of the Company 
of Scotland´s settlement, the archaeologist provides a metaphor of the singular impacts of 
the Darien expeditions and their durable yet scattered vestiges on three continents.  His 
accompanying reference to the allure of the strategic narrow land base between the 
Atlantic and Pacific, enhanced by minimal Spanish development and proven opportunities 
for native support, also addresses the high value of the property for both the Scots and the 
cast of opposing interests determined to assure New Caledonia´s failure.  
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As illustrated in the previous chapters, the international ramifications of the attempt to 
create a trading entrepot in Darien were far broader and substantial than previously 
considered.  Although the enterprise had pronounced influence on the evolution of 
Scottish-English relations, that well-examined aspect of the Company of Scotland should 
not be allowed to eclipse recognition of its implications and influence across a far broader 
geography.  From New York and Jamaica, from Rome to Lima and in Sevilla, reactions 
were deliberate and dramatic.  From the testimony of Councilor Captain Robert Pincarton 
before the Casa de la Contratación to the payment of the donativo by churches across 
Mexico to conflicts created between Jewish and English merchants in Jamaica, 
reverberations to the unprecedented Darien initiative asserted themselves.  Economic 
implications were manifested not only in the mercantile interest piqued across the 
Caribbean and up the coast of British North America, but also in the Court of Portugal, 
where Spanish impoundment in Cartagena of the lucrative Cacheo Company´s slaveships 
and those of its English subcontractors resulted in lost revenues and frayed relations.   
 
Within the chaotic opportunism that characterized the place and period, the situation also 
prompted new opportunities for alliance, redemption and intelligence-gathering that were 
expeditiously exploited.  Juxtaposed against the concurrent arbitration of the Partition 
Treaties and the anticipated death of King Carlos II, the Scottish offense to Spain allowed 
Louis XIV the ideal circumstance to offer armed naval assistance and information, 
ingratiating France to the same Governor of Cartagena who had been so soundly 
humiliated less than three years prior during the raid on his city.  The English also showed 
little hesitation in seeking an advantage, deploying Admiral Benbow to the Caribbean with 
offers of assistance to Spanish Governors along the coast.  The accompanying acquisition 
of intelligence from his squadron´s calls along the Spanish Main not only provided updates 
to London on the activities of the Scots, but would enhance the Royal Navy´s knowledge 
of ports and defenses during military engagements of the forthcoming War of the Spanish 
Succession.  Surviving their own experiences within the colony, men such as the deserter 
David Allen and eventual Governor of Annapolis Royal Samuel Vetch would strive to seek 
personal advancement through the marketing of their individual experiences and acquired 
knowledge. 
 Nor was the highest level of European diplomacy exempted from involvement in the short 
but turbulent history of New Caledonia.  While the Spanish Ambassador in London met 
with his Scottish spy and relayed latest events to Madrid, King William III was forced to 
initiate a campaign to assure Spain of his non-involvement and astonishing lack of 
knowledge of the activities of his Scottish Kingdom.  The English monarch would finally 
heed the caution of his advisers, assigning the Hague´s trusted envoy to Madrid to seek 
from the Spanish King a stay on the execution of four Darien survivors convicted of piracy 
by the courts of the Casa de la Contratación. 
 
There were no less significant impacts for Spanish America.  The threat imposed by the 
intent to create a permanent foreign enclave between the vital centers of Portobello and 
Cartagena, with its potential to interrupt movement of wealth from Pacific to Atlantic so 
vital to Spain, activated the intricate and powerful colonial complex of administrative, 
intelligence and military resources that would effectively expel the Scots, even without the 
support of the armada mounted and dispatched from Cadiz.  The native Cuna, in whose 
territories events unfolded and armed conflict was waged, would witness among the most 
profound impacts of all.  Having cultivated relationships with a succession of European 
arrivals over the previous two centuries, their equally established history of discord with 
the Spanish, coupled by alarm over the actual attempt at permanent foreign occupation, 
provided a brutal reminder not just to Panama and Cartagena , but also to Lima and 
Madrid, of the absolute requirement to impose control over the highly coveted but porous 
Isthmus.  In the words of Rosalia Ferrari Ortiz, “if the situation was difficult for England 
and Scotland, it was no less so for Darien”.
592
 
 
Inevitably, the investigation of the broader implications of Scotland´s Darien expeditions 
also reveals new details about and insights into the individuals that participated, the events 
that unfolded, and the way history has recorded them.  From the interrogations of deserters 
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and prisoners to the identification of Walter Herries as a spy dealing directly with the 
Spanish Ambassador to the testimony of the four men incarcerated in Sevilla to the reports 
of various Spanish officials of conversations with Admiral Benbow, new voices have been 
contributed to the story of the Company of Scotland.  The military composition of the 
enterprise´s participants, its clear intent to trade illegally with the Spanish Main, its 
international crew members, and its initial censorship of the degree of desertion all 
contribute to a broader understanding of what transpired and why.  The contention of the 
judges of the Casa de la Contratación that trade goods stowed on the Dolphin proved the 
intent of the Company to trade illegally along the Spanish-American coast directly 
contrasts with criticism prevalent in previous histories that the cargo was ill-chosen for its 
intended purpose, while correspondence from the Governor of Cartagena verifies the 
accuracy of the often dismissed accounts provided in pamphlets authored by Surgeon-Spy 
Herries. 
 
The lack of a coordinated or consolidated departure from New Caledonia by its surviving 
participants, including its deserters, has been a deterrent to a thorough examination of the 
roles they played in the diaspora they inadvertently created.  Though a small number did 
return to Scotland, the contributions of the majority who settled in new communities 
scattered across the Americas would be notable.  Certainly Colonel John Anderson´s future 
in New Jersey, the acquisition of an estate on Jamaica by Colonel Guthrie, and the addition 
of Alexander Stobo to the ministry in South Carolina are all significant, yet the 
undocumented lives of those who integrated into cities and villages across both Spanish 
America and British America also deserve credit for their adaptation to completely 
unintended circumstances and itineraries. 
 
An overwhelming realization acquired during the preparation of the previous chapters is 
that there remains a significant amount of material regarding the Darien expeditions that 
has yet to be brought to the historical record.  Limited as it is to two languages, this work 
self-restricts itself to that portion of manuscripts.  Nevertheless, the material available in 
English and Spanish also indicates, through its revelation of involvement by the French 
and the Portuguese, and the interest documented from Vienna, Hamburg and 
Amsterdam
593
, that pertinent material is resting in a significant array of archives, waiting to 
add to the history of Darien and the Atlantic World at the end of the seventeenth century.  
The closely observed irritation the expeditions created between Spain and England, the 
reaction of the Papacy and the eager assistance offered by France, the financial opportunity 
for merchants operating out of Caribbean and North American ports, and the shared 
concern of both Scotland and Spain involving Pacific shores all indicate that there are 
additional aspects of New Caledonia´s story, reaching far beyond the British Isles, yet to 
be discovered. 
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Caledonia:  The Declaration of the Council constituted by the Indian and African 
Company of Scotland, for the government and direction of their Colonies and 
Settlements in the Indies. 
 
The said Company pursuant to the Powers and Immunities granted unto them by His 
Majesty of Great Britain, our Sovereign Lord, with Advice and Consent of His Parliament 
of Scotland, having granted and conceded unto us and our Successors in the Government 
for all times hereafter, full Power to equip, set out, freight, and navigate our own or hired 
Ships, in warlike or other manner, from any Ports or Places in amity, or not in hostility 
with His Majesty, to any Lands, Islands, Countries, or Places in Asia, Africa, or America, 
and there to plant Colonies, build Cities, Towns or Forts, in or upon the places not 
inhabited; or in or upon any other place, by consent of the Natives or Inhabitants thereof, 
and not possest by any European Soveraign, Potentate, Prince, or State; and to provide and 
furnish the aforesaid Places, Cities, Towns, or Forts, with Magazines, Ordinance, Arms, 
Weapons, Ammunition and Stores of War; and by force of Arms to defend the same Trade, 
Navigation, Colonies, Cities, Towns, Forts, Plantations, and other Effects whatsoever; and 
likewise to make Reprizals, and to seek and take reparation of damage done by Sea or by 
Land; and to make and conclude Treaties of Peace and Commerce with Soveraign Princes, 
Estates, Rulers, Governours or Proprietors of the aforesaid Lands, Islands, Countries, or 
places in Asia, Africa or America. 
 
And reserving to themselves five per Cent, or one twentieth part of the Lands, Mines, 
Minerals, Stones of value, precious Woods, and Fishings, have further conceded and 
granted unto us, the free and absolute Right and Property in and to all Such Lands, Islands, 
Colonies, Towns, Forts and Plantations, as we shall come to establish, or possess in 
manner aforesaid; as also to all manner of Treasures, Wealth, Riches, Profits, Mines, 
Minerals and Fishings, with the whole Product and Benefit thereof, as well under as above 
the Ground, as well in Rivers and Seas as in the Lands thereunto belonging; or for or by 
reason of the same in any sort, together with the right of Government and Admiralty 
thereof; as likewise that all manner of Persons who shall settle to inhabit, or be born in any 
such Plantations, Colonies, Cities, Towns, Factories, or Places, shall be, and be reputed as 
Natives of the Kingdom of Scotland.  And generally the said Company have 
communicated unto us a Right to all the Powers, Properties and Privileges granted unto 
them by Act of Parliament, or otherwise howsoever, with Power to grant and delegate the 
same, and to permit and allow such sort of Trade, Commerce and Navigation unto the 
Plantations, Colonies, Cities, and Places of our Possession, as we shall think fit and 
convenient. 
 
And the chief Captains and Supream Leaders of the People of Darien, in compliance with 
former Agreements, having now in most kind and obliging manner received us into their 
Friendship and Country with promise and contract to assist and join in defense thereof, 
against such as shall be their or our Enemies in any time to come:  Which, besides its being 
one of the most healthful, rich, and fruitful Countries upon Earth, hath the advantage of 
being a narrow ISTHMUS, seated in the heighth of the World, between two vast Oceans, 
which renders it more convenient than any other for being the common Store-house of the 
insearchable and immense Treasures of the spacious South Seas, the door of Commerce to 
China and Japan, and, the Emporium and Staple for the Trade of both Indies. 
 
And now by virtue of the before-mentioned Powers to us given, We do here settle, and in 
the name of GOD establish Our Selves: and in Honour and for the Memory of that most 
Ancient, and Renowned Name of our Mother Kingdom, We do, and will from hence-
forward call this Country by the Name of Caledonia; and our selves, Successors; and 
Associates, by the name of Caledonians. 
 
And suitable to the Weight and greatness of the Trust reposed, and the valuable 
Opportunity now in our hands, being firmly resolved to communicate and dispose thereof 
in the most just and equal manner for increasing the Dominions and Subjects of the King 
Our Soveraign Lord, the Honour and wealth of our Country, as well as the benefit and 
advantage of those who now are, or may hereafter be concerned with us:  We do hereby 
declare, That all manner of People soever, shall from hence-forward be equally free and 
alike capable of the said Properties, Privileges, Protections, Immunities, and Rights of 
Government granted unto us; and the Merchants and Merchants Ships of all Nations, may 
freely come to and trade with us, without being liable in their Persons, Goods or Effects, to 
any manner of Capture, Confiscation, Seizure, Forfeiture, Attachment, Arrest, Restraint or 
Prohibition, for or by reason of any Embargo, breach of the Peace, Letters of Mark, or 
Reprizals, Declaration of War with any foreign Prince, Potentate or State, or upon any 
other account or pretence whatsoever. 
 
And we do hereby not only grant and concede, and declare a general and equal freedom of 
Government and Trade to those of all Nations, who shall hereafter be of or concerned with 
us; but also a full and free Liberty of Conscience in matter of Religion, so as the same be 
not understood to allow, connive at or indulge the balspheming of God´s holy Name, or 
any of his Divine Attributes; or of the unhallowing or prophaning the Sabbath Day. 
 
And finally, as the best and surest means to render any Government successful, durable, 
and happy, it shall (by the help of Almighty God be ever our constant and chiefest care that 
all our further Constitutions, Laws, and Ordinances, be consonant and agreeable to the 
Holy Scripture, right Reason, and the Examples of the wisest and justest Nations, that from 
the Truth and Rightcon . . . thereof we may reasonably hope for and expect the Blessings 
of Prosperity and Increase. 
 
 
By Order of the Council, 
Hugh Ross, Secretary 
New Edinburgh 
December 18, 1698 
 
Source:   
Anonymous, An Enquiry into the Causes of the Miscarraige of the Scots Colony at Darien 
or an Answer to a Libel Entituled `A Defence of the Scots Abdicating Darien´.  Submitted 
to the Good People of England  (Glasgow 1700), pp. 67-69. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   APPENDIX II 
 
Articles of Agreement betwixt the Council of Caledonia and Captain Ephraim 
Pilkingtoun 
 
 
WITNESSETH AS FOLLOWES. 
 
First, The said Ephraim Pilkingtoun shall have and receive for the hyre of his Shalloop 
twelve full shares. 
 
2d, The said Ephraim Pilkingtoun shall have and receive for himselfe two shares and a 
halfe. 
 
3d, The Doctor shall have one hundred pieces of eight for his chest of Medicins, and one 
share in common. 
 
4
th
, The said Council reserves to themselves one tenth part of all the loading of any prize 
taken at sea – the wounded and disabled men being first provided for, and the like share of 
all booty taken upon land. 
 
5.  If any man be disabled in the service of the voyage, in so much that he be put from 
getting a future lyvlyhood, in such case the same man shall have and receive six hundred 
peeces of eight, or six able slaves, if so much be made in the said voyage 
 
6.  All the remaining part of the profit of the voyage to be equally divided amongst the men 
belonging to the vessels, share and part alike. 
 
7.  That the said Ephraim Pilkingtoun have his choice of first, second, or third prize taken 
in the voyage in the lieu of his, not exceeding three in number. 
 
In virtue wherof, both parties have herto set their hands at Fort St Andrew the Elevinth day 
of March One thousand six hundred nynty nyn 
 
Robert Jolly, J Ephr Pilkington 
 
Source:  John H. Burton (ed.), The Darien Papers:  Being A Selection Of Original Letters 
And Official Documents Relating To The Establishment Of A Colony At Darien By The 
Company Of Scotland Trading To Africa And The Indies.  1695-1700 (Edinburgh 1849), p. 
101. 
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